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ABSTRACT 
The amygdala and hippocampus interact with thalamocortical systems to regulate 
cognitive-emotional learning, and lesions of amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, and 
cortex have different effects depending on the phase of learning when they occur. In 
examining eyeblink conditioning data, several questions arise: Why is the hippocampus 
needed for trace conditioning where there is a temporal gap between the conditioned 
stimulus offset and the onset of the unconditioned stimulus, but not needed for delay 
conditioning where stimuli temporally overlap and co-terminate? Why do amygdala 
lesions made before or immediately after training decelerate conditioning while those 
made later have no impact on conditioned behavior? Why do thalamic lesions degrade 
trace conditioning more than delay conditioning? Why do hippocampal lesions degrade 
recent learning but not temporally remote learning? Why do cortical lesions degrade 
temporally remote learning, and cause amnesia, but not recent or post-lesion learning? 
How is temporally graded amnesia caused by ablation of medial prefrontal cortex? How 
are mechanisms of motivated attention and the emergent state of consciousness linked 
  viii 
during conditioning? How do neurotrophins, notably Brain Derived Neurotrophic Factor 
(BDNF), influence memory formation and consolidation?  
A neural model, called neurotrophic START, or nSTART, proposes answers to 
these questions. The nSTART model synthesizes and extends key principles, 
mechanisms, and properties of three previously published brain models of normal 
behavior. These three models describe aspects of how the brain can learn to categorize 
objects and events in the world; how the brain can learn the emotional meanings of such 
events, notably rewarding and punishing events, through cognitive-emotional 
interactions; and how the brain can learn to adaptively time attention paid to 
motivationally important events, and when to respond to these events, in a context-
appropriate manner. The model clarifies how hippocampal adaptive timing mechanisms 
and BDNF may bridge the gap between stimuli during trace conditioning and thereby 
allow thalamocortical and corticocortical learning to take place and be consolidated. The 
simulated data arise as emergent properties of several brain regions interacting together. 
The model overcomes problems of alternative memory models, notably models wherein 
memories that are initially stored in hippocampus move to the neocortex during 
consolidation. 
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PREFACE 
Models of memory consolidation have been used for decades to explain 
challenging data about learning, memory, and consciousness. Experimental methods and 
analysis techniques supported by technological advances have resulted in three main 
models of memory consolidation: the standard unitary trace model, the multiple traces 
model, and the schemas model, a model that uses schemas, or mental models, to unite 
psychological constructs with neurobiology and thus account for accelerated top-down 
learning based on prior associations. The present work reinforces and expands the 
multiple traces and schema theories of memory consolidation by explaining and 
simulating a mechanistic model of conditioning that links learning and memory to 
resonant states of mind that occur during the experience of stimuli as well as during times 
with no external input. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
1.1. Amygdala, Hippocampus, Cortex, and Thalamus in Delay and Trace 
Conditioning 
 The roles and interactions of amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, and neocortex in 
cognitive and cognitive-emotional learning, memory, and consciousness have been 
extensively investigated through experimental and clinical studies (Berger & Thompson, 
1978; Buchel, Clark, Manns, & Squire, 2001; Dolan, Armony, & Friston, 1999; 
Frankland & Bontempi, 2005; Kim, Clark, & Thompson, 1995; Lee & Kim, 2004; Mauk 
& Thompson 1987; Moustafa et al., 2013; Port, Romano, Steinmetz, Mikhail, & 
Patterson, 1986; Powell & Churchwell, 2002; Smith, 1968; Takehara, Kawahara, & 
Krino, 2003).  This thesis develops a neural model aimed at providing a unified 
explanation of challenging data about how these brain regions interact during normal 
learning, and how lesions may cause specific learning and behavioral deficits, including 
amnesia. The model also proposes testable predictions to further test its explanations. The 
most relevant experiments use the paradigm of classical conditioning, notably delay 
conditioning and trace conditioning during the eyeblink conditioning task that is often 
used to explicate basic properties of associative learning. Earlier versions of this work 
were briefly presented in Franklin & Grossberg (2005, 2008). 
Eyeblink conditioning has been extensively studied because it has disclosed 
behavioral, neurophysiological, and anatomical information about the learning and 
memory processes related to adaptively timed, conditioned responses to aversive stimuli, 
as measured by eyelid movements in mice (Chen et al., 1995), rats (Clark, Broadbent, 
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Zola, & Squire, 2002; Neufeld & Mintz, 2001; Schmajuk, Lam, & Christiansen, 1994), 
monkeys (Clark & Zola, 1998), and humans (Clark Manns, & Squire, 2001; Solomon, et 
al, 1990), and by the timing and amplitude of the nictitating membrane reflex (NMR) 
which involves a nictitating membrane that covers the eye like an eyelid in cats (Norman 
et al., 1974), rabbits (Berger & Thompson, 1978; Christian & Thompson, 1999; 
McLaughlin, Skaggs, Churchwell, & Powell, 2002; Port, Mikhail, & Patterson, 1985; 
Port et al., 1986; Powell & Churchill 2002; Powell, Skaggs, Churchwell, & McLauglin, 
2001; Solomon, et al, 1990), and other animals. Eyeblink/NMR conditioning data will 
herein be used to help formulate and answer basic questions about associative learning, 
adaptive timing, and memory consolidation.  
Classical conditioning involves learning associations between objects or events. 
Eyeblink conditioning associates a neutral event, such as a tone or a light, called the 
conditioned stimulus (CS), with an emotionally-charged, reflex-inducing event, such as a 
puff of air to the eye or a shock to the periorbital area, called the unconditioned stimulus 
(US). Delay conditioning occurs when the stimulus events temporally overlap so that the 
subject learns to make a conditioned response (CR) in anticipation of the US (Figure 1). 
Trace conditioning involves a temporal gap between CS offset and US onset such that a 
CS-activated memory trace is required during the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) in order to 
establish an adaptively timed association between CS and US that leads to a successful 
CR (Pavlov, 1927). 
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Figure 1. Delay and trace conditioning paradigms. Eyeblink conditioning associates a neutral event, 
called the conditioned stimulus (CS), with an emotionally-charged, reflex-inducing event, called the 
unconditioned stimulus (US). Delay conditioning occurs when the stimulus events temporally overlap. 
Trace conditioning involves a temporal gap between CS offset and US onset such that a CS-activated 
memory trace is required during the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) in order to establish an association 
between CS and US. After either normal delay and trace conditioning, with a range of stimulus durations 
and ISIs a conditioned response (CR) is performed in anticipation of the US. 
Multiple brain areas are involved in eyeblink conditioning. Many of these regions, and 
their interactions, are simulated in the current neural model (Figure 2). Sensory input 
comes into the cortex, and the model, by way of the thalamus. Since the US is an aversive 
stimulus, the amygdala is involved (Buchel, Dolan, Armony, & Friston, 1999; Lee & 
Kim, 2004). The hippocampus plays a role in new learning, in general (Frankland & 
Bontempi, 2005; Kim, Clark, & Thompson, 1995; Takehara et al., 2003) and in 
adaptively timed learning, in particular (Buchel et al., 1999; Green & Woodruff-Pak, 
2000; Kaneko & Thompson, 1997; Port et al., 1986; Smith, 1968). Prefrontal cortex plays 
an essential role in the consolidation of long-term memory (Frankland & Bontempi, 
2005; Takehara, Kawahara, & Krino, 2003; Winocur, Moscovitch, & Bontempi, 2010). 
Lesions of amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, and neocortex have different effects 
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depending on the phase of learning when they occur. In particular, the model clarifies 
why the hippocampus is needed for trace conditioning, but not delay conditioning 
(Buchel  et al.,  1999; Frankland & Bontempi, 2005; Green & Woodruff-Pak, 2000; 
Kaneko & Thompson, 1997; Kim, Clark, & Thompson, 1995; Port et al., 1986; Takehara, 
Kawahara, & Krino, 2003); why thalamic lesions retard the acquisition of trace 
conditioning (Powell & Churchwell, 2002), but have less of a statistically significant 
effect on delay conditioning (Buchanan & Thompson, 1990); why early but not late 
amygdala lesions degrade both delay conditioning (Lee & Kim, 2004) and trace 
conditioning (Buchel et al., 1999); why hippocampal lesions degrade recent but not 
temporally remote trace conditioning (Kim et al., 1995; Takehara et al., 2003); why in 
delay conditioning, such lesions typically have no negative impact on CR performance 
but this finding may vary with experimental preparation and CR success criteria (Berger, 
1984; Chen et al., 1995; Lee & Kim, 2004; Port, 1985; Shors, 1992; Moustafa, et al., 
2013); why cortical lesions degrade temporally remote but not recent trace conditioning, 
but have no impact on the acquisition of delay conditioning (Frankland & Bontempi, 
2005; Kronforst-Collins & Disterhoft, 1998; McLaughlin et al., 2002; Takehara et al., 
2003; see also, Oakley & Steele Russell, 1972; Yeo, Hardiman, Moore, & Steele 
Russell,.1984); how temporally graded amnesia may be caused by ablation of medial 
prefrontal cortex after memory consolidation (Simon, Knuckley,  Churchwell, & Powell, 
2005; Takehara et al., 2003; Weible, McEchron, & Disterhoft, 2000); how attention and 
consciousness are linked during delay and trace conditioning (Clark, Manns, & Squire, 
2002; Clark & Squire, 1998); and how neurotrophins, notably Brain Derived 
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Neurotrophic Factor (BDNF), influence memory formation and consolidation (Tyler et 
al., 2002).  
The thesis does not attempt to explain all aspects of memory consolidation, 
although its proposed explanations may help to do so in future studies. One reason for 
this is that the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus, which figure prominently in model 
explanations, carry out multiple functions (see Section 5.4). The model only attempts to 
explain how an interacting subset of these mechanisms contribute to conditioning and 
memory consolidation. Not considered, for example, are sequence-dependent learning, 
which depends on prefrontal working memories and list chunking dynamics (cf. 
compatible models for such processes in Grossberg & Kazerounian, 2016; Grossberg & 
Pearson, 2008; and Silver et al., 2011), or spatial navigation, which depends upon 
entorhinal grid cells and hippocampal place cells (cf. compatible models n Grossberg & 
Pilly, 2014; Pilly & Grossberg, 2012). In addition, the model does not attempt to simulate 
properties such as hippocampal replay, which require an analysis of sequence-dependent 
learning, including spatial navigation, for their consideration, or finer neurophysiological 
properties such the role of sleep, sharp wave ripples, and spindles in memory 
consolidation (see Albouy, King, Maquet, & Doyon, 2013, for a review). 
Data about brain activity during sleep provide further evidence about learning 
processes that support memory consolidation. These processes begin with awake 
experience and may continue during sleep where there are no external stimuli that 
support learning (Kali & Dayan, 2004; Wilson, 2002). The activity generated during 
waking in hippocampus is reproduced in sequence during rapid eye movement (REM) 
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sleep with the same time scale as the original experiences, lasting tens of seconds to 
minutes (Louie & Wilson, 2001), or is compressed during slow-wave sleep (Nádasdy et 
al. 1999). During sleep, slow waves appear to be initiated in hippocampal CA3 (Siapis & 
Wilson, 1998; Wilson & McNaughton, 1994), and hippocampal place cells tend to fire as 
though neuronal states were being played back in their previously experienced sequence 
as part of the memory consolidation process (Ji & Wilson, 2007; Qin, McNaughton, 
Skaggs, & Barnes, 1997; Skaggs & McNaughton, 1996; Steriade, 1999; Wilson & 
McNaughton, 1994). Relevant to the nSTART analysis are the facts that, during sleep, 
the interaction of hippocampal cells with cortex leads to neurotrophic expression 
(Hobson & Pace-Schott, 2002; Montaggio, et al, 2404), and that similar sequential, self-
organizing ensembles that are based on experience may also exist in various areas of 
neocortex (Ji & Wilson, 2007; Maquet et al., 2000; cf. Deadwyler, West, & Robinson, 
1981; Schoenbaum & Eichenbaum, 1995).  With the nSTART analyses of 
neurotrophically-modulated memory consolidation as a function, these sleep- and 
sequence-dependent processes, which require substantial additional model development, 
can be more easily understood. 
1.2. Unifying three basic competences. 
 The model reconciles three basic behavioral competences. Its explanatory power 
is illustrated by the fact that these basic competences are self-evident, but the above data 
properties are not. All three competences involve the brain’s ability to adaptively time its 
learning processes in a task-appropriate manner.  
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First, the brain needs to pay attention quickly to salient events, both positive and 
negative. However, such a rapid attention shift to focus on a salient event creates the risk 
of prematurely responding to that event, or of prematurely resetting and shifting the 
attentional focus to a different event before the response to that event could be fully 
executed. As explained below, this fast motivated attention pathway includes the 
amygdala. These potential problems of a fast motivated attention shift are alleviated by 
the second and third competences. 
Second, the brain needs to be able to adaptively time and maintain motivated 
attention on a salient event until an appropriate response is executed. The ability to 
maintain motivated attention for an adaptively timed interval on the salient event involves 
the hippocampus, notably its dentate-CA3 region (Berger, Clark & Thompson, 1980). 
Recent data have further developed this theme through the discovery of hippocampal 
"time cells" (Kraus et al., 2013; MacDonald et al., 2011). 
Third, the brain needs to be able to adaptively time and execute an appropriate 
response to the salient event. The ability to execute an adaptively timed behavioral 
response always involves the cerebellum (Christian & Thompson, 2003; Fiala, 
Grossberg, & Bullock, 1996; Green & Woodruff-Pak, 2000; Ito, 1984). When the timing 
contingencies involve a relatively long trace conditioning ISI, or the onset of the US in 
delay conditioning is sufficiently delayed, then the hippocampus may also be required 
due to higher cognitive demand (Beylin, Gandhi, Wood, Talk, Matzel, & Shors, 2001). 
How the brain may realize these three competences, along with data supporting 
these hypotheses, has been described in articles about the Spectrally Timed Adaptive 
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Resonance Theory (START) model of Grossberg & Merrill (1992, 1996). A variation of 
the START model in which several of its mechanisms are out of balance is called the 
Imbalanced START, or iSTART, model that has been used to describe possible neural 
mechanisms of autism (Grossberg & Seidman, 2006). START mechanisms have also 
been used to offer mechanistic explanations of various symptoms of schizophrenia 
(Grossberg, 2000b). The current neurotrophic START, or nSTART, model builds upon 
this foundation. The nSTART model further develops the START model to refine the 
anatomical interactions that are described in START, to clarify how adaptively timed 
learning and memory consolidation depend upon neurotrophins acting within several of 
these anatomical interactions, and to explain using this expanded model how various 
brain lesions to areas involved in eyeblink conditioning may cause abnormal learning and 
memory. 
1.3. nSTART model of adaptively timed eyeblink conditioning. 
Neural pathways that support the conditioned eye-blink response involve various 
hierarchical and parallel circuits (Thompson, 1988; Woodruff-Pak & Steinmetz, 2000a, 
2000b). The nSTART macrocircuit (Figure 2) simulates key processes that exist within 
the wider network that supports the eyeblink response in vivo and highlights circuitry 
required for adaptively timed trace conditioning. Thalamus and sensory cortex are 
lumped into one sensory cortical representation for representational simplicity. However, 
the exposition of the model and its output pathways will require discussion of 
independent thalamocortical and corticocortical pathways. Different experimental 
manipulations affect brain regions like thalamus, cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus in 
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different ways. The nSTART model computer simulations illustrate these differences. In 
addition, it is important to explain how these several individual responses of different 
brain regions contribute to a final common path whose activity covaries with observed 
conditioned responses. Outputs from these brain regions meet directly or indirectly at the 
pontine nucleus, the final common bridge to the cerebellum which generates the CR 
(Freeman & Muckler, 2003; Kalmbach et al, 2009; Siegel et al., 2012; Woodruff-Pak & 
Disterhoft, 2007). Simulations of how the model pontine nucleus responds to the 
aggregate effect of all the other brain regions are thus also provided. The internal 
dynamics of the cerebellum are not, however, simulated in the nSTART model, but see 
Fiala, Grossberg, & Bullock (1996) for a detailed cerebellar learning model that simulates 
how Ca++ can modulate mGluR dynamics to adaptively time responses across long ISIs. 
 
Figure 2. The neurotrophic START macrocircuit. The neurotrophic START, or nSTART, macrocircuit 
is formed from parallel and interconencted networks that support both delay and trace conditioing. 
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Connectivity between thalamus and sensory cortex includes pathways from the amygdala and 
hippocampus, as does connectivity between sensory cortex and prefrontal cortex, specifically orbitofrontal 
cortex. These circuits are homologous. Hence the current model lumps the thalamus and sensory cortex 
together and simulates only sensory cortical dynamics. Multiple types of learning and neurotrophic 
mechanisms of memory consolidation cooperate in these circuits to generate adaptively timed responses. 
Connections from sensory cortex to orbitofrontal cortex support category learning. Reciprocal connections 
from orbitofrontal cortex to sensory cortex support attention. Habituative transmitter gates modulate 
excitatory conductances at all processing stages. Connections from sensory cortex to amygdala connections 
support conditioned reinforcer learning. Connections from amygdala to orbitofrontal cortex support 
incentive motivation learning. Hippocampal adaptive timing and BDNF bridge temporal delays between 
CS offset and US onset during trace conditioning acquisition. BDNF also supports long-term memory 
consolidation within sensory cortex to hippocampal pathways and from hippocampal to orbitofrontal 
pathways. The pontine nuclei serve as a final common pathway for reading-out conditioned responses. 
Cerebellar dynamics are not simulated in nSTART. Key: arrowhead = excitatory synapse; hemidisc = 
adaptive weight; square = habituative transmitter gate; square followed by a hemidisc = habituative 
transmitter gate followed by an adaptive weight. 
 
1.4. Normal and amnesic delay conditioning and trace conditioning. 
The ability to associatively learn what subset of earlier events predicts, or causes, 
later consequences, and what event combinations are not predictive, is a critical survival 
competence in normal adaptive behavior. In this section, data are highlighted that 
describe the differences between the normal and abnormal acquisition and retention of 
associative learning relative to the specific role of interactions among the processing 
areas in nSTART’s functional anatomy; notably, interactions between sensory cortex and 
thalamus, prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus. See the Methods, Section 2, for 
an exposition of design principles and heuristic modeling concepts that go into the 
nSTART model; the Model Description, Section 3, for a non-technical exposition of the 
model processes and their interactions; the Results, Section 4, for model simulations of 
data; the Discussion, Section 5, for a general summary; and the Mathematical Equations 
and Parameters, Appendix A, for a complete summary of the model mechanisms.   
Lesion data show that delay conditioning requires the cerebellum but does not 
need hippocampus to acquire an adaptively timed conditioned response. Studies of 
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hippocampal lesions in rats, rabbits and humans reveal that, if a lesion occurs before 
delay conditioning (Daum, Channon & Canavar, 1989; Ivkovich & Stanton, 2001; 
Schmaltz & Theios, 1972; Solomon & Moore, 1975; Weiskrantz & Warrington, 1979;), 
or any time after delay conditioning (Akase, Alkon & Disterhoft, 1989; Orr & Berger, 
1985; Port et al., 1986), the subject can still acquire or retain a CR. Depending on the 
performance criteria, sometimes the acquisition is reported as facilitated (Berger, 1984; 
Chen, 1995; Lee & Kim, 2004; Port, 1985; Shors, 1992). 
Lee & Kim (2004) presented EMG data showing that amygdala lesions in rats 
decelerated delay conditioning if made prior to training, but not if made post-training, 
while hippocampal lesions accelerated delay conditioning if made prior to training. They 
found a time-limited role of the amygdala similar to the time-limited role of the 
hippocampus: the amygdala is more active during early acquisition than later. In addition, 
they found that the amygdala without the hippocampus is not sufficient for trace 
conditioning. During fMRI studies of human trace conditioning, Buchel et al. (1999) also 
found decreases of amygdala responses over time. They cited other fMRI studies that 
found robust hippocampal activity in trace conditioning, but not delay conditioning, to 
underscore their hypothesis that, while amygdala may contribute to trace conditioning, 
the hippocampus is required. Chau & Galvez (2012) discussed the likelihood of the same 
time-limited involvement of amygdala in trace eyeblink conditioning. 
Holland and Gallagher (1999) reviewed literature describing the role of the 
amygdala as either modulatory or required, depending on specific connections with other 
brain systems, for normal “functions often characterized as attention, reinforcement and 
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representation” (p. 66). Aggleton and Saunders (2000) described the amygdala in terms 
of four functional systems (accessory olfactory, main olfactory, autonomic, and 
frontotemporal). In the macaque monkey, 10 interconnected cytotonic areas were defined 
within the amygdala, with 15 types of cortical inputs and 17 types of cortical projections, 
and 22 types of subcortical inputs from the amygdala and 15 types of subcortical 
projections to the amygdala (their Figures 1.2-1.7, pp. 4-9). Given this complexity, the 
data are mixed about whether amygdala is required for acquisition, or retention after 
consolidation, depending on the cause (cytotoxin, acid or electronic burning, cutting), 
target area, and degree of lesion, as well as the strength of the US, learning paradigm, and 
specific task (Blair, Sotres-Bayon,  Moiya, & LeDoux, 2005; Cahill & McGaugh, 1990; 
Everitt, Cardinal, Hall, Parkinson, & Robbins, 2000; Kapp, Wilson, Pascoe, Supple, & 
Whalen, 1990; Killcross, Everitt, & Robbins, 1997; Lehmann, Treit, & Parent, 2000; 
Medina, Repa, Mauk & LeDoux, 2002; Neufeld & Mintz, 2001; Oswald. Maddox, 
Tisdale, & Powell, 2010; Vazdarjanova & McGaugh, 1998). In fact, "...aversive eyeblink 
conditioning...survives lesions of either the central or basolateral parts of the amygdala" 
(Lavond, 1993). Additionally, such lesions have been found not to prevent Pavlovian 
appetitive conditioning or other types of appetitively based learning (McGaugh, 2002, 
p.456).  
These inconsistencies among the data may exist due to the contributions from 
multiple pathways that support emotion. For example, within the MOTIVATOR model 
extension of the CogEM model (see Section 2.3), hypothalamic and related internal 
homeostatic and drive circuits may function without amygdala (Dranias et al., 2008). The 
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nSTART model only incorporates an afferent cortical connection from the amygdala to 
represent incentive motivational learning signals. Within the cortex, however, the 
excitatory inputs from both amygdala and hippocampus are modulated by the strength of 
thalamocortical signals. 
A clear pattern emerges from comparing various data that disclose essential 
functions of hippocampus, functions that are qualititatively simulated in nSTART. 
Hippocampus has been studied with regard to the acquisition of trace eye blink 
conditioning, and the adaptive timing of conditioned responses (Berger, Laham, & 
Thompson, 1980; Mauk & Ruiz, 1992; Schmaltz & Theios, 1972; Sears & Steinmetz, 
1990; Woodruff-Pak, 1993; Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft, 2007). If a hippocampal lesion 
or other system disruption occurs before trace conditioning acquisition (Ivkovich & 
Stanton, 2001; Kaneko & Thompson, 1997; Weiss & Thompson, 1991b; Woodruff-Pak, 
2001), or shortly thereafter (Kim et al., 1995; Moyer, Deyo, & Disterhoft, 1990; 
Takehara et al., 2003), the CR is not obtained or retained. Trace conditioning is impaired 
by pre-acquisition hippocampal lesions created during laboratory experimentation on 
animals (Anagnostaras, Maren, & Fanselow, 1999; Berry & Thompson, 1979; Garrud et 
al., 1984; James, Hardiman, & Yeo, 1987; Kim et al., 1995; Orr & Berger, 1985; 
Schmajuk, Lam, & Christiansen, 1994; Schmaltz & Theios, 1972; Solomon & Moore, 
1975), and in humans with amnesia (Clark & Squire, 1998; Gabrieli et al., 1995; 
McGlinchey-Berroth, Carrillo, Gabrieli, Brawn, & Disterhoft, 1997), Alzheimer’s 
disease, or age-related deficits (Little, Lipsitt, & Rovee-Collier, 1984; Solomon et al., 
1990; Weiss & Thompson, 1991a; Woodruf-Pak, 2001). 
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The data show that, during trace conditioning, there is successful post-acquisition 
performance of the CR only if the hippocampal lesion occurs after a critical period of 
hippocampal support of memory consolidation within neocortex (Kim et al., 1995; 
Takashima, et al., 2009; Takehara, et al., 2003). Data from in vitro cell preparations also 
support the time-limited role of hippocampus in new learning that is simulated in 
nSTART: activity in hippocampal CA1 and CA3 pyramidal neurons peaked 24 hours 
after conditioning was completed and decayed back to baseline within 14 days 
(Thompson, Moyer, & Disterhoft, 1996). The effect of early versus late hippocampal 
lesions is challenging to explain since no overt training occurs after conditioning during 
the period before hippocampal ablation.  
After consolidation due to hippocampal involvement is accomplished, 
thalamocortical signals in conjunction with the cerebellum determine the timed execution 
of the CR during performance (Gabreil, Sparenborg, & Stolar, 1987; Sosina, 1992). 
Indeed, “…there are two memory circuitries for trace conditioning. One involves the 
hippocampus and the cerebellum and mediates recently acquired memory; the other 
involves the mPFC and the cerebellum and mediates remotely acquired memory” 
(Takehara, et al., 2003, p. 9904; see also Berger, Weikart, Basset & Orr, 1986; O'Reilly, 
et al., 2010). nSTART qualitatively models these data as follows: after the consolidation 
of memory, when there is no need for hippocampus, nSTART models the cortical 
connections to the pontine nuclei that serve to elicit conditioned responses by way of the 
cerebellum (Kalmback, Chitwood, & Mauk, 2012; Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft, 2007).  
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Based on the extent and timing of hippocampal damage, learning impairments 
range from needing more training trials than normal in order to learn successfully, 
through persistent response-timing difficulties, to the inability to learn and form new 
memories. The nSTART model explains the need for the hippocampus during trace 
conditioning in terms of how the hippocampus supports strengthening of partially 
conditioned thalamocortical and corticocortical connections during memory 
consolidation (see Figure 2). The hippocampus has this ability because it includes circuits 
that can bridge the temporal gaps between CS and US during trace conditioning, unlike 
the amygdala, and can learn to adaptively time these temporal gaps in its responses, as 
originally simulated in the START model (Grossberg & Merrill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg 
& Schmajuk, 1989). The current nSTART model extends this analysis using mechanisms 
of endogenous hippocampal activation and BDNF modulation (see Section 1.6) to 
explain the time-limited role of the hippocampus in terms of its support of the 
consolidation of new learning into long-term memories. This hypothesis is elaborated and 
contrasted with alternative models of memory consolidation in Section 5.2. 
1.5. Conditioning and consciousness. 
Several studies of humans have described a link between consciousness and 
conditioning.  Early work interpreted conscious awareness as another class of conditioned 
responses (Grant, 1973; Hilgard, Campbell, & Sears, 1937; Kimble, 1962; McAllister & 
McAllister, 1958).  More recently, it was found that, while amnesic patients with 
hippocampal damage acquired delay conditioning at a normal rate, they failed to acquire 
trace conditioning (Clark & Squire, 1998). These experimenters postulated that normal 
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humans acquire trace conditioning because they have intact declarative or episodic 
memory and, therefore, can demonstrate conscious knowledge of a temporal relationship 
between CS and US: “trace conditioning requires the acquisition and retention of 
conscious knowledge” (p. 79). They did not, however, discuss mechanisms underlying 
this ability, save mentioning that the neocortex probably represents temporal 
relationships between stimuli and “would require the hippocampus and related structures 
to work conjointly with the neocortex” (p.79).  
Other studies have also demonstrated a link between consciousness and 
conditioning (Gabrieli et al., 1995; McGlinchey-Berroth, Brawn, & Disterhoft, 1999; 
McGlinchey-Berroth et al., 1997) and described an essential role for awareness in 
declarative learning, but no necessary role in non-declarative or procedural learning, as 
illustrated by experimental findings related to trace and delay conditioning, respectively 
(Manns, Clark, & Squire, 2000; Papka, Ivry, & Woodruff-Pak, 1997). For example, trace 
conditioning is facilitated by conscious awareness in normal control subjects while delay 
conditioning is not, whereas amnesics with bilateral hippocampal lesions perform at a 
success rate similar to unaware controls for both delay and trace conditioning (Clark, 
Manns, & Squire, 2001). Amnesics were found to be unaware of experimental 
contingencies, and poor performers on trace conditioning (Clark & Squire, 1998). Thus, 
the link between adaptive timing, attention, awareness, and consciousness has been 
experimentally established within the trace conditioning paradigm. The nSTART model 
traces the link between consciousness and conditioning to the role of hippocampus in 
supporting a sustained cognitive-emotional resonance that underlies motivated attention, 
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consolidation of long-term memory, core consciousness, and "the feeling of what 
happens" (Damasio, 1999). 
1.6. BDNF in memory formation and consolidation. 
Memory consolidation, a process that supports an enduring memory of new 
learning, has been extensively studied: (McGaugh, 2000, 2002; Mehta, 2007; Nadel & 
Bohbot, 2001; Takehara, Kawahara, & Krino, 2003; Squire & Alverez, 1995; Takashima, 
2009; Thompson, Moyer, & Disterhoft, 1996; Tse et al., 2007; Tyler, et al. 2002). These 
data show time-limited involvement of the limbic system, and long-term involvement of 
neocortex. The question of what sort of process occurs during the period that actively 
strengthens memory, even when there is no explicit practice, has been linked to the action 
of neurotrophins (Zang, et al., 2007), especially Brain Derived Neurotrophic Factor, or 
BDNF, a complex class of proteins that have important effects on learning and memory 
(Heldt, Stanek, Chhatwal, & Ressler, 2007; Hu & Russek, 2008; Monteggia et al., 2004; 
Purves, 1988; Rattiner, Davis, & Ressler, 2005; Schuman, 1999; Thoenen, 1995; Tyler, 
Alonso, Bramham, & Pozzo-Miller, 2002). Postsynaptically, neurotrophins enhance 
responsiveness of target synapses (Kang & Schuman, 1995; Kohara, Kitamura, 
Morishima, & Tsumoto, 2001) and allow for quicker processing (Knipper et al., 1993; 
Lessman, 1998). Presynaptically, they act as retrograde messengers (Davis & Murphy, 
1994; Ganguly, Koss, & Poo, 2000) coming from a target cell population back to 
excitatory source cells and increasing the flow of transmitter from the source cell 
population to generate a positive feedback loop between the source and the target cells 
(Schinder, Berninger, & Poo, 2000), as also occurs in some neural models of learning and 
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memory search; e.g., Carpenter & Grossberg (1990). BDNF has also been interpreted as 
an essential component of long-term potentiation (LTP) in normal cell processing (Chen, 
Kolbeck, Barde, Bonhoeffer, & Kossel, 1999; Korte et al., 1995; Phillips et al., 1990). 
The functional involvement of existing BDNF receptors is critical in early LTP (up to 1 
hour) during the acquisition phase of learning the CR, whereas continued activation of 
the slowly decaying late phase LTP signal (3+ hours) requires new protein synthesis and 
gene expression. Rossato et al. (2009) have shown that hippocampal dopamine and the 
ventral tegmental area provide a temporally sensitive trigger for the expression of BDNF 
that is essential for long-term consolidation of memory related to reinforcement learning. 
The BDNF response to a particular stimulus event may vary from microseconds 
(initial acquisition) to several days or weeks (long-term memory consolidation); thus, 
neurotrophins have a role whether the phase of learning is one of initial synaptic 
enhancement or long-term memory consolidation (Kang, Welcher, Shelton, & Schuman, 
1997; Schuman, 1999; Singer, 1999). Furthermore, BDNF blockade shows that BDNF is 
essential for memory development at different phases of memory formation (Kang et al., 
1997), and during all ages of an individual (Cabelli, Hohn, & Shatz, 1995; Tokuka, Saito, 
Yorifugi, Kishimoto, & Hisanaga, 2000). As nSTART qualitatively simulates, 
neurotrophins are thus required for both the initial acquisition of a memory, as well as for 
its ongoing maintenance as memory consolidates.  
BDNF is heavily expressed in the hippocampus as well as in the neocortex, where 
neurotrophins figure largely in activity-dependent development and plasticity, not only to 
build new bridges as needed, but also to inhibit and dismantle old synaptic bridges. A 
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process of competition among axons during the development of nerve connections 
(Bonhoffer, 1996; Tucker, Meyer, & Barde, 2001; van Ooyen & Willshaw, 1999; see 
review in Tyler et al., 2002), exists both in young and mature animals (Phillips, Hains, 
Laramee, Rosenthal, & Winslow, 1990). BDNF also maintains cortical circuitry for long-
term memory that may be shaped by various BDNF-independent factors during and after 
consolidation (Gorski, Zeiler, Tamowski, & Jones, 2003).  
The nSTART model hypothesizes how BDNF may amplify and temporally 
extend activity-based signals within the hippocampus and the neocortex that facilitate 
endogenous strengthening of memory without further explicit learning. In particular, 
memory consolidation may be mechanistically achieved by means of a sustained cascade 
of BDNF expression beginning in the hippocampus and spreading to the cortex (Buzsáki 
& Chrobak, 2005; Cousens & Otto, 1998; Hobson & Pace-Schott, 2002; Monteggia, et 
al., 2004; Nádasdy, Hirase, Czurkó, Csicsvari, & Buzsáki, 1999; Smythe, Colom, & 
Bland, 1992; Staubli & Lynch, 1987; Vertes, Hoover, & Di Prisco, 2004), which is 
modeled in nSTART by the maintained activity level of hippocampal and cortical BDNF 
after conditioning trials end (see Figure 2).  
Hippocampal bursting activity is not the only bursting activity that drives 
consolidation. Long-term activity-dependent consolidation of new learning is also 
supported by the synchronization of thalamocortical interactions in response to thalamic 
or cortical inputs (Llinas, Ribary, Joliot, & Wang, 1994; Steriade, 1999). Thalamic 
bursting neurons may lead to synaptic modifications in cortex, and cortex can in turn 
influence thalamic oscillations (Sherman & Guillery, 2003; Steriade, 1999). 
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Thalamocortical resonance has been described as a basis for temporal binding and 
consciousness in increasingly specific models over the years. These models simulate how 
specific and nonspecific thalamic nuclei interact with the reticular nucleus and multiple 
stages of laminar cortical circuitry (Buzsáki, Llinás, Singer, Berthoz, & Christen, 1994; 
Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001; Grossberg, 1980, 2003, 2007; Grossberg & Versace, 2008; 
Pollen, 1999). nSTART qualitatively explains consolidation without including bursting 
phenomena, although oscillatory dynamics of this kind arise naturally in finer spiking 
versions of rate-based models such as nSTART (Grossberg & Versace, 2008; Palma, 
Grossberg, & Versace, 2012a, 2012b).  
The nSTART model focuses on amygdala and hippocampal interactions with 
thalamus and neocortex during conditioning (Figure 2). The model proposes that the 
hippocampus supports thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical category learning that 
becomes well established during memory consolidation through its endogenous 
(bursting) activity (Siapas, Lubenov, & Wilson, 2005; Sosina, 1993) that is supported by 
neurotrophin mediators (Destexhe, Contreras & Steriade, 1998). nSTART proposes that 
thalamo-cortical sustained activity is maintained through the combination of two 
mechanisms: the level of cortical BDNF activity, and the strength of the learned thalamo-
cortical adaptive weights, or long-term memory (LTM) traces that were strengthened by 
the memory consolidation process. This proposal is consistent with trace conditioning 
data showing that, after consolidation, when the hippocampus is no longer required for 
performance of CRs, the medial prefrontal cortex takes on a critical role for performance 
of the CR in reaction to the associated thalamic sensory input, Here, the etiology of 
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retrograde amnesia is understood as a failure to retain memory, rather than by a failure of 
adaptive timing (Takehara et al., 2003) 
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CHAPTER 2. Methods 
2.1. From CogEM to nSTART. 
The nSTART model synthesizes and extends key principles, mechanisms, and 
properties of three previously published brain models of conditioning and behavior. 
These three models describe aspects of:  
(1) how the brain learns to categorize objects and events in the world (Carpenter 
& Grossberg, 1987, 1991, 1993; Grossberg, 1980, 1982b, 1984a, 1987, 1999b, 2013; 
Raizada & Grossberg, 2003); this is described within Adaptive Resonance Theory, or 
ART;  
(2) how the brain learns the emotional meanings of such events through cognitive-
emotional interactions, notably rewarding and punishing experiences, and how the brain 
determines which events are motivationally predictive, as during attentional blocking and 
unblocking (Dranias, Grossberg, & Bullock, 2008; Grossberg, 1971, 1972a, 1972b, 1980, 
1982, 1984, 2000b; Grossberg, Bullock, & Dranias, 2008; Grossberg & Gutowski, 1987; 
Grossberg & Levine, 1987; Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1987); this is described within the 
Cognitive-Emotional-Motor, or CogEM, model; and  
(3) how the brain learns to adaptively time the attention that is paid to 
motivationally important events, and when to respond to these events, in a context-
appropriate manner (Fiala, Grossberg, & Bullock, 1996; Grossberg & Merrill, 1992, 
1996; Grossberg & Paine, 2000; Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1989); this is described within 
the START model.  
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All three component models have been mathematically and computationally 
characterized elsewhere in order to explain behavioral and brain data about normal and 
abnormal behaviors. The principles and mechanisms that these models employ have thus 
been independently validated through their ability to explain a wide range of data. 
nSTART builds on this foundation to explain data about conditioning and memory 
consolidation, as it is affected by early and late amygdala, hippocampal, and cortical 
lesions, as well as BDNF expression in hippocampus and cortex. The exposition in this 
section heuristically states the main modeling concepts and mechanisms before building 
upon them to mathematically realize the current model advances and synthesis.  
The simulated data properties emerge from interactions of several brain regions 
whose processes evolve on multiple time scales, interacting in multiple nonlinear 
feedback loops. In order to simulate these data, the model incorporates only those 
network interactions that are rate-limiting in generating the targeted data. More detailed 
models of the relevant brain regions, that are consistent with the model interactions 
simulated herein, are described below, and provide a guide to future studies aimed at 
incorporating a broader range of functional competences.  
2.2. Adaptive Resonance Theory. 
The first model upon which nSTART builds is called Adaptive Resonance 
Theory, or ART. ART is reviewed because a key process in nSTART is a form of 
category learning, and also because nSTART simulates a cognitive-emotional resonance 
that is essential for explaining its targeted data. ART proposes how the brain can rapidly 
learn to attend, recognize, and predict new objects and events without catastrophically 
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forgetting memories of previously learned objects and events. This is accomplished 
through an attentive matching process between the feature patterns that are created by 
stimulus-driven bottom-up adaptive filters, and learned top-down expectations (Figure 3). 
The top-down expectations, acting by themselves, can also prime the brain to anticipate 
future bottom-up feature patterns with which they will be matched.  
 
Figure 3. The ART1 memory search and learning cycle. ART searches for and learns a new recognition 
category using cycles of match-induced resonance and mismatch-induced reset. Active patterns are shaded 
gray; inhibited patterns are not shaded. (a) Input pattern I is instated across feature detectors at level F1 as 
an activity pattern X, at the same time that it generates excitatory signals to the orienting system A with a 
gain that is called the vigilance parameter. Activity pattern X generates inhibitory signals to the orienting 
system A as it generates a bottom-up input pattern S to the category level F2. A dynamic balance within A 
between excitatory inputs from I and inhibitory inputs from S keeps S quiet. The bottom-up signals in S are 
multiplied by learned adaptive weights to form the input pattern T to F2. The inputs T are contrast-enhanced 
and normalized within F2  by recurrent lateral inhibitory signals that obey the membrane equations of 
neurophysiology, otherwise called shunting interactions. In a winner-take-all competition, selection and 
activation is reserved for a small number of cells within F2  that receive the largest inputs. The chosen cells 
represent the category Y that codes for the feature pattern at F1. (b) The category activity Y generates top-
down signals U that are multiplied by adaptive weights to form a prototype, or critical feature pattern, V 
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that encodes the expectation that the active F2 category has learned for what feature pattern to expect at F1. 
This top-down expectation input V is added at F1 cells. If V mismatches I at F1, then a new STM activity 
pattern X* (gray area), is selected at cells where the patterns match well enough. In other words, X* is 
active at I features that are confirmed by V. Mismatched features (white area) are inhibited. When X 
changes to X*, total inhibition decreases from F1 to A. (c) If inhibition decreases sufficiently, A releases a 
nonspecific arousal burst to F2; that is, “novel events are arousing”. Within the orienting system A, the 
vigilance parameter represented in a triangle) determines how bad a match will be tolerated before a 
burst of nonspecific arousal is triggered. This arousal burst triggers a memory search for a better-matching 
winner-take-all category, as follows: Arousal resets F2 by inhibiting Y. (d) After Y is inhibited, X is 
reinstated and Y stays inhibited as X activates a different category, that is represented by a different winner-
take-all activity pattern Y*, at  F2.. Search continues until a better matching, or novel, category is selected. 
When search ends, an attentive resonance triggers learning of the attended data in adaptive weights within 
both the bottom-up and top-down pathways. As learning stabilizes, inputs I can activate their globally best-
matching categories directly through the adaptive filter, without activating the orienting system. [Adapted 
with permission from Carpenter and Grossberg (1987).] 
 
In nSTART, it is assumed that each CS and US is familiar, and has already undergone 
object category learning before the current simulations begin. The CS and US inputs to 
the sensory cortex in the nSTART model macrocircuit are assumed to be processed as 
learned categories (Figure 2). nSTART models a second-stage of category learning 
between sensory cortex and orbitofrontal cortex. In the brain, this stage goes from an 
object category to an object-value category. The learning in this pathway embodies a 
simplified form of category learning. In general, each object category can get associated 
with more than one object-value category, so can learn to generate different responses 
when different value categories are active. These adaptive connections are thus one-to-
many. Conceptually, the two stages of learning, at the object category stage, and the 
object-value category stage, can be interpreted as a coordinated category learning process 
through which the prefrontal cortex, notably the orbitofrontal cortex, categorizes objects 
and their motivational significance (Barbas, 1995, 2007; Freedman, Riesenhuber, 
Poggio, & Miller, 2002; Meyers, et al., 2008; Rolls, 1998, 2000). nSTART simulates 
such conditioning with only a single drive, and one-to-one connections, so that 
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strengthening of the connection from object category to object-value category represents 
a simplified form of this category learning process. Distributed ART, or dART, 
(Carpenter, 1994, 1997) shows how ART can be generalized to learn distributed object 
categories. 
As in other ART models, a top-down expectation pathway also exists from 
orbitofrontal cortex to sensory cortex. It provides top-down attentive modulation of 
sensory cortical activity, and is part of the cortico-cortico-amygdalar-hippocampal 
resonance that develops in the model during learning. This cognitive-emotional 
resonance, which plays a key role in the current model and its simulations, as well as its 
precursors in the START and iSTART models, is the main reason that nSTART is 
considered to be part of the family of ART models. Indeed, Grossberg (2016) 
summarizes an emerging classification of the brain resonances that support conscious 
seeing, hearing, knowing, and feeling that includes this cognitive-emotional resonance. 
nSTART explains how this cognitive-emotional resonance is sustained through time by 
adaptively-timed hippocampal feedback signals (Figure 2). This hippocampal feedback 
plays a critical role in the model's explanation of data about memory consolidation, and 
its ability to explain how the brain bridges the temporal gap between stimuli that occurs 
in experimental paradigms like trace conditioning. Finally, the role of the hippocampus in 
sustaining the cognitive-emotional resonances helps to explain the experimentally 
reported link between conditioning and consciousness (Clark & Squire, 1998).   
In a complete ART model, when a sufficiently good match occurs between the 
bottom-up input pattern and the top-down expectation, the system locks into a resonant 
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state that focuses attention on the matched features and drives learning to incorporate 
them into the learned category; hence the term adaptive resonance. ART also predicts 
that all conscious states are resonant states, and the Grossberg (2016) classification of 
resonances contributes to clarifying their diverse functions throughout the brain. Such an 
adaptive resonance is one of the key mechanisms whereby ART ensures that memories 
are dynamically buffered against catastrophic forgetting. In addition to the attentive 
resonant state itself, a hypothesis testing, or memory search, process in response to 
unexpected events helps to discover predictive recognition categories in response to 
unexpected events. This hypothesis testing cycle is also not incorporated into nSTART, 
but is compatible with the nSTART mechanisms that are simulated. These mechanisms 
are summarized here for completeness.  
One critical mechanism that is included is the matching of bottom-up input 
patterns by learned top-down expectations. As noted above, a simplified form of this 
matching process is included in nSTART in order to explain the cognitive-emotional 
resonances that support memory consolidation and the link between conditioning and 
consciousness. Hypothesis testing, or memory search, is not simulated because it is 
assumed that, after object category learning of CS and US inputs is complete, unexpected 
events are minimized in the kinds of highly controlled delay and trace conditioning 
experiments that are the focus of the current study. 
Another mechanism, also not included in nSTART, regulates how coarse or fine 
matches need to be to elicit a resonance. The degree of match between bottom-up and 
top-down signal patterns that is required for resonance, sustained attention, and learning 
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to occur is set by a vigilance parameter (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987) (see  in Figure 
3a). Vigilance may be increased by predictive errors, and controls whether a particular 
learned category will represent concrete information, such as a particular view of a 
particular face, or abstract information, such as the fact that everyone has a face. Low 
vigilance allows the learning of general and abstract recognition categories, whereas high 
vigilance forces the learning of specific and concrete categories. Given that the inputs to 
the nSTART model are just simple CS and US stimuli, the current simulations do not 
need to vary the degree of abstractness of the categories to be learned, so vigilance 
control has been omitted for simplicity. 
A big enough mismatch designates that the selected category does not represent 
the input data well enough, and drives a memory search, or hypothesis testing, for a 
category that can better represent the input data. In a more complete nSTART model, 
hypothesis testing would enable the learning and stable memory of large numbers of 
thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical recognition categories. Such a hypothesis-testing 
process includes a novelty-sensitive orienting system, which is predicted to include both 
the nonspecific thalamus and the hippocampus (Figure 3c; Carpenter & Grossberg, 1993; 
Grossberg, 2013; Grossberg & Versace, 2008). In nSTART, the model hippocampus 
includes the crucial process of adaptively timed learning that can bridge temporal gaps of 
hundreds of milliseconds to support trace conditioning and memory consolidation. In a 
more general nSTART model that is capable of self-stabilizing its learned memories, 
hippocampus would also be involved in the memory search process.  
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In an ART model that includes memory search, when a mismatch occurs, the 
orienting system is activated and generates nonspecific arousal signals back to the 
attentional system that carries out the category learning. These arousal signals rapidly 
reset the active recognition categories that have been reading out the poorly matching 
top-down expectations (Figure 3c). The cause of the mismatch is hereby removed, 
thereby freeing the bottom-up filter to activate a different recognition category (Figure 
3d). This cycle of mismatch, arousal, and reset can repeat, thereby initiating a memory 
search, or hypothesis testing cycle, for a better-matching category. If no adequate match 
with a recognition category exists, say because the bottom-up input represents an 
unfamiliar experience, then the search process automatically activates an as yet 
uncommitted population of cells, with which to learn a new recognition category to 
represent the novel information.  
 All the learning and search processes that ART predicted have received support 
from behavioral, ERP, anatomical, neurophysiological, and/or neuropharmacological 
data, which are reviewed in the ART articles listed above. See, in particular, Grossberg 
(2013). Indeed, the role of hippocampus in novelty detection has been known for many 
years (Deadwyler, West, & Lynch, 1979; Deadwyler et al., 1981; Vinogradova, 1975). In 
particular, the hippocampal CA1 and CA3 regions have been shown to be involved in a 
process of comparison between a prior conditioned stimulus and a current stimulus by 
rats in a non-spatial auditory task, the continuous non-matching-to-sample task (Sakurai, 
1990).  During performance of the task, single unit activity was recorded from several 
areas: CA1 and CA3, dentate gyrus (DG), entorhinal cortex, subicular complex, motor 
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cortex (MC), prefrontal cortex and dorsomedial thalamus.  Go and No-Go responses 
indicated, respectively, whether the current tone was perceived as the same as (match) or 
different from (nonmatch) the preceding tone.  Since about half of the units from the MC, 
CA1, CA3, and DG had increments of activity immediately prior to a Go response, these 
regions were implicated in motor or decisional aspects of making a match response.  On 
non-match trials, units were also found in CA1 and CA3 with activity correlated to a 
correct No-Go response. Corroborating the function of the hippocampus in recognition 
memory, but not in storing the memories themselves, Otto & Eichenbaum (1992) 
reported that CA1 cells compare cortical representations of current perceptual processes 
to previous representations stored in parahippocampal and neocortical structures to detect 
mismatch in an odor-guided task. They noted that “the hippocampus maintains neither 
active nor passive memory representations” (p. 332). 
Several articles have proposed finer anatomical and neuropharmacological details 
about how vigilance control may be achieved. Grossberg & Versace (2008) have 
proposed how the nonspecific thalamus can be activated by novel sensory events and can 
thereby trigger hypothesis testing. In their Synchronous Matching ART (SMART) model, 
a predictive error can lead to a mismatch within the nucleus basalis of Meynert, which 
releases acetylcholine broadly in neocortex, leading to an increase in vigilance and a 
memory search for a better matching category. Palma, Grossberg, & Versace (2013a, 
2013b) further model how acetylcholine-modulated processes work, and explain a wide 
range of data that support basic properties of vigilance control by using their modeling 
synthesis. 
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2.3. CogEM and MOTIVATOR models. 
Recognition categories can be activated when objects are experienced, but do not 
reflect the emotional or motivational value of these objects. Such a recognition category 
can, however, be associated through reinforcement learning with one or more drive 
representations, which are brain sites that represent internal drive states and emotions. 
Activation of a drive representation by a recognition category can trigger emotional 
reactions and incentive motivational feedback to recognition categories, thereby 
amplifying valued recognition categories with motivated attention as part of a cognitive-
emotional resonance between inferotemporal cortex, amygdala, and orbitofrontal cortex. 
When a recognition category is chosen in this way, it can trigger choice and release of 
actions that realize valued goals in a context-sensitive way.  
Such internal drive states and motivational decisions are incorporated into 
nSTART using mechanisms from the second model, called the Cognitive-Emotional-
Motor, or CogEM, model. CogEM simulates the learning of cognitive-emotional 
associations, notably associations that link external objects and events in the world to 
internal feelings and emotions that give these objects and events value (Figure 3a and 
3b). These emotions also activate the motivational pathways that energize actions aimed 
at acquiring or manipulating objects or events to satisfy them.  
The CogEM model clarifies interactions between two types of homologous 
circuits: one circuit includes interactions between thalamus, sensory cortex, and 
amygdala; the other circuit includes interactions between sensory cortex, orbitofrontal 
cortex, and amygdala. The nSTART model (Figure 2) simulates cortico-cortico-
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amygdalar interactions. At the present level of simplification, the same activation and 
learning dynamics could also simulate interactions between thalamus, sensory cortices, 
and the amygdala. In particular, the CogEM model proposes how emotional centers of 
the brain, such as the amygdala, interact with sensory and prefrontal cortices—notably 
orbitofrontal cortex—to generate affective states, attend to motivationally salient sensory 
events, and elicit motivated behaviors. Neurophysiological data provide increasing 
support for the predicted role of interactions between amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex 
in focusing motivated attention on cell populations that can select learned responses 
which have previously succeeded in acquiring valued goal objects (Baxter et al., 2000; 
Rolls, 1998, 2000; Schoenbaum, Setlow, Saddoris, & Gallagher, 2003). 
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Figure 4. Cognitive-Emotional-Motor (CogEM) Models. (a) The simplest Cognitive-Emotional-Motor 
(CogEM) model: Three types of interacting representations (sensory, S; drive, D; and motor, M) that 
control three types of learning (conditioned reinforcer, incentive motivational, and motor) help to explain 
many reinforcement learning data. (b) In order to work well, a sensory representation S must have (at least) 
two successive stages, S(1) and S(2), so that sensory events cannot release actions that are motivationally 
inappropriate. The two successive stages of a sensory representation S are interpreted to be in the 
appropriate sensory cortex (corresponds to S(1)) and the prefrontal cortex, notably the orbitofrontal cortex 
(corresponds to S(2)). As indicated in Figure 4a, the prefrontal stage requires motivational support from a 
drive representation D such as amygdala, to be fully effective, in the form of feedback from the incentive 
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motivational learning pathway. Amydgala inputs to prefrontal cortex cause feedback from prefrontal cortex 
to sensory cortex that selectively amplifies and focuses attention upon motivationally relevant sensory 
events, and thereby “attentionally blocks” irrelevant cues. [Reprinted with permission from Grossberg and 
Seidman (2006).] (c) The amygdala and basal ganglia work together, embodying complementary functions, 
to provide motivational support, focus attention, and release contextually appropriate actions to achieve 
valued goals. For example, the basal ganglia substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) releases Now Print 
learning signals in response to unexpected rewards or punishments, whereas the amygdala generates 
incentive motivational signals that support the attainment of expected valued goal objects. The 
MOTIVATOR model circuit diagram shows cognitive-emotional interactions between higher-order sensory 
cortices that support object categories and an evaluative neuraxis composed of the hypothalamus, 
amygdala, basal ganglia, and orbitofrontal cortex that supports object-value categories. [Reprinted with 
permission from Dranias et al. (2008).] 
 
In ART, resonant states can develop within sensory and cognitive feedback loops. 
Resonance can also occur within CogEM circuits between sensory and cognitive 
representations of the external world and emotional representations of what is valued by 
the individual. Activating the (sensory cortex)-(amygdala)-(prefrontal cortex) feedback 
loop between cognitive and emotional centers is predicted to generate a cognitive-
emotional resonance that can support conscious awareness of events happening in the 
world and how we feel about them. This resonance tends to focus attention selectively 
upon objects and events that promise to satisfy emotional needs. Such a resonance, when 
it is temporally extended to also include hippocampus, as described below, helps to 
explain how trace conditioning occurs, as well as the link between conditioning and 
consciousness that has been experimentally reported. 
Figures 4a and 4b summarize the CogEM hypothesis that (at least) three types of 
internal representation interact during classical conditioning and other reinforcement 
learning paradigms: sensory cortical representations S, drive representations D, and 
motor representations M. These representations, and the learning that they support, are 
incorporated into the nSTART circuit (Figure 2). 
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Sensory representations S temporarily store internal representations of sensory 
events in short-term and working memory. Drive representations D are sites where 
reinforcing and homeostatic, or drive, cues converge to activate emotional responses. 
Motor representations M control the read-out of actions. In particular, the S 
representations are thalamo-cortical or cortico-cortical representations of external events, 
including the object recognition categories that are learned by inferotemporal and 
prefrontal cortical interactions (Desimone, 1991; Gochin, Miller, Gross, & Gerstein, 
1991; Harries & Perrett, 1991; Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983; Ungerleider & 
Mishkin, 1982), and that are modeled by ART. Sensory representations temporarily store 
internal representations of sensory events, such as conditioned stimuli (CS) and 
unconditioned stimuli (US), in short-term memory via recurrent on-center off-surround 
networks that tend to conserve their total activity while they contrast-normalize, contrast-
enhance, and store their input patterns in short-term memory (Figures 4a and 4b).  
The D representations include hypothalamic and amygdala circuits (Figures 2 4 
and 5) at which reinforcing and homeostatic, or drive, cues converge to generate 
emotional reactions and motivational decisions (Aggleton, 1993; Bower, 1981; Davis, 
1994; Gloor et al., 1982; Halgren, Walter, Cherlow, & Crandall, 1978; LeDoux, 1993). 
The M representations include cortical and cerebellar circuits that control discrete 
adaptive responses (Evarts, 1973; Ito, 1984; Kalaska, Cohen, Hyde, & Prud’homme, 
1989; Thompson, 1988). More complete models of the internal structure of these several 
types of representations have been presented elsewhere (e.g., Brown, Bullock, & 
Grossberg, 2004; Bullock, Cisek, & Grossberg, 1998; Carpenter & Grossberg, 1991; 
  
36 
Contreras-Vidal, Grossberg, & Bullock, 1997; Dranias, Grossberg, & Bullock, 2008; 
Fiala, Grossberg, & Bullock, 1996; Gnadt & Grossberg, 2008; Grossberg, 1987; 
Grossberg, Bullock & Dranias, 2008; Grossberg & Merrill, 1996; Grossberg & 
Schmajuk, 1987; Raizada & Grossberg, 2003), and can be incorporated into future 
elaborations of nSTART without undermining any of the current model's conclusions. 
 nSTART does not incorporate the basal ganglia to simulate its targeted data, even 
though the basal ganglia and amygdala work together to provide motivational support, 
focus attention, and release contextually appropriate actions to achieve valued goals 
(Flores & Diserhoft, 2009). The MOTIVATOR model (Dranias et al., 2008; Grossberg et 
al., 2008) begins to explain how this interaction happens (Figure 4c), notably how the 
amygdala and basal ganglia may play complementary roles during cognitive-emotional 
learning and motivated goal-oriented behaviors. MOTIVATOR describes cognitive-
emotional interactions between higher-order sensory cortices and an evaluative neuraxis 
composed of the hypothalamus, amygdala, basal ganglia, and orbitofrontal cortex. Given 
a conditioned stimulus (CS), the model amygdala and lateral hypothalamus interact to 
calculate the expected current value of the subjective outcome that the CS predicts, 
constrained by the current state of deprivation or satiation. As in the CogEM model, the 
amygdala relays the expected value information to orbitofrontal cells that receive inputs 
from anterior inferotemporal cells, and medial orbitofrontal cells that receive inputs from 
rhinal cortex. The activations of these orbitofrontal cells code the subjective values of 
objects. These values guide behavioral choices.  
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The model basal ganglia detect errors in CS-specific predictions of the value and 
timing of rewards. Excitatory inputs from the pedunculopontine nucleus interact with 
timed inhibitory inputs from model striosomes in the ventral striatum to regulate 
dopamine burst and dip responses from cells in the substantia nigra pars compacta and 
ventral tegmental area.  Learning in cortical and striatal regions is strongly modulated by 
dopamine.  The MOTIVATOR model is used to address tasks that examine food-specific 
satiety, Pavlovian conditioning, reinforcer devaluation, and simultaneous visual 
discrimination. Model simulations successfully reproduce discharge dynamics of known 
cell types, including signals that predict saccadic reaction times and CS-dependent 
changes in systolic blood pressure. In the nSTART model, these basal ganglia 
interactions are not needed to simulate the targeted data, hence will not be further 
discussed. 
Even without basal ganglia dynamics, the CogEM model has successfully learned 
to control motivated behaviors in mobile robots (e.g., Baloch & Waxman, 1991; Chang & 
Gaudiano, 1998; Gaudiano & Chang, 1997; Gaudiano, Zalama, Chang, & Lopez-
Coronado, 1996). 
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Figure 5. Orbital prefrontal cortex receives multiple projections. Orbital prefrontal cortex receives 
projections from sensory cortices (visual, somatosensory, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory) and from the 
amygdala, which also receives inputs from the same sensory cortices. The amygdala, in turn, projects to the 
orbital prefrontal cortex. These anatomical stages correspond to the model CogEM stages in Figure 4b. 
[Reprinted with permission from Barbas (1995).] 
 
Three types of learning take place among the CogEM sensory, drive, and motor 
representations (Figure 4a). Conditioned reinforcer learning enables sensory events to 
activate emotional reactions at drive representations. Incentive motivational learning 
enables emotions to generate a motivational set that biases the system to process 
cognitive information consistent with that emotion. Motor learning allows sensory and 
cognitive representations to generate actions. nSTART simulates both conditioned 
reinforcer learning, from thalamus to amygdala, or from sensory cortex to amygdala, as 
well as incentive motivational learning, from amygdala to sensory cortex, or from 
amygdala, to orbitofrontal cortex (Figure 2). Instead of explicitly modeling motor 
learning circuits in the cerebellum, nSTART uses CR cortical activation in addition to the 
amygdala as sources of input to the pontine nucleus as an indicator of the timing and 
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strength of conditioned motor outputs (Freeman & Muckler, 2003; Kalmbach et al, 2009; 
Siegel et al., 2012; Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft, 2007).  
During classical conditioning, a CS activates its sensory representation S before 
the drive representation D is activated by an unconditioned simulus (US), or other 
previously conditioned reinforcer CSs. If it is appropriately timed, such pairing causes 
learning at the adaptive weights within the S  D pathway. The ability of the CS to 
subsequently activate D via this learned pathway is one of its key properties as a 
conditioned reinforcer. As these S  D associations are being formed, incentive 
motivational learning within the D  S incentive motivational pathway also occurs, due 
to the same pairing of CS and US. Incentive motivational learning enables an activated 
drive representation D to prime, or modulate, the sensory representations S of all cues, 
including the CSs, that have consistently been correlated with it. That is how activating D 
generates a “motivational set”: it primes all of the sensory and cognitive representations 
that have been associated with that drive in the past. These incentive motivational signals 
are a type of motivationally-biased attention. The S  M motor, or habit, learning 
enables the sensorimotor maps, vectors, and gains that are involved in sensory-motor 
control to be adaptively calibrated, thereby enabling a CS to read-out correctly calibrated 
movements as a CR. 
Taken together, these processes control aspects of the learning and recognition of 
sensory and cognitive memories, which are often classified as part of the declarative 
memory system (Mishkin, 1982, 1993; Squire & Cohen, 1984); and the performance of 
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learned motor skills, which are often classified as part of the procedural memory system 
(Gilbert & Thatch, 1977; Ito, 1984; Thompson, 1988). 
Once both conditioned reinforcer and incentive motivational learning have taken 
place, a CS can activate a (sensory cortex)-(amygdala)-(orbitofrontal cortex)-(sensory 
cortex) feedback circuit (Figures 2 and 4a). This circuit supports a cognitive-emotional 
resonance that leads to core consciousness and "the feeling of what happens" (Damasio, 
1999) while it enables the brain to rapidly focus motivated attention on motivationally 
salient objects and events. This is the first behavioral competence that was mentioned 
above in Section 1.1. This feedback circuit could also, however, without further 
processing, immediately activate motor responses, thereby leading to premature 
responding in many situations.  
We show below that this amygdala-based process is effective during delay 
conditioning, where the CS and US overlap in time, but not during trace conditioning, 
where the CS terminates before the US begins, at least not without the benefit of the 
adaptively timed learning mechanisms that are described in the next section. Thus, 
although the CogEM model can realize the first behavioral competence that is 
summarized above, it cannot realize the second and third competences, which involve 
bridging temporal gaps between CS, US, and conditioned responses (see Section 2.1). 
Mechanisms that realize the second and third behavioral competences enable the brain to 
learn during trace conditioning. 
It is also important to acknowledge that, as reviewed in Section 1.4, the amygdala 
may have a time-limited role during aversive conditioning (Lee & Kim, 2004). As the 
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association of eyeblink CS-US becomes more consolidated through the strengthening of 
direct thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical learned associations, the role of amygdala 
may become less critical. 
2.4. Spectral Timing model and hippocampal time cells. 
The third model, called the Spectral Timing model, clarifies how the brain learns 
adaptively timed responses in order to acquire rewards and other goal objects that are 
delayed in time, as occurs during trace conditioning. Spectral timing enables the model to 
bridge an interstimulus interval (ISI), or temporal gap, of hundreds of milliseconds, or 
even seconds, between the CS offset and US onset. This learning mechanism has been 
called spectral timing because a “spectrum” of cells respond at different, but overlapping, 
times and can together generate a population response whose adaptively timed cell 
responses become maximal at, or near, the time when the US is expected (Grossberg & 
Merrill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1989), as has been shown in 
neurophysiological experiments about adaptively timed conditioning in the hippocampus 
(Berger & Thompson, 1978; Nowak & Berger, 1992; see also Tieu et al.,1999).  
 Each cell in such a spectrum reaches its maximum activity at different times.  If 
the cell responds later, then its activity duration is broader in time, a property that is 
called a Weber law, or scalar timing, property (Gibbon, 1977). Recent neurophysiological 
data about "time cells" in the hippocampus have supported the Spectral Timing model 
prediction of a spectrum of cells with different peak activity times that obey a Weber law. 
Indeed, such a Weber law property was salient in the data of MacDonald et al. (2011), 
who wrote: "…the mean peak firing rate for each time cell occurred at sequential 
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moments, and the overlap among firing periods from even these small ensembles of time 
cells bridges the entire delay. Notably, the spread of the firing period for each neuron 
increased with the peak firing time…" (p. 3). MacDonald et al. (2011) have hereby 
provided direct neurophysiological support for the prediction of spectral timing model 
cells ("small ensembles of time cells") that obey the Weber law property ("spread of the 
firing period…increased with the peak firing time"). 
 To generate the adaptively timed population response, each cell's activity is 
multiplied, or gated, by an adaptive weight before the memory-gated activity adds to the 
population response. During conditioning, each weight is amplified or suppressed to the 
extent to which its activity does, or does not, overlap times at which the US occurs; that 
is, times around the ISI between CS and US. Learning has the effect of amplifying 
signals from cells whose timing matches the ISI, at least partially. Most cell activity 
intervals do not match the ISI perfectly. However, after such learning, the sum of the 
gated signals from all the cells— that is, its population response—is well-timed to the 
ISI, and typically peaks at or near the expected time of US onset. This sort of adaptive 
timing endows the nSTART model with the ability to learn associations between events 
that are separated in time, notably between a CS and US during trace conditioning.  
 Evidence for adaptive timing has been found during many different types of 
reinforcement learning. For example, classical conditioning is optimal at a range of inter-
stimulus intervals between the CS and US that are characteristic of the task, species, and 
age, and is typically attenuated at zero ISI and long ISIs. Within an operative range, 
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learned responses are timed to match the statistics of the learning environment (e.g., 
Smith, 1968).  
Although the amygdala has been identified as a primary site in the expression of 
emotion and stimulus-reward associations (Aggleton, 1993), as summarized in Figures 2 
and 5, the hippocampal formation has been implicated in the adaptively timed processing 
of cognitive-emotional interactions. For example, Thompson et al. (1987) distinguished 
two types of learning that go on during conditioning of the rabbit Nictitating Membrane 
Response: adaptively timed “conditioned fear” learning that is linked to the hippocampus, 
and adaptively timed “learning of the discrete adaptive response” that is linked to the 
cerebellum. In particular, neurophysiological evidence has been reported for adaptive 
timing in entorhinal cortex activation of hippocampal dentate and CA3 pyramidal cells 
(Berger & Thompson, 1978; Nowak & Berger, 1992) to which the more recently reported 
"time cells" presumably contribute.  
 Spectral timing has been used to model challenging behavioral, 
neurophysiological, and anatomical data about several parts of the brain: the 
hippocampus to maintain motivated attention on goals for an adaptively timed interval 
(Grossberg & Merrill, 1992, 1996; cf. Friedman, Bressler, Garner, & Ziv, 2000), the 
cerebellum to read out adaptively timed movements (Fiala, Grossberg, & Bullock, 1996; 
Ito, 1984), and the basal ganglia to release dopamine bursts and dips that drive new 
associative learning in multiple brain regions in response to unexpectedly timed rewards 
and non-rewards (Brown, Bullock, & Grossberg, 1999, 2004; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et 
al., 1992). 
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2.5. Distinguishing expected and unexpected disconfirmations. 
Adaptive timing is essential for animals that actively explore and learn about their 
environment, since rewards and other goals are often delayed in time relative to the 
actions that are aimed at acquiring them. The brain needs to be dynamically buffered, or 
protected against, reacting prematurely before a delayed reward can be received. The 
Spectral Timing model accomplishes this by predicting how the brain distinguishes 
expected non-occurrences, also called expected disconfirmations, of reward, which 
should not be allowed to interfere with acquiring a delayed reward, from unexpected non-
occurrences, also called unexpected disconfirmations, of reward, which can trigger the 
usual consequences of predictive failure, including reset of working memory, attention 
shifts, emotional rebounds, and the release of exploratory behaviors. In the nSTART 
model, and the START model before it, spectral timing circuits generate adaptively timed 
hippocampal responses that can bridge temporal gaps between CS and US and provide 
motivated attention to maintain activation of the hippocampus and neocortex between 
those temporal gaps (Figures 2 and 6).  
 What spares an animal from erroneously reacting to expected non-occurrences of 
reward as predictive failures? Why does an animal not immediately become so frustrated 
by the non-occurrence of such a reward that it prematurely shifts its attentional focus and 
releases exploratory behavior aimed at finding the desired reward somewhere else, 
leading to relentless exploration for immediate gratification? Alternatively, if the animal 
does wait, but the reward does not appear at the expected time, then how does the animal 
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then react to the unexpected non-occurrence of the reward by becoming frustrated, 
resetting its working memory, shifting its attention, and releasing exploratory behavior? 
 Any solution to this problem needs to account for the fact that the process of 
registering ART-like sensory matches or mismatches is not itself inhibited (Figure 3): if 
the reward happened to appear earlier than expected, the animal could still perceive it and 
release consummatory responses. Instead, the effects of these sensory mismatches upon 
reinforcement, attention, and exploration are somehow inhibited, or gated off. That is, a 
primary role of such an adaptive timing mechanism seems to be to inhibit, or gate, the 
mismatch-mediated arousal process whereby a disconfirmed expectation would otherwise 
activate widespread signals that could activate negatively reinforcing frustrative 
emotional responses that drive extinction of  previous consummatory behavior, reset 
working memory, shift attention, and release exploratory behavior. 
 The START model unifies networks for spectrally timed learning and the 
differential processing of expected vs. unexpected non-occurrences, or disconfirmations 
(Figure 6). In START, learning from sensory cortex to amygdala in Si  D pathways is 
supplemented by a parallel Si  H hippocampal pathway. This parallel pathway 
embodies a spectral timing circuit. The spectral timing circuit supports adaptively timed 
learning that can bridge temporal gaps between cues and reinforcers, as occurs during 
trace conditioning. As shown in Figure 6, both of these learned pathways can generate an 
inhibitory output signal to the orienting system A. As described within ART (Figure 3c), 
the orienting system is activated by novelty-sensitive mismatch events. Such a mismatch 
can trigger a burst of nonspecific arousal that is capable of resetting the currently active 
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recognition categories that caused the mismatch, while triggering opponent emotional 
reactions, attention shifts, and exploratory behavioral responses. The inhibitory pathway 
from D to A in Figure 6 prevents the orienting system from causing these consequences 
in response to expected disconfirmations, but not to unexpected disconfirmations 
(Grossberg & Merrill, 1992, 1996). In particular, read-out from the hippocampal adaptive 
timing circuit activates D which, in turn, inhibits A. At the same time, adaptively timed 
incentive motivational signals to the prefrontal cortex (pathway D  Si(2) in Figure 6) are 
supported by adaptively timed output signals from the hippocampus that help to maintain 
motivated attention, and a cognitive-emotional resonance for a task-appropriate duration. 
 
 
Figure 6. Macrocircuit of the START model of conditioning, attention, and timing. In the START 
model, conditioning, attention, and timing are integrated. Adaptively timed hippocampal signals R maintain 
motivated attention via a cortico-hippocampal-cortical feedback pathway, at the same time that they inhibit 
activation of orienting system circuits A via an amygdala drive representation D. The orienting system is 
also assumed to occur in the hippocampus. The adaptively timed signal is learned at a spectrum of cells 
whose activities respond at different rates rj and are gated by different adaptive weights zij. A transient Now 
Print learning signal N drives learned changes in these adaptive weights. In the nSTART model, the 
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hippocampal feedback circuit operate in parallel to the amygdala, rather than through it. See Section 2.5 for 
details. [Reprinted with permission from Grossberg and Merrill (1992).] 
 
Thus, in the START model, two complementary pathways are proposed to control 
spectrally-timed behavior: one excites adaptively-timed motivated attention and 
responding, and the other inhibits orienting responses in response to expected 
disconfirmations. Adaptively-timed motivated attention is mediated through an 
inferotemporal-amygdala-orbitofrontal positive feedback loop in which conditioned 
reinforcer learning and incentive motivational learning work together to rapidly focus 
attention upon the most salient cues, while blocking recognition of other cues via lateral 
inhibition (see Figures 5 and 6). The hippocampal adaptive timing circuit works in 
parallel to maintain activity in this positive feedback loop and thereby focus motivated 
attention on salient cues for a duration that matches environmental contingences. 
2.6. nSTART model. 
The nSTART model builds upon, extends, and unifies, the ART, CogEM, and 
START models in several ways to explain data about normal and abnormal learning and 
memory. First, nSTART incorporates a simplified model hippocampus and adaptively 
timed learning within the model's thalamo-hippocampal and cortico-hippocampal 
connections (Figure 2). Second, nSTART incorporates a simplified version of ART 
category learning in its bottom-up cortico-cortical connections. Third, learning in these 
connections, and in the model's hippocampo-cortical connections, is modulated by a 
simple embodiment of Brain Derived Neurotrophic Factor (BDNF). Fourth, the sensory 
cortical and orbitofrontal cortical processing stages habituate in an activity-dependent 
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way, a property that has previously been used to model other cortical development and 
learning processes, such as the development of visual cortical area V1 (e.g., Grossberg & 
Seitz, 2003; Olson & Grossberg, 1998).  
The nSTART model focuses on amygdala and hippocampal interactions with 
sensory cortex and orbitofrontal cortex during conditioning (Figures 2 and 6), with the 
hippocampus required to support learning and memory consolidation, especially during 
learning experiences such as trace conditioning wherein a temporal gap between the 
associated stimuli needs to be bridged, as described in Section 1.4. Consolidation is 
enabled, in the brain and in the model, by a self-organizing process whereby active 
neurons and specific neural connections are reinforced and strengthened through positive 
feedback. 
BDNF-mediated hippocampal activation is proposed to maintain and enhance 
cortico-cortical resonances that strengthen and stabilize partial learning based on 
previously experienced bottom-up sensory inputs. This partial learning occurs during 
conditioning trials within the bottom-up adaptive filters that activate learned recognition 
categories, and within the corresponding top-down expectations. After the consolidation 
process strengthens these pathways, the hippocampus is no longer required for 
performance of CRs, but rather the prefrontal cortex takes on a critical role in generating 
successful performance of the CR in concert with the associated thalamic sensory input 
(Takehara et al., 2003) and amygdala-driven motivational support.  Since amygdala and 
prefrontal cortex provide input to the pontine nuclei, their collective activity there reflects 
the salience of the CS in generating a trace CR (Siegel, et al., 2012; Siegel, et al., 2015). 
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The prefrontal cortex interacts with the cerebellum via the pontine nucleus to directly 
mediate adaptively timed conditioned responses (Weiss & Disterhoft, 2011; Woodruff-
Pak & Disterhoft, 2007). A detailed biochemical model of how the cerebellum learns to 
control adaptively timed conditioned responses is developed in Fiala, Grossberg, & 
Bullock (1996), with Ca++-modulated metabotropic glutamate receptor (mGluR) system 
playing a critical role in enabling temporal gaps to be bridged via a spectral timing 
circuit. 
2.7. Linking consciousness, conditioning, and consolidation. 
The nSTART model traces the link between consciousness and conditioning to 
cognitive-emotional resonances that are sustained long enough to support consciousness. 
Such cognitive-emotional resonances maintain core consciousness (Damasio, 1999) and 
the ability to make responses, somatosensory responses in the case of eyeblink 
conditioning, that depend on interactions between sensory cortex and orbitofrontal cortex, 
or thalamus and medial prefrontal cortex (Powell & Churchwell, 2002). The nSTART 
model proposes that, when the hippocampus is removed, and with it the capacity to 
sustain a temporally prolonged cognitive-emotional resonance and adaptively timed 
focusing of motivated attention upon cognitively relevant information, then core 
consciousness and performance may be impaired. The model hereby explains how 
interactions among thalamus, hippocampus, amygdala, and cortex may support the 
conscious awareness that is needed for trace conditioning, but not delay conditioning 
(Clark & Squire, 1998). 
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As explained by the model, memory consolidation during trace conditioning 
builds upon cooperative interactions among several different neural pathways in which 
learning takes place during trace conditioning trials. Consider the case of the circuits in 
Figures 4 and 5, for example. A property of the CogEM model, which is supported by 
neurophysiological data, as summarized below, is that the (sensory 
cortex)(orbitofrontal cortex) pathway, by itself, is not able to initiate efficient 
conditioning. Motivational support is needed as well.  How this is proposed to occur is 
illustrated by considering what would happen if the sensory cortex and prefrontal cortex 
were lumped together, as in Figure 4a. Then, after a reinforcing cue activated a sensory 
representation S, it could activate a motor representation M at the same time that it also 
sent conditioned reinforcer signals to a drive representation D such as the amygdala. As a 
result, a motor response could be initiated before the sensory representation received 
incentive motivational feedback to determine whether the sensory cue should generate a 
response at that time. For example, eating behavior might be initiated before the network 
could determine if it was hungry; avoidance behavior before a determination of danger. 
This deficiency is corrected by interactions between a sensory cortex and its 
prefrontal, notably orbitofrontal, cortical projection, as in Figure 4b and its anatomical 
interpretation in Figure 5. Here, the various sensory cortices play the role of the first 
cortical stage (1)
CSS  of the sensory representations, the orbitofrontal cortex plays the role of 
the second cortical stage 
(2)
CSS  of the sensory representations, and the amygdala and 
related structures play the role of the drive representations D. This two-stage sensory 
representation overcomes the problem just mentioned by assuming that each orbitofrontal 
  
51 
cell obeys a polyvalent constraint whereby it can fire vigorously only if it receives input 
from its sensory cortex and from a motivational source such as a drive representation. 
This polyvalent constraint on the model prefrontal cortex prevents this region from 
triggering an action until it gets incentive feedback from a motivationally-consistent drive 
representation (Grossberg, 1971, 1982). More specifically, presentation of a given cue, or 
CS, activates the first stage (1)
CSS  of its sensory representation (in sensory cortex) in Figure 
4b. This activation is stored in short-term memory using positive feedback pathways 
from the sensory representation to itself. The stored activity generates output signals to 
all the drive representations with which the sensory representation is linked, as well as to 
the second stage 
(2)
CSS  of the sensory representation (in prefrontal cortex). The second 
stage 
(2)
CSS  obeys the polyvalent constraint: It cannot fire while the CS is stored in short-
term memory unless it receives converging signals from the first sensory stage (via the 
 
S
CS
(1) ®S
CS
(2)
 pathway) and from a drive representation (via the 
 
S
CS
(1) ®D®S
CS
(2)
 pathway). 
Early in conditioning, a CS can activate its representation 
 
S
CS
(1)
 in the sensory 
cortex, but cannot vigorously activate its representation 
 
S
CS
(2)
 in the orbitofrontal cortex, or 
a drive representation D in the amygdala. A US can, however, activate D. When the CS 
and US are paired appropriately through time, the conditioned reinforcer adaptive 
weights in the 
 
S
CS
(1) ®D pathway can be strengthened. The converging CS-activated 
inputs from 
 
S
CS
(1)
 and US-activated inputs from D at 
 
S
CS
(2)
 also enable the adaptive weights 
in the incentive motivational pathway 
 
D®S
CS
(2)
 to be strengthened. After conditioning, 
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during retention testing when only the CS is presented, the two pathways 
 
S
CS
(1) ®S
CS
(2)
 and 
 
S
CS
(1) ®D®S
CS
(2)
 can supply enough converging input to fire the orbitofrontal 
representation 
 
S
CS
(2)
 without the help of the US. It should be noted that the association 
 
S
CS
(1) ®S
CS
(2)  can also link the CS-activated sensory representation with the US-activated 
orbitofrontal representation, which can read out the response even before conditioning 
trials begin. 
These properties are consistent with the following anatomical interpretation. The 
amygdala and related structures have been identified in both animals and humans to be a 
brain region that is involved in learning and eliciting memories of experiences with 
strong emotional significance (Aggleton, 1993; Davis, 1994; Gloor et al., 1982; Halgren, 
Walter, Cherlow, & Crandall, 1978; LeDoux, 1993). The orbitofrontal cortex is known to 
be a major projection area of the ventral, or object-processing cortical visual stream 
(Barbas, 1995, 2007; Fulton, 1950; Fuster, 1989; Rolls, 1998; Wilson, Scalaidhem, & 
Goldman-Rakic, 1993). Cells in the orbitofrontal cortex are sensitive to the reward 
associations of sensory cues, as well as to how satiated the corresponding drive is at any 
time (e.g., Mishkin & Aggleton, 1981; Rolls, 1998; 2000). The feedback between the 
prefrontal and sensory cortical stages may be interpreted as an example of the ubiquitous 
positive feedback that occurs between cortical regions including prefrontal and sensory 
cortices (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Höistad & Barbas, 2008; Macchi & Rinvik, 1976; 
Sillito, Jones, Gerstein, & West, 1994; Tsumoto, Creutzfeldt, & Legéndy, 1978; van 
Essen & Maunsell, 1983). In CogEM, it provides a top-down ART attentional priming 
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signal that obeys the ART Matching Rule. Finally, the CogEM, and nSTART, models are 
consistent with data suggesting that the ventral prefrontal cortex and the amygdala are 
involved in the process by which responses are selected on the basis of their emotional 
valence and success in achieving rewards (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991; 
Passingham, 1997). In particular, Fuster (1989) has concluded from studies of monkeys 
that the orbitofrontal cortex helps to suppress inappropriate responses. These monkey 
data are consistent with clinical evidence that patients with injury to orbitofrontal cortex 
tend to behave in an inappropriate manner (Blumer & Benson, 1975; Liddle, 1994).  
2.8. Bridging the temporal gap: Hippocampus does this, not amygdala. 
The need to regulate orbitofrontal outputs using drive information puts into sharp 
relief the problem that the brain needs to solve in order to be capable of trace 
conditioning, or indeed of any learning wherein there is a temporal gap between the 
stimuli that need to be associated: if the amygdala cannot bridge the temporal gap 
between CS and US during trace conditioning, what can? If there were no structure 
capable of bridging that gap, then either the motivational appropriateness of responding 
would be sacrificed, or the ability to learn across temporal gaps. As briefly noted above, 
the nSTART model proposes how the brain solves this problem by using the 
hippocampus to bridge the temporal gap, using spectrally timed learning and BDNF 
processes in connections from thalamus and sensory cortex to the hippocampus, 
combined with learned incentive motivational processes and BDNF in connections from 
hippocampus to neocortex (Figure 2). 
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Initially, during trace conditioning, the interstimulus interval (ISI) between the CS 
and US is too large to be bridged by either the direct (sensory cortex)(orbitofrontal 
cortex) pathway or by the indirect (sensory cortex)(amygdala)(orbitofrontal cortex) 
pathway. In other words, by the time the US becomes active, CS-activated signals from 
the sensory cortex to the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex have significantly 
decayed, so that they cannot strongly drive associative learning between simultaneously 
active CS and US representations. In contrast, in the manner explicated by the model, the 
greater persistence afforded by hippocampal adaptive timing enables CS-activated signals 
via the hippocampus to bridge this ISI. Then, when paired with the US, which can 
activate its own sensory cortical and orbitofrontal cortical representations, CS-activated 
associations can begin to form in the (sensory cortex)(hippocampus)(orbitofrontal 
cortex) pathway, and can support feedback from orbitofrontal cortex to the CS 
representation in sensory cortex, thereby enabling a sustained cognitive-emotional 
resonance that can support conscious awareness. Model hippocampal neurotrophins 
extend this temporal interval and enhance the strength of these effects. Once both the 
sensory cortex and orbitofrontal cortex are simultaneously active, associations can also 
start to form directly from the CS-activated representation in the sensory cortex to the 
orbitofrontal cortex, thereby consolidating the learned categorical memory that associates 
an object category with an object-value category. As these direct connections consolidate, 
the hippocampus becomes less important in controlling behaviors that are read out from 
orbitofrontal cortical sites.  
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After partial conditioning gets learning started in associated thalamo-cortical and 
cortico-cortical pathways, during the memory consolidation process, hippocampal 
adaptively timed circuits, and even beyond that, BDNF activity, persist and support 
resonating cortico-cortical and cortico-hippocampo-cortical activity. The polyvalent 
constraint on the firing of orbitofrontal cells is therefore achieved even after learning 
trials cease. Without hippocampal support after partial conditioning, this cannot occur. 
The model suggests that this is why early, but not late, hippocampal lesions interfere with 
the formation and consolidation of conditioned responses. 
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CHAPTER 3. Model Description 
3.1. nSTART model overview. 
The nSTART model is here described in terms of the processing stages that are 
activated during a conditioning trial, and the functional role of each stage is explained. 
Figure 2 illustrates the model as a macrocircuit. Figure 7 shows a set of diagrams that 
summarize the processing steps and relationships among the model variables. Appendix 
A combines them to form a complete circuit diagram (Figure 18) whose mathematical 
equations and parameters are also specified. Model parameters have the same values for 
all simulations except where modifications have been made to simulate lesions or 
different US levels. 
For each trial, conditioning variables are simulated from 1 to 2000 ms. Three 
types of trials simulate the learning of conditioning contingencies: acquisition or training 
(CS-US pairing), retention or testing (CS only), and no stimulus (neither CS nor US) in 
order to extend the time between the last training trial and the testing trial. Between any 
two trials, process variables are either reset to initial values, or not, depending on their 
functional role. There are two types of process variables: one for intra-trial process 
dynamics (these variables are reset for each trial), and one for inter-trial cumulative 
learning (these variables are not reset for each trial). Cumulative learning variables are 
identified below in the discussion of the functional role of each process. See Table 2 in 
Appeddix A for a list of all variables. 
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Figure 7. Processing Steps for nSTART Conditioning. The processing steps for a conditioning trial in 
the nSTART model are illustrated. As conditioned variables or activites that represent learning, the 
following are not reset to zero between trials in order to simulate inter-trial learning: adaptive weights wSi, 
wAi, wHi, Fi, and zij; and hippocampal and orbitofrontal BDNF BH and BOi, respectively. See below for 
details. (a) External stimuli, Ii, activate sensory representations in the sensory cortex Si via the thalamus Ti 
(see Section 3.2.1). Orbitofrontal cortical activity Oi (see Section 3.3.1) generates a top-down excitatory 
feedback signal back to Si. The total excitatory signal, including this positive feedback, is gated by the 
habituative transmitter gate Smi (see Section 3.2.2). (b) Excitatory inputs to orbitofrontal cortex from 
sensory cortex (Si, Section 3.2), amygdala (A, Section 3.4), and hippocampus (H, Section 3.5) are gated by 
learned presynaptic weights (wSi, wAi, and wHi, respectively; see Section 3.3.2). An example of this 
processing shown in Figure 7c. Orbitofrontal BDNF (BOi, Section 3.3.3) extends duration of Oi  activity. 
The total excitatory signal, including positive feedback, is gated by the habituative transmitter gate Omi. 
(see Section 3.3.4). (c) The learned weight wSi from sensory cortex to orbitofrontal cortex is modulated by 
orbitofrontal and BDNF signals. (d) Amygdala (A) receives inputs from sensory cortex (Si) that are gated 
by conditioned reinforcer adaptive weights (Fi; see Section 3.4.2). The transient Now Print signal (N) that 
drives the learning of adaptively timed hippocampal responses is the difference between the excitatory 
signal from amygdala (A) and an inhibitory signal from a feedforward amygdala-activated inhibitory 
interneuron (E), which time-averages amygdala activity (see Section 3.5.8). (e) Sensory cortical (Si) inputs 
to hippocampus (H) learn to adaptively time (zij) the ISI using the Now Print signal (N) to drive learning 
within a spectral timing circuit. The cells in the spectral timing circuit react to sensory cortical (Si) inputs at 
20 different rates that are subscripted with j. The resulting activations (xij) generate sigmoidal output signals 
(f(xij)).  These outputs are multiplied by their habituative transmitter gates (yij) to produce an activation 
spectrum (gij) which determines the rate at which the adaptive weights (zij) learn from N. See Section 3.5.8 
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for details. The zij multiply the gij to generate net outputs hij (Section 3.5.4). that are added to generate an 
adaptively timed population input (R; see Section 3.5.3) to hippocampus (H). R also regulates hippocampal 
BDNF (BH), which further extends hippocampal activity through time (see Section 3.5.9). H also supports 
production of orbitofronal BDNF (BOi) (see Section 3.3.3). (f) Hippocampal BDNF (BH) is an indirect 
promoter of the production of cortical BDNF (BCi) through its excitatory effect on the activity H. (g) 
Pontine nuclei (P) are excited by amygdala (A) and orbitofrontal cortex (O) and are the final common 
pathway for generating a CR. These processing components are combined in Figure 18. 
 
3.2. Sensory cortex and thalamus. 
3.2.1. Sensory cortical dynamics. 
The dynamics of sensory cortex were simulated (Figure 2). Thalamic activity was 
set equal to the resultant sensory cortical activity, for computational simplicity. CS and 
US inputs are labeled 
1I  and 0 ,I  respectively. Input  
I
i
 activates the thi sensory cortical 
cell, i = 0 or 1. The inputs are turned on and off through time by presentation and 
termination of a CS input (
1I ) or US input ( 0I ), and are defined by a saturating function I 
= f() = 16 /(1+3) of an external stimulus intensity .  
Sensory cortex cell activities 
iS  compete for a limited capacity of activation 
via a recurrent on-center off-surround network of cells that obey membrane, or 
shunting equations. (Appendix A.2.1, Equations 1 and 2). These recurrent 
interactions use a nonlinear signal function (Appendix A.2.2, Equation 4) that 
contrast-enhances network activity patterns and sustains the contrast-enhanced 
activities in short-term memory after the input pattern ends. In addition to the 
bottom-up input 
 
I
i
 and the recurrent on-center interactions, excitatory inputs 
include a top-down attentional signal iO  from object-value categories in the 
orbitofrontal cortex. This feedback pathway closes a bottom-up/top-down feedback 
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loop between sensory cortex and orbitofrontal cortex and gain-amplifies cortico-
cortical activity (Appendix A.3.1, Equation 7).  
A habituative transmitter gate 
miS multiplies the total excitatory input and is 
inactivated by it in an activity-dependent way, thereby preventing unlimited perseverative 
activation of the cortico-cortical excitatory feedback loop (Appendix A.2.3, Equation 6). 
This gate can be realized in several ways, one being a presynaptic chemical transmitter 
that is released by axonal signals, and the other as a postsynaptic membrane current. The 
orbitofrontal cortical cells have an analogous habituative process (Appendix A.3.4, 
Equation 13). When all these processes interact, a brief input can trigger sustained 
cortical activity via the recurrent on-center, modulated by orbitofrontal attentional 
feedback, until it habituates in an activity-dependent way, or is reset by recurrent 
competitive interactions. 
3.2.2. Signal functions in the recurrent on-center off-surround network. 
In order to suppress noise in the system and contrast enhance cell activity, the 
signal function ( )S if S  in the recurrent on-center off-surround network is faster-than-
linear (Grossberg, 1973, 1980), with a firing threshold that is larger than the passive 
equilibrium point and grows linearly with cell activity above threshold (Appendix A.2.2, 
Equation 4). 
3.2.3. Habituative transmitter gates. 
The habituative transmitter gate at each sensory cortical cell accumulates at a 
constant rate up to a maximum value, and is inactivated at a rate proportional to the size 
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of the excitatory signal that it gates, multiplied by the amount of available transmitter 
(Appendix A.3.1, Equation 6; Abbott et al., 1997; Grossberg, 1968b, 1972, 1980). 
 
3.3. Orbitofrontal cortex, category learning, and incentive motivational learning. 
3.3.1. Orbitofrontal cortical dynamics. 
Sensory cortical activity 
 
S
1
 can generate excitatory signals to cells with 
orbitofrontal cortical activity 
1.O  As in the sensory cortex, orbitofrontal cortical cells 
compete via a recurrent on-center off-surround network whose cells obey the membrane, 
or shunting, equations of physiology. These recurrent dynamics enable orbitofrontal 
cortical activity to contrast-normalize and contrast-enhance its inputs, and for cell 
activities that win the competition to persist in short-term memory after inputs terminate. 
Finally, again as in the model sensory cortex, the total excitatory input to prefrontal 
cortical cells can habituate in an activity-dependent way (Appendix A.3.4, Equation 13).  
3.3.2. Cortical category learning and incentive motivational learning. 
Adaptive weights 
1Sw  exist in this pathway from CS-activated sensory cortex to 
orbitofrontal cortex, and may be strengthened by the conditioning process. Support for 
category learning process is a critical event that enables conditioned responding to occur 
after sufficient memory consolidation occurs, so that hippocampal support is no longer 
required. 
Before conditioning occurs, when a CS is presented, it can activate its sensory 
representation, and sends signals to its orbitofrontal representation, amygdala, and 
 
 
 
 
61 
hippocampus. However, before conditioning occurs, these signals cannot vigorously 
activate other regions of the model network. When the US occurs, it can activate its own 
sensory and orbitofrontal cortical representations, as well as the amygdala and 
hippocampus. Incentive motivational signals from the amygdala and hippocampus can 
then be broadcast nonspecifically to many orbitofrontal cortical cells, including those that 
receive signals from the CS. The hippocampal incentive motivational signals last longer 
than the amygdala signals because of their capacity for adaptively-timed responding 
across long ISIs, as will be noted in Section 3.5. Only those orbitofrontal cortical cells 
that receive a simultaneous combination of CS-activated and US-activated signals can 
start to vigorously fire.  
When 
1O  becomes active at the same time that signals from  
S
1
, are active, the 
adaptive weight 
1Sw  in the corresponding category learning pathway to orbitofrontal 
cortex (Appendix A.3.2, Equation 9) can grow. Category learning enables a CS to 
activate an orbitofrontal representation that can release conditioned responses further 
downstream. As in the START model, the sensory cortex (Appendix A.2.1, Equation 2), 
amygdala (Appendix A.4.1, Equation 14), and hippocampus (Appendix A.5.2, Equation 
16), all play a role in this cortico-cortical category learning process, during which 
incentive motivational learning from both amygdala and hippocampus to orbitofrontal 
cortex also takes place, with adaptive weights 
 
w
Ai
 and 
 
w
Hi
 in the corresponding 
pathways (Appendix A.3.2). 
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 After being gated by its adaptive weight 
 
w
S1
, a sensory cortical input to an 
orbitofrontal cell is multiplicatively modulated, or gated, by the sum of amygdala, 
hippocampal, and BDNF incentive motivational signals (A, H and BO, respectively; see 
Section 3.3.2). As noted above, when these converging signals are sufficiently large at 
the beginning of conditioning, O1  can become active, so all three types of adaptive 
weights abutting the prefrontal cortical cell, from sensory cortex, amygdala, and 
hippocampus ( , ,Si Ai Hiw w w ), can be conditioned if their input sources are also active at 
these times (see Figures 7b and 7c). In situations where the ISI is large, as during trace 
conditioning, the incentive motivational signal from hippocampus may be large, even if 
the signal from amygdala is not.  
As explained in Section 3.5, the hippocampus can maintain its activity for an 
adaptively-timed duration that can span a long trace interval. In addition, BDNF at the 
hippocampus BH  (Section 3.3.3) and orbitofrontal cortex BOi  (Section 3.5.9) can sustain 
prefrontal cortical activity for an even longer duration. This action of BDNF captures in a 
simplified way how BDNF-modulated hippocampal bursting is maintained during 
memory consolidation.  
These adaptive weights all obey an outstar learning law (Grossberg, 1968a, 1980). 
In the incentive motivational pathways from amygdala and hippocampus, learning is 
gated on and off by a sampling signal that grows with amygdala or hippocampal activity, 
plus hippocampal BDNF activity (Appendix A.3.2, Equations 10 and 11). When the 
sampling signal is on, it determines the rate at which the corresponding adaptive weight 
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time-averages activity O1, thereby combining both Hebbian and anti-Hebbian learning 
properties. 
3.3.3. Orbitofrontal BDNF. 
Orbitofrontal BDNF BOi  (Appendix A.3.3, Equation 7) slowly time-averages the 
level of hippocampal activity H, and thereby extends its duration. This BDNF process 
hereby helps to maintain cortical activity across an extended CS-US temporal gap during 
trace conditioning, and thus to support the consolidation of cortico-cortical category 
learning.  
3.3.4. Habituative transmitter gates. 
As in Section 3.2.3, the habituative transmitter gate at each cortical cell prevents 
unlimited perseverative activation of orbitofrontal cortical cells via their positive 
feedback loops. As before, such a habituative transmitter gate accumulates at a constant 
rate up to a maximum value, and is inactivated at a rate proportional to the size of the 
excitatory signal that it gates, multiplied by the amount of available transmitter 
(Appendix A.2.3, Equation 5). 
3.4. Amygdala and conditioned reinforcer learning. 
3.4.1 Amygdala drive representation dynamics. 
The amygdala has a complex cytotonic architecture that represents emotional 
states and generates incentive motivational signals (Aggleton & Saunders, 2000). The 
amygdala is simplified in nSTART to enable conditioned reinforcer learning and 
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incentive motivation learning to occur, as in the CogEM and START models (see Figure 
4). In the nSTART model, a single drive representation of amygdala activity A (Appendix 
A.4.1, Equation 14) is activated by the sum of excitatory inputs from sensory cortex 
iS
that are gated by conditioned reinforcer adaptive weights.  
3.4.2 Conditioned reinforcer learning. 
These adaptive weights determine how well sensory cortex can activate A. 
Conditioned reinforcer learning is a key step in converting a conditioned stimulus into a 
conditioned reinforcer that can activate the amygdala. Together with incentive 
motivational learning in the pathway from amygdala to orbitofrontal cortex (Appendix 
A.3.2), a sensory cortical input can stimulate the amygdala which, in turn, can provide 
motivational support to fire orbitofrontal cortical cells (Figure 2). 
 The CS cannot strongly excite the drive representation activity A before 
conditioning takes place. During conditioning, the US can directly activate A via its 
sensory representation. Pairing of CS-activated signals from the sensory cortex to the 
amgydala with those of the US to the amygdala causes conditioned reinforcer learning in 
the adaptive weights within the (sensory cortex)-to-amygdala pathways.  
As in the case of incentive motivational learning, the learning law that is used for 
conditioned reinforcer learning is an outstar learning law (Appendix A.4.2, Equation 15) 
whereby a sensory cortical representation can sample and learn a spatial pattern of 
conditioned reinforcer adaptive weights across multiple drive representations. The current 
model simulations only consider such learning at a single drive representation.  
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3.5. Hippocampus and adaptively timed learning.. 
3.5.1. Adaptively-timed hippocampal learning. 
As noted in Section 3.3.1, the hippocampus receives adaptively timed inputs that 
can maintain its activity for a duration that can span the trace interval. The hippocampus 
can hereby provide its own incentive motivational pathway to orbitofrontal cortical cells 
in cases when the amygdala cannot. In addition, BDNF at the model hippocampus and 
prefrontal cortex can sustain prefrontal cortical activity for an even longer duration. The 
adaptively timed “spectral timing” process spans several processing steps. 
3.5.2. Adaptively-timed hippocampal activity. 
The adaptively timed signal R and the hippocampal BDNF signal BH   together 
maintain activity of the model hippocampus (Appendix A.5.2, Equation 16) across trace 
conditioning intervals, and also during periods after partial conditioning when no further 
external inputs are presented. In these latter periods, sustained hippocampal activity 
provides the incentive motivational signals that support memory consolidation of cortico-
cortical category learning.  
Figure 7f shows the functional relationships between hippocampal BDNF ( BH ), 
hippocampal activity (H), the hippocampal-to-orbitofrontal learned weight (wHi), and the 
hippocampal-to-orbitofrontal stimulation of cortical BDNF ( BOi ) production.  
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3.5.3. Adaptively-timed population output signal. 
The adaptively timed input from the sensory cortex to the hippocampus is the 
population output 
,
ij
i j
R h of spectrally-timed and learning-gated signals (Appendix 
A.5.3, Equation 17). The individual signals ijh  are not well timed, but the population 
response R  is, and its activity peaks around the ISI. Adaptively timed learning is thus an 
emergent property of this entire population of cell sites.  
3.5.4. Activation spectrum. 
The components of the adaptively timed signal R are defined as follows: First, a 
population of hippocampal cell sites with activities 
 
x
ij
 (Appendix A.5.5, Equation 20) 
reacts to the excitatory input signal from sensory cortex at a spectrum of rates, ranging 
from fast to slow, that span the different ISIs to be learned. Activity 
 
x
ij
 generates a 
sigmoidal output signal 
 
f (x
ij
)  to the next processing stage.  
3.5.5. Habituative transmitter spectrum. 
Each signal 
 
f (x
ij
)  is gated by with a habituative transmitter gate 
 
y
ij
 (Appendix 
A.5.6, Equation 22) that is similar in structure and function to the habituative transmitter 
gates described in Section 3.2.3. The different rates at which each spectral activity ( )ijf x
responds causes the corresponding habituative transmitter
 
y
ij
to habituate at a different 
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rate. Habituative transmitter 
 
y
ij
 multiplies, or gates, the corresponding signal 
 
f (x
ij
)  to 
generate a net output signal 
 
g
ij
 (Appendix A.5.7, Equation 23).  
3.5.6. Gated signal spectrum and time cells. 
Multiplication of the increasing 
 
f (x
ij
)  with the decreasing 
 
y
ij
 generates a 
unimodal curve
 
g
ij
= f (x
ij
)z
ij
 through time. Each ijg  peaks at a different time, and curves 
that peak at later times have broader activation profiles through time (see Figure 11c), 
thereby realizing a Weber law property. Predicted properties of these cell responses were 
reported in neurophysiological data about hippocampal time cells (MacDonald et al., 
2011). The Spectral Timing model predicts how such time cells may be used both to 
bridge the long ISIs that occur during trace conditioning, and to learn adaptively timed 
output signals that match the timing of experienced ISIs during delay or trace 
conditioning. This learning is proposed to occur in the following way.  
3.5.7. Spectral learning law. 
To generate the adaptively-timed response R , each signal ijg  is multiplied, or 
gated, by a long-term memory (LTM) trace ijz  (Appendix A.5.8, Equation 24). In 
addition, ijg  helps to control learning by ijz : when ijg  is positive, ijz  can approach the 
value of a Now Print learning signal N at a rate proportional to ijg . Each ijz  thus changes 
by an amount that reflects the degree to which the curves ijg  and N, which represent 
sensory and reinforcement values, respectively, are simultaneously large. If ijg  is large 
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while N is large, then ijz  will increase. If  ijg  is large while N is small, then ijz  will 
decrease. Thus, adaptively timed learning selectively amplifies those 
 
z
ij
 whose sampling 
signals ijg  are on when N is on. Since the ijz  represent adaptively timed learned traces 
that persist across trials, they are not reset to initial values between trials but rather are 
cumulative across trials.  
Signal N is activated transiently by increments in amygdala activity, and is thus 
active at times when the amygdala receives either US or conditioned CS inputs. A direct 
excitatory output signal from amygdala (Appendix A.4.1, Equation 14) and an inhibitory 
signal from an amygdala-activated inhibitory interneuron E (Appendix A.5.8, Equation 
26) combine to compute N (Appendix A.5.8, Equation 25); see Figure 7d. In response to 
larger inputs A, N increases in amplitude, but not significantly in duration. Thus, learning 
rate can change without undermining learned timing.  
3.5.8. Doubly-gated signal spectrum. 
The adaptive weight ijz  gates the sampling signal ijg  to generate a twice-gated 
output signal 
 
h
ij
= 8 f (x
ij
)y
ij
z
ij
 from each of the differently timed cell sites (Appendix 
A.5.4, Equation 18); see Figure 11d. Comparison of ijh  with ijg  in Figure 11d shows 
how the population response 
,
ij
i j
R h  learns to match the ISI.  
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3.5.9. Hippocampal BDNF. 
R  causes production and release of hippocampal BDNF BH  (Appendix A.5.9, 
Equation 27). Sustained BDNF activity helps to maintain hippocampal activity even 
longer than R  can, and thus its incentive motivational support to orbitofrontal cortex 
across the CS-US ISI intervals during trace conditioning and memory consolidation 
(Figure 7e).  
3.6. The Pontine Nuclei. 
3.6.1. Final common path for conditioned output. 
Projections from the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex input to the pontine nuclei 
(Figure 7g). Pontine activity P controls output signals that generate a CR (Kalmbach et. 
al., 2009; Siegel et al., 2012; Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft, 2007; see Appendix A.6.1, 
Equation (22)). 
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CHAPTER 4. Results 
4.1. Summary of six key simulation measures. 
Using a single set of model paramenters except when the US intensity was varied, 
the following measurements are used to simulate the experimental data. Where there is an 
intact or partial hippocampus in the simulation, the adaptively timed signal within the 
hippocampus, R, is used to illustrate how the hippocampus reflects CR-timed 
performance, as seen in many experimental data (Smith, 1968; Schmaltz & Theios, 1972; 
Berger, 1984; Thompson, 1988). Orbitofrontal cortical activity, O, is reported since it is 
involved in activating downstream conditioned motor outputs (Kalmbach, et. al., 2009; 
Siegel et al., 2012; Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft, 2007); and is a critical site of long-term 
memory consolidation in the model (Appendix A.5.3, Equation 17). In addition, the 
activity of the pontine nuclei P (Appendix A.6.1, Equation 28) is reported in all cases 
because it serves as a common output path for CR (Kalmbach, et. al., 2009; Siegel, et al., 
2012; Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft, 2007). To understand how CR activity is generated in 
the pons, the activity profiles of sensory cortex (S), amygdala (A), and hippocampus (H) 
are also reported. 
These key output measures are a function of all of the variables in the system. To 
understand some of the dynamics that will be described in the following sections, 
consider orbitofrontal cortical activity (Oi). nSTART model parameters have been 
selected such that a true winner-take-all (WTA) competition for orbitofrontal cortical 
activity is not operative since activation remains in each of the two nodes representing the 
CS and the US throughout learning and retention testing. As illustrated in Appendix B.4, 
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the retention test outcome after 20 trials, Oi does not exhibit a WTA profile but rather a 
dynamic equilibrium. The graph of Oi (first row, third column) shows the critical impact 
of the associated learning variables wTi, wAi and wHi (third row, second, third, and fourth 
columns, respectively) and cortical BDNF BOi (third row, first column) on cortical 
activity. Appendix B also shows the time course of all nSTART system variables during 
normal trace conditioning during acquisition trial 1, 5 and 20 (Appendices B.1, B.2 and 
B.3, respectively) so that the change in each variable is illustrated as learning continues. 
Note that the graph for the adaptively timed signal within the hippocampus, R, (fourth 
row, fifth column) shows the output form all previous trials in the run. The description of 
each variable and its role in the processing steps for nSTART conditioning is given in 
Figure 7, a circuit diagram of their interactions in Figure 18, and a list of them in Table 1 
in Appendix A.  
4.2. Simulation of normal trace conditioning. 
Figure 8a shows behavioral data for normal trace conditioning during rabbit 
nictitating membrane conditioning for multiple ISIs in response to different US levels 
(Smith, 1968). These data exhibit the Weber law property whereby smaller ISIs generate 
earlier response peaks with narrower variances. The data also generally show the typical 
inverted-U envelope through time at each US intensity level for each ISI curve as well as 
collectively as the ISI increases. Finally, the data show that, whereas conditioned 
response timing is only sensitive to the ISI, response amplitude is also sensitive to US 
intensity (1, 2, and 4 MA).  
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Under the learning conditions in the Smith (1968) experiments, where a living 
animal has much more complex knowledge, motivation, and attentional distractions than 
in a computational model like nSTART, 110 trials, on each of 10 consecutive days, were 
completed to obtain the given CR data, which are smoothed averages of the individual 
trials. Smith noted that his data of “average topographies present a somewhat distorted 
picture of individual CRs…the later peak of the averaged response appeared to be later 
than the mean of the individual responses” (Smith, 1968, p.683; see Figure 8a).  
Figure 8b shows how hippocampal adaptive timing R  in nSTART simulates 
these properties of normal conditioning on a recall trial, in response to the CS alone, after 
20 prior learning trials for each ISI in response to three different US amplitudes. The 
peak activities and timing of both the cortex and the pontine nuclei (Figure 8d) reflect the 
properties of the adaptively timed hippocampal output to them. 
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Figure 8. Data and simulations of trace conditioning at multiple ISIs. (a) Data showing trace 
conditioning data at multiple ISIs for different US levels (Smith, 1968).  (b) Simulation of Smith data by 
nSTART model is based on 20 acquisition trials per ISI for time = 1 to 2000 ms, US level =1 (solid line), 2 
(thicker solid line), and 4 (thickest solid line). The hippocampal output signal R (Equation 17) is plotted for 
a retention test trial in response to the CS alone. Simulating qualitative properties of the data, peak 
amplitude of each curve is near its associated ISI of 125, 250, 500 and 1000 ms, respectively. The model is 
sensitive to US intensity. (c) A comparison of the normal simulation of the Smith data in (b) using US level 
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=1 (solid line), with simulation of two abnormal treatments: with no hippocampal BDNF (dashed-line) and 
with no hippocampal BDNF and no cortical BDNF (dotted-line). Short ISIs show an increase in amplitude, 
longer ISIs show a decrease. (d) Activity in the pontine nuclei (P) for a retention test in response to the CS 
only: ISI = 125 ms (dotted line), ISI = 250 ms (dotted-dashed line), ISI = 500ms (dashed line), ISI = 1000 
ms (solid line). The CS input is shown as a vertical dashed bar starting at a CS onset at 1 ms. Short ISIs 
(125 ms and 250 ms) do not exhibit typical pontine profiles; in vivo, very short ISIs are likely processed 
directly by the pons and its connection to the cerebellum. As the ISI becomes longer and a CR is more 
reliant on the timed orbitfrontal connection to the pons, pontine activity matches the experimental data. 
 
When orbitofrontal BDNF BO1 (Section 3.3.3) is eliminated after acquisition trials in 
model simulations, adaptive timing is impacted more negatively for longer ISIs (Figure 
8c). This learning impairment is due to a weakened cortico-cortico-hippocampal 
feedback loop, which is critical in trace conditioning.  
nSTART is robust in that, with a single set of parameters, it can learn long ISIs 
better under normal conditions with additional learning trials; for example, the retention 
test output for ISI = 1000 after 20 and 40 acquisition trials shows that peak R amplitude 
and timing changed from 0.5616 at 911 ms to 0.5393 at 949 ms, respectively. The 
activity profiles of the pontine nuclei are consistent with these results: P peak amplitude 
and timing changed from 1.311 at 639 ms, at 20 trials, to 1.689 at 601 ms, at 40 trials. 
These peak timings are within the effective 400ms signaling window that has been found 
experimentally (Kalmbach, et. al., 2009; Siegel, et al., 2012; Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft, 
2007).  
4.3. Delay conditioning with and without hippocampus. 
A comparison of simulations of delay conditioning after 5 training trials with and 
without hippocampal lesions (see H  in Figure 9a) and indicates that an intact model 
hippocampus is not required for delay conditioning (see P  in Figure 8a), as also occurs 
typically in the data (see Table 1, Section 4.9). The involvement of the amygdala in each 
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case (normal, 50% partial ablation, and 80% partial ablation) is apparent when their peak 
activities are compared. While in vivo the cerebellum typically is able to learn delay 
conditioning without forebrain processing, the model illustrates how the amygdala may 
motivationally support a parallel input channel to the pontine activity found in normal 
delay conditioning.  
This effect is enhanced after 10 training trials (Figure 9b). In vivo, output 
pathways like the pontine pathway are supplemented by adaptively timed cerebellar 
response learning, which would strengthen these tendencies.  
 
Figure 9. Simulation of delay conditioning data. The hippocampus is not required for delay conditioning. 
(a) To simulate hippocampal lesions before any delay conditioning trials, the scalar H in the hippocampus 
excitation term in Equation 16 was progressively decreased. There were 5 training trials with US onset at 
550 ms, US duration = 50 ms, US offset at 600 ms, and US level = 1. The results show network activations 
in response to a CS after training: sensory cortex (S), orbitofrontal cortex (O), hippocampus (H), amygdala 
(A), hippocampal adaptive timing (R), and the pontine nuclei (P). The CS is represented by vertical solid 
lines, the US onset during training by a vertical dashed line (in delay conditioning, the CS offset and the US 
offset coincide). Delay conditioning shows little change in pontine activity in the normal (solid line) versus 
50% (dashed line) and 80% (dotted line) lesions. (b) 10 learning trials, instead of the 5 trials in (a), yield 
better learning, including at the orbitofrontal cortex. 
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Experimental data when the ISI is relatively long, for example, 1500 ms in rats, do show 
deficits in the initial timing and amplitude of the CR, and in the time to acquire the CR, 
when hippocampus is damaged. These experimenters (Beylin, et al., 2001) counted any 
response within 500 ms of US onset as a CR. We do not simulate this finding due to the 
variability of these results. They can, however, be qualitatively explained if the sensory 
cortical responses habituate at later times when the CS is sustained for such long 
durations. Then an at least partial temporal gap would be created between internal CS 
activations and US onset. This kind of result could then be explained using the same 
mechanisms that are used to explicit deficits during trace conditioning after hippocampal 
damage (Section 4.5).  
4.4. Delay and trace conditioning with and without amygdala. 
Simulations of amygdala lesions are also consistent with experimental data 
(graphs labeled A in Figure 10). Delay conditioning with partial and complete amygdala 
lesions demonstrate the experimental finding (Lee & Kim, 2004) that the amygdala is 
required for optimal acquisition and retention of the CR, as reflected in the simulated 
hippocampal response amplitude for adaptive timing (R), the orbitofrontal cortical 
response amplitude (O), and especially the pontine response amplitude (P). To simulate 
partial lesions of the amygdala in delay conditioning, the gain of the excitatory inputs 
from the sensory cortex to the amygdala (Appendix A.4.1, Equation 14, parameter A ) is 
lowered from the baseline value of 40 to 30, and then to 20. When the growth rate is thus 
attenuated, there is normal timing in delay conditioning but with a smaller peak 
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amplitude in the amygdala, and also in the hippocampus, which depends upon amygdala-
triggered Now Print signals to train the temporal distribution of spectrally timed 
hippocampal learning (Figure 10a). The lower peak amplitude reflects the fact that in vivo 
there is slower and weaker learning of the adaptively timed response. The experimental 
finding that 4 to 5 more days of training rats with amygdala lesions can support learning 
of the CR (Lee and Kim, 2004) may also include support from extra-amygdala circuits. 
Additional training also improves learning in the model (Figure 10b). However, when the 
amygdala is completely ablated before training, there is no hippocampal response. The 
cortical and pontine peak amplitudes show similar results.  
The dynamics of the nSTART cortico-cortico-hippocampal loop explains how 
aversive conditioning can occur with partial amygdala lesions. Activity in the model 
orbitofrontal cortex, based in part on hippocampal and amygdala inputs (Appendix A.3.1, 
Equation 7), continues to support adaptively timed learning via its input to sensory cortex 
(Appendix A.2.1, Equation 2), and sensory cortical input to the hippocampal activation 
spectrum (Appendix A.3.5, Equation 19) supports adaptively timed learning (Appendix 
A.3.3, Equation 17). For this to occur, there has to be enough amygdala input to generate 
a Now Print signal that shapes the adaptively timed response through learning. In vivo, 
other circuits are also involved that are outside the scope of the nSTART model (see 
Figure 2), such as cerebellum, hypothalamus, and basal ganglia, but their responses are 
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not rate-limiting in simulating the main effects above. 
 
Figure 10. Simulation of amygdala lesion data. Simulations of amygdala lesions demonstrate that the 
amygdala is required for optimal acquisition but not for successful retention. (a) To simulate partial lesions 
of the amygdala before any training trials occur in delay conditioning (5 training trials; US onset at 550 ms, 
US duration = 50 ms, US offset at 600 ms, US level = 1), scalar A in the amygdala excitation term in 
Equation 14 was progressively decreased. The results based on the CS-only presentation during retention 
testing are presented on a single graph of the variables for sensory cortex (S), orbitofrontal cortex (O), 
hippocampus (H), amygdala (A), hippocampal adaptive timing (R), and pontine nuclei (P): normal (solid 
line), 25% decrease (dashed line) and 50% decrease (dotted line). These graphs show a marker for the US 
presented in training for reference only (vertical dashed lines). The CS is also represented (vertical solid 
lines). Accurate CR peak amplitude timing as measured by R remained consistent in all cases as in vivo but 
require additional training for improved responses (see Figure 10b). The activity profiles of the pontine 
nuclei vary with the strength and timing of cortical activity to effect a CR. In vivo they are supplemented by 
learning in the cerebellum, where an adaptively-timed association is made between signals from the tone 
CS pathway from auditory nuclei to the pons, and from the pons via mossy fiber projections to the 
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cerebellum, where they are trained by signals from the reflex US pathway from the trigeminal to inferior 
olive nuclei and then via climbing fibers to the cerebellum (Christian & Thompson, 2003; Fiala, Grossberg, 
& Bullock, 1996). (b) Simulation after 10 delay conditioning training trials after partial lesions of the 
amygdala. All other input parameters and output variables are the same as in Figure 10a. The CR peak 
amplitude improved as measured by R. Again, the activity profiles of the pontine nuclei vary with the 
strength and timing of cortical activity. (c) Simulation of partial lesions of the amygdala before any training 
trials occur in trace conditioning (20 training trials, US onset at 750 ms, US duration = 50 ms, US level = 1) 
show that both the CR amplitude and timing as measured by R and P are negatively impacted: normal 
(solid line), 25% decrease (dashed line) and 50% decrease (dotted line). The activity profiles of the pontine 
nuclei (P) reflect the experimental data that amygdala is important in trace conditioning. (d) Trace 
conditioning with amygdala (A) ablated 100% after 20 acquisition trials but just before the retention test. 
On retention test with CS only, normal activity profiles for CS and US in sensory cortex (S) and 
orbitofrontal cortex (O) support normal adaptively-timed response in hippocampus (R), indicating a time-
limited involvement of the amygdala during acquisition. The activity profile of the pontine nuclei (P) also 
supports the simulation of the data that amygdala involvement is time-limited. 
 
The amygdala is required for delay conditioning acquisition, but not for its expression. 
The cortico-cortico-cerebellar circuit can execute the timed response after learning. 
Simulations of complete amygdala lesions (outputs of Appendix A.4.1, Equation 14 for 
amygdala and Equation 15 for conditioned reinforcement are both zero) show that there 
is no CR learned if the lesion is made pre-training, but an acquired CR is retained if the 
lesion is made post-training (Figure 10d), in agreement with some experimental data (Lee 
& Kim, 2004; Sosina, 1993) but not all (McGaugh, 2002; Siegel, et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, while Buchel et al., (1999) had reported decelerated trace conditioning 
when amygdala lesions were made before training, simulation of a 50% partial lesion of 
the amygdala before trace conditioning followed by a retention test after 60 training trials 
(US onset at 750 ms, US level = 1) still shows severe impairments compared with 20 
training trials. Perhaps the lesion is so large that recovery may not be possible at all 
(Siegel, et al., 2015).  
In particular, the amygdala has been found to be unnecessary for fear conditioning 
acquisition in Pavlovian experimental paradigms in which the aversive US is so negative 
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that autonomic reflex pathways may control the learning (Lehman et al., 2000; 
Vazdarjanova & McGaugh, 1998). However, in appetitive learning and instrumental 
conditioning, the amygdala is always required for acquisition (Cahill & McGaugh, 1990; 
McGaugh, 2002). This latter property is explained by the model hypothesis that 
conditioned reinforcer learning and incentive motivational learning both involve the 
amygdala, and provide positive attentional feedback that supports the rapid category 
learning required to enable the CS to elicit a CR via the orbitofrontal cortex (Figure 2). 
Within the dynamics of the nSTART model, this kind of amygdala-mediated motivated 
attention supports the acquisition of delay and trace conditioning by strengthening 
adaptively timed attentional shifts based on learned cues. After conditioning, both delay 
and trace CRs may be mediated more completely by fast cortico-cortical activation of 
recognition categories via learned cortical weights that serve to activate the adaptively-
timed cerebellar motor response without continued need for involvement of the amygdala 
or the hippocampus.  
The nSTART model predicts that, if both amygdala and hippocampus are ablated 
before or after delay conditioning, then the amygdala lesion most influences delay 
conditioning, as above. If both amygdala and hippocampus are ablated before trace 
conditioning, then the model proposes how the hippocampal damage prevents the CR 
from being learned, because the required cortico-cortical connections that establish long-
term memory trace could not be formed using spectral timing as a temporal bridge. 
Finally, if both amygdala and hippocampus are ablated long enough after trace 
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conditioning ends, then the model predicts that strong learned cortico-cortical 
associations will already have formed.  
Such cortico-cortical learning, supported by amygdala and hippocampus, is a 
primary form of memory consolidation in the model, but this form of consolidation does 
not imply that the "same information" is transferred from associative links that involve 
amygdala and hippocampus to cortico-cortical associations. In addition, the mechanism 
for memory consolidation that is simulated by nSTART does not propose that memory 
engrams are quickly learned by the hippocampus and then slowly transferred to the 
neocortex, as some have proposed, a proposal that seems beset with fundamental 
difficulties; see Section 5.2. Rather, nSTART demonstrates how hippocampal 
endogenous activation capable of bridging the temporal gap can energize the 
strengthening and consolidation of cortico-cortical pathways that are the same pathways 
that were partially learned before consolidation begins.  
For simplicity, the nSTART model lumps amygdala and hypothalamus together, 
and thus does not simulate how spared hypothalamic connections might enable 
responding after an amygdala lesion. The MOTIVATOR model (Section 2.3, Figure 4c; 
Dranias, Grossberg, & Bullock, 2008; Grossberg, Bullock, & Dranias, 2008) explicitly 
simulates hypothalamic, amygdala, and basal ganglia contributions to conditioning and 
motivated performance that are consistent with the current results, and that can be 
incorporated without undermining the current results in a future extended model. 
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4.5. Trace conditioning with and without hippocampus. 
Data from early, intermediate, and late stages of normal trace conditioning trace 
acquisition trials (McEchron & Disterhoft, 1997; Kim et al., 1995; Takehara et al., 2003) 
were simulated. In the nSTART model, learning to adaptively time a response to a 
stimulus is the result of an adaptively timed spectrum of cells (Section 3.5). Figures 11a-e 
show the spectral activity and output during the simulation after the initial acquisition 
trial. This process unfolds as follows (see Figure 7 for diagrams of network processing 
steps and Figure 18 for a complete circuit diagram).  
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Figure 11. Trace conditioning simulation data. Trace conditioning simulation data from the initial 
acquisition trial (a-e) compare well with experimental data in (f) that show average voltage measure for 
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eyeblink response (closure upward) of excitatory hippocampal pyramidal cells during trace conditioning 
(f). (a) Hippocampal activation spectrum (f(x1j), see Equations 19 - 21). (b) Habituative transmitter gates 
(y1j, Equation 22). (c) Transmitter-Gated signals. (g1j = f(x1j)y1j, Equation 23). (d) Adaptively timed gated 
signals (h1j = 8g1jz1j, Equation (18). (e) Population response ( ,1
R h
jj
   Equation 17) after one training 
trial. This curve compares well with: (f) Experimental data showing voltage measures for eyeblink 
responses averaged across animals for a single day of training, from a study of hippocampal CA1 
pyramidal cell activity during trace conditioning. The CS duration is marked by the leftmost vertical dashed 
lines; the US by the rightmost vertical dashed lines. (g) The hippocampal activation spectrum at retention 
after 20 conditioning trials. [Data in (f) reprinted with permission from McEchron & Disterhoft (1997).] 
 
As described in Sections 3.5.5, the signals f(xij) are generated by the activities 
xij(t) of the j
th spectral cell (or cell population) (i,j) in response to the ith input Ii 
(Appendix A.5.5, Equations 19 - 21, and Figure 11a). Each xij responds at a different rate 
rj to Ii. In particular, we use i = 1 to represent the CS and i = 0 to represent the US. Thus, 
f(x1j) signals are generated by the CS. They cause the release of chemical transmitters 
y1j(t) that habituate, or are inactivated, at a rate proportional to their driving signals f(x1j) 
(Appendix A.5.5, Equation 19, and Figure 11b). The transmitters interact with, or gate, 
their respective signals to generate gated sampling signals g1j that are products of f(x1j) 
and y1j (Figure 11c). These sampling signals g1j are the differently timed responses of cell 
sites that together form the basis for spectrally timed learning.  
Learning of the association between CS and US occurs at each spectral cell site 
only when its g1j is positive. Thus, each g1j samples learning of US activity that is 
correlated with it. Both the timing and rate of learning by the adaptive timing weights z1j 
(Appendix A.5.8, Equation 24) covary with the size of the corresponding g1j. Due to the 
fact that the various g1j have their peak activities at different times, each site is maximally 
sensitive to learning correlations with different delays between CS and US.  
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The signals g1j give rise to adaptively timed outputs 
 
h
ij
= 8g
ij
z
ij
wherein the signals 
g1j are multiplied, or gated, by their adaptive weights z1j  (Figure 11d). When the 
adaptively weighted signals for all spectral components are added together, they form a 
total population output R that is adaptively timed to peak at, or near, the expected time of 
US onset. Thus, spectral timing is a property of an entire population of pathways that 
respond at different rates, no one of which, by itself, adequately represents accurate ISI 
timing. The hippocampal response after the initial acquisition trial is shown in Figure 
11e. Figure 11f shows data of McEchron & Disterhoft (1997) that exhibits similar timing 
from early acquisition trials. Figure 11g shows simulation output from the retention test 
after 20 acquisition trials; cf., Figure 8. 
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Figure 12. Optimal trace conditioning depends on an intact hippocampus. Optimal trace conditioning 
depends on adequate hippocampus function. (a) To simulate partial lesions of the hippocampus before any 
training trials occur in trace conditioning, scalar H in the hippocampal excitation term in Equation 16 was 
progressively decreased. This was followed by 20 training trials, with US onset at 750 ms, US duration = 
50 ms, and US amplitude = 1. The results of retention testing are shown for the activities of sensory cortex 
(S), orbitofrontal cortex (O), hippocampus (H), amygdala (A), hippocampal adaptive timing (R), and the 
pontine nuclei (P). These graphs show a marker for the US presented in training for reference only (vertical 
dashed lines. The CS is also represented (vertical solid lines). Compared with normal retention testing 
results after 20 acquisition trials results (solid line), a 50% decrease (dashed line) gave a small reduction in 
CR peak amplitude and retained good timing while an 80% decrease (dotted line) caused deficits in both 
amplitude and timing. (b) While extended training (60 trials rather than 20) with 80% ablation shows minor 
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improvement in the amplitude and timing of R, the amplitude and timing of P remain too small to support a 
normal CR. An intact hippocampus is thus required for efficient trace conditioning. 
 
The simulation of the property that trace conditioning depends on an intact hippocampus 
is shown in Figure 12. The model proposes how a neurotrophic cascade from 
hippocampus to cortex supports learning of an associative connection between sensory 
cortex and orbitofrontal cortex in response to CS and US pairing during trace 
conditioning (Appendix A.3.2, Equation 9). Unless there is enough time to build the 
cortico-cortical synaptic connections required to consolidate memory, both the timing 
and amplitude of learning rapidly degrade, as in anterograde amnesia (see Section 4.7).  
Figure 12a summarizes simulations of how various levels of hippocampal ablation 
(normal: solid line; 50% ablation: dashed line; 80% ablation: dotted line) cause 
progressively weaker responses that also become premature after sufficient ablation. 
These effects are due to the elimination of many, but not all, of the adaptively timed 
hippocampal cell responses that, taken together, span the ISI, as shown in Figures 11a-e. 
The duration of this spectral activity is also a key to understanding the role of the 
hippocampus in trace conditioning and consciousness (see Section 4.7). Even in the case 
of an 80% lesion, Figure 12b shows that extended training yields some improvement in 
the timing and amplitude of response indicators for adaptive timing within the 
hippocampus (R) and the pontine nuclei (P).  
The nSTART prediction of when and how the hippocampus is involved in cortical 
learning was described in Section 3.5 and is illustrated by the simulation results in 
Figures 13. Figure 13a simulates the property that the establishment of a long-term 
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memory as a result of trace conditioning requires a critical consolidation period with a 
normally functioning hippocampus. Figure 13a (first row) compares effects of early 
hippocampal ablation with delayed hippocampal ablation on orbitofrontal peak 
amplitude, which provides one measure of the strength of the CR. In the partially trained 
case with five acquisition trials (first row, left column), a reduction in cortical activity 
results if the hippocampal ablation is made early (dotted line), immediately after 
acquisition and before the consolidation period, during which there are no stimulus (NS) 
trials before the CS, as compared with the activity that is attained after a late ablation 
(solid line), which is made after the NS trials and just before CS. In contrast, in the fully 
trained case after 20 acquisition trials (first row, right column), no impairment ensues. 
There is no difference in orbitofrontal activity between early hippocampal ablation 
(dotted line) and late hippocampal ablation (solid line) because cortico-cortical 
connections have already become sufficiently large before the ablation occurs. These 
simulations are in agreement with experimental data (Kim et al., 1995; McEchron & 
Disterhoft, 1997; Moyer, et al., 1990; Takehara et al., 2003). 
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Figure 13. Simulation of consolidation with early versus late hippocampal ablation. Simulations of 
early versus late hippocampal ablation after trace conditioning trials with US onset at 750 ms, US duration 
= 50 ms, and US amplitude = 1. There is a critical period after learning trials end that is sensitive to 
hippocampal ablation, as shown in changes in the peak amplitude of the cortical CR when post-acquisition 
hippocampal ablation follows learning with 5 acquisition trials (left column; partially trained) and 20 
acquisition trials (right column; fully trained). Three cases are simulated: (a) the normal baseline system, 
(b) with no post-acquisition hippocampal BDNF and (c) with no post-acquisition hippocampal BDNF and 
no post-acquisition cortical BDNF. In each treatment, training trials are followed by various periods of no 
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stimulus (NS) trials (durations of inter-trial intervals) with hippocampal ablation either relatively early or 
late. A retention test with CS presentation follows the NS period. Cortical peak amplitude (first rows) and 
CS-activated cortico-cortical adaptive weights (second rows) in each simulation are shown for late 
hippocampal ablation (solid lines) and early hippocampal ablation (dotted lines) for each treatment.  
 
The adaptive weights from sensory cortex to orbitofrontal cortex for each of the cases in 
Figure 13a (first row) are shown in Figure 13a (second row). In particular, the lower two 
graphs show cortico-cortical adaptive weights that covary with the orbitofrontal cortical 
activity for each scenario.  After partial training with 5 acquisition trials, early 
hippocampal ablation prevents an increase in adaptive weight because a critical source of 
incentive motivational support from the hippocampus is removed before the weight can 
reach an asymptote (Figure 13a, second row, left column, dotted line). Late hippocampal 
ablation (Figure 13a, left column, solid line) enables weight learning to benefit from this 
support. After 20 trials of training to asymptote, hippocampal support is no longer needed 
(Figure 13a, second row, right column).  
It should, however, be emphasized that activation of sensory cortex will continue 
to activate both the orbitofrontal cortex and hippocampus after learning is complete. This 
kind of memory consolidation does not imply that the "memory trace" moves from 
hippocampus to orbitofrontal cortex (cf., Nadel and Moscovitch, 1997).  
When hippocampal BDNF is eliminated after acquisition trials (Figure 13b), the 
simulation results are largely unchanged. However, when both hippocampal and 
orbitofrontal BDNF are removed after acquisition trials in the partially trained case 
(Figure 13c, left column), there are the same deleterious effects on orbitofrontal activity 
(Figure 13c, left column, first row) and on cortico-cortical weights (Figure 13c, left 
column, second row) for both the early and late ablation treatments, due to the lack of 
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orbitofrontal BDNF support for consolidation. In the fully trained case (Figure 13c, right 
column), removal of hippocampal and orbitofrontal BDNF during early and late ablation 
treatments yield similar orbitofrontal activities (Figure 13c, right column, first row) and 
cortico-cortical weights (Figure 13c, right column, second row) because consolidation 
has already occurred. Measures of pontine activity in the model also support this analysis 
since they are driven by cortical input. 
4.6. Delay and trace conditioning with and without thalamus or sensory 
cortex. 
Thalamic lesions negatively affect many types of learning since the thalamus is 
the gateway to perception and higher-levels of emotional and cognitive processing. 
Experimental data on thalamic lesions before delay or trace conditioning slow acquisition 
to some degree (Buchman & Thompson, 1990; Powell & Churchwell, 2002). However, 
the deficit is greater in trace conditioning than in delay conditioning, since there are then 
alternate paths available for auditory CS representations to the cerebellum.  
The model predicts that lesions to thalamus, with an equivalent effect on sensory 
cortex, that are made after delay or trace conditioning would also impair retention for two 
reasons: (1) disruption of stimulus input processing, and (2) damage to the pathways that 
support cortico-cortical learning of the association between CS and US, which also serve 
to control CR performance in the post-consolidation stage of learning. Figure 14 shows 
that general CR acquisition is impaired in proportion to the extent of the lesion, as 
reflected in the simulated hippocampal response amplitude (R), orbitofrontal cortex (O), 
and pontine nuclei (P). The simulations show that, as in vivo for thalamic lesions, the 
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disruption to trace conditioning (Figure 14b) is more severe than disruption to delay 
conditioning (Figure 14a). Extended training (doubling the number of training trials) 
improves performance for delay conditioning (Figure 14c) but causes little improvement 
for trace conditioning in the lesion cases, although it does cause improvement in the no 
lesion case (Figure 14d). 
 
Figure 14. Simulations of sensory cortical or thalamic lesions. Simulations of lesions of the thalamus, 
with equivalent effects on sensory cortex, demonstrate that the sensory cortex is required for optimal 
acquisition and retention in both delay and trace conditioning. To simulate partial lesions of the sensory 
cortex before any training trials occur, scalar S in the sensory cortex (Equation 2) was progressively 
decreased: normal = solid line, 25% decrease = dashed line, and 50% decrease = dotted line. The results of 
retention testing by CS presentation are shown for sensory cortex (S), orbitofrontal cortex (O), 
hippocampus (H), amygdala (A), hippocampal adaptive timing (R), and the pontine nuclei (P). Vertical 
dashed lines mark the time of US presentation during training, but not recall, trials. Vertical solid lines 
mark the onset and offset of the CS during training trials. Lesions to the sensory cortex weaken learning as 
a function of the conditioning paradigm and the extent of the lesion, with a special focus on O and P. (a) 
Recall after 5 training trials of delay conditioning in all three cases. (b) Worse trace conditioning was seen 
  
93 
in the lesioned cases, even after 20 training trials, than in the corresponding delay conditioning cases in (a). 
(c) Doubling the number of training trials during delay conditioning to 10 training trials improved 
performance in all three cases. (d) Doubling the number of training trials during trace conditioning to 40 
trials improved performance in the no-lesion case, but had a negligible effect in the two lesioned cases.  
 
4.7. Conditioning, consciousness, and amnesia. 
The link between consciousness and conditioning (Clark, Manns, & Squire, 2002) 
is clarified by contrasting what happens during delay versus trace conditioning in normal 
and amnesic subjects. The nSTART model requires a sustained interaction of sensory 
cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and hippocampus to achieve trace conditioning. From his 
clinical data from brain-damaged patients, Damasio (1999, pp. 157-158, 195ff, 265) 
heuristically derived a CogEM-type model and noted that conscious awareness of “the 
feeling of what happens” relies on a sustained feedback interaction. The nSTART model 
(Figure 2) builds on the START model (Grossberg and Merrill, 1992, 1996) to explain 
this sort of data with its prediction that this sort of conscious awareness is supported by a 
sustained, adaptively timed, cognitive-emotional resonance, which is mechanized as a 
temporal-amygdala-orbitofrontal resonance that is supported by hippocampal feedback. 
This specific resonance specializes the ART prediction that “all conscious states are 
resonant states” (Grossberg, 1999). This explanation clarifies why trace conditioning is 
facilitated by conscious awareness but delay conditioning is not, why a normal subject 
may not be consciously aware of delay conditioning, and why amnesics with bilateral 
hippocampal lesions perform like unaware controls on delay and trace conditioning.  
In particular, the emotional path via amygdala operates more quickly than the 
cognitive path of self-awareness via hippocampus. Furthermore, during delay 
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conditioning, adaptively-timed responding can be controlled through the cerebellum, so 
the hippocampus is not a critical component of successful delay conditioning and, thus, 
neither is awareness.  
Recent experiments have supported the CogEM prediction (Grossberg, 1975, 
1984) that emotional responses are part of an attentive cognitive-emotional resonance, 
and that amygdala activity may be influenced by factors such as stimulus valence, 
attentional load, competing cognitive task demands, and ambiguity (Pessoa, Padmala, & 
Morland, 2005; Pessoa, Japee, & Ungerleider, 2000). These experimental results are, 
moreover, consistent with the hypothesis that a sustained cortico-cortico-hippocampal 
resonance supports consciousness, since parallel hippocampal and amygdala activations 
occur during normal conditioning. Indeed, adaptively-timed hippocampally timed 
cognitive-emotional resonances are predicted to help prevent premature reset by the 
attentional focus on a valued goal object expected disconfirmations by task-irrelevant 
cues; see Section 2.5 (Grossberg & Merrill, 1992, 1996). A hippocampal role is also 
consistent with the facts that lesions to the amygdala slow acquisition of delay 
conditioning, but do not impact already acquired responses (Section 4.4; Lee & Kim, 
2004) and that, although amygdala plays a key role in associative learning, researchers 
also note that: “circuitry within the amygdala (AM) or a closely related structure is 
necessary for some aspects of the formation, maintenance, or expression of these CRs” 
(Choi & Brown, 2003, p. 8713). 
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4.8. Anterograde and retrograde amnesia. 
The model clarifies data related to the production of retrograde amnesia due to 
ablation of the medial prefrontal cortex before, during, or after completion of the 
consolidation process. Whereas the hippocampus is necessary for the acquisition and 
consolidation of trace conditioning (Section 4.5)—the lack thereof causes anterograde 
amnesia and recent retrograde amnesia (Clark, Broadbent, Zola, & Squire, 2002; Clark & 
Squire, 1998; Gabrieli et al., 1995; McGlinchey-Berroth et al., 1997; but see also Bayley, 
Frascino, & Squire, 2005))—the medial prefrontal cortex is necessary for the retention of 
a high percentage of CRs after trace conditioning occurs in normal subjects. In agreement 
with data (Kronforst-Collins & Disterhoft, 1998), the simulated CR that results when the 
orbitofrontal cortex is ablated before or after 20 trace conditioning trials shows impaired 
timing and amplitude in the pontine nuclei responses (Figures 15b and 15d, respectively). 
Takehara et al. (2003) analyzed this phenomenon as a failure to retain or retrieve memory 
of the associated adaptive response, and not a simple failure of adaptive timing, because 
the ablation in their experiments did not affect CR timing. In the nSTART model, the 
notion that the orbitofrontal cortex provides a critical pathway that helps to read-out the 
conditioned response via connections to the pontine nuclei is consistent with this retrieval 
interpretation. In addition, since direct damage to motor cortex does not impair trace 
eyeblink conditioning (Ivkovich & Thompson, 1997), an alternative interpretation that a 
motor circuit has failed is not supported.  
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Figure 15. Simulations of orbitofrontal cortical lesions. Pre-training orbitofrontal cortical lesions do not 
impair delay conditioning as much as trace conditioning. Scalar O in the orbitofrontal cortex (Equation 7) 
was progressively decreased to simulate a lesion. In (a) and (b), the unlesioned normal case = solid line, 5% 
lesion = dashed line, and 10% lesion = dotted line. The CS and US inputs were chosen as in Figure 14. The 
results of retention testing due to CS presentation are shown by graphing the activities of sensory cortex 
(S), orbitofrontal cortex (O), hippocampus (H), amygdala (A), hippocampal adaptive timing (R) and pontine 
nuclei (P): (a) Delay conditioning with 5 acquisition trials. (b) Trace conditioning with 20 acquisition trials. 
(c) Complete lesions after delay conditioning with 5 acquisition trials do not impact the ability to perform 
the CR as reflected in R and P amplitudes, although timing of P is impaired. (d) Complete orbitofrontal 
lesions after trace conditioning with 20 acquisition trials greatly reduce the ability to perform the CR as 
reflected in collapsed R and P amplitudes, and a failure of P timing. Thus orbitofrontal cortex is required 
for performance after trace conditioning in the data and the model. 
 
In the nSTART model, orbitofrontal cortical ablation also interferes with the 
ability of the CS to sustain the learned cortico-cortical resonance that results in an 
adaptively timed response profile of the CR in the hippocampus. Indeed, anterograde 
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amnesia may also result if new memories cannot be consolidated due to cortical insult 
that prevents, or greatly weakens, such a resonance (see Figure 13c). Figures 15a and 15c 
show that, when the model orbitofrontal cortex is ablated before or after 5 delay 
conditioning trials, the CR is not negatively affected, which fits data showing that delay 
conditioning does not require conscious awareness of the stimulus contingencies (Clark 
& Squire, 1998; Manns, Clark & Squire, 2001) and that amnesics can learn delay 
conditioning, but not trace conditioning (Clark, et al., 2001).   
The intact hippocampus may also support sustained conscious resonance during 
normal delay conditioning, but it is not required for the ISI durations in the cited studies: 
“…those conditioning tasks that require the integrity of the hippocampus are the same 
tasks that aware participants can acquire and unaware participants cannot…” (Clark & 
Squire, 2004, p. 1467).  In particular, for these ISIs, there may not have been enough time 
to generate a fully developed conscious cognitive-emotional resonance. 
These simulation results display the temporal properties of hippocampal and 
cortical involvement in normal learning involving declarative memory. Amnesia data 
properties, such as the loss of recent memory, the inability to form new memory, or the 
loss of remote memory, are consistent with these dynamics in terms of the age of the 
memory when processing becomes abnormal: with hippocampal injury, new memories 
rapidly perish while old memories persist; with cortical injury (Figure 13), new memories 
might be formed with support from other structures, depending on what cortical 
structures were damaged, while old memories that critically depend on the cortex perish. 
Cortical injury may involve the lack of activity in ablated areas, or hyperactivity in the 
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remaining functioning cells (Li, Bandrowski, & Prince, 2005). In any case, the magnitude 
of the learning deficit depends on locations and scope of damage. Specific effects of 
interruption on learning and memory—that is, the type of amnesia—are dependent on the 
task, the stage of learning, and the specific brain area that is deficient, among other 
variables. The current model illustrates how lesions of several different brain areas, at 
different times before, during, or after the course of learning, can differentially contribute 
to this complex pattern of behavioral deficits. 
4.9. Summary of simulation results and experimental data. 
In summary, the nSTART model simulates and qualitatively explains key data 
patterns concerning how thalamic, prefrontal cortical, amygdala, and hippocampal lesions 
may influence learning and memory. These data patterns are summarized in Table 1, 
including, for example, the hallmark hippocampal activity profiles over time during delay 
conditioning (Berger et al., 1980) and trace conditioning (McEchron & Disterhoft, 1997), 
the role of hippocampal and cortical lesions in influencing acquisition and retention of 
recently learned versus remotely learned eyeblink responses (Kim et al., 1995; Takehara 
et al., 2003), and the ability of amnesic individuals to do delay conditioning, but not trace 
conditioning, along with corresponding differences in conscious awareness (Clark et al., 
2001).  
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Lesions of 
Hippocampus 
 
Before conditioning Early after conditioning Late after conditioning 
Delay 
paradigm 
CR acquisition- YES 
Berger, 1984 
Chen et al. 1995 
Daum et al. 1989 
Ivkovich & Stanton 2001 
Lee & Kim 2004 
Port, et al. 1983 
Schmaltz & Theios 1972  
Shors, et al. 1992 
Solomon & Moore 1975 
Weizenkratz & 
Warrington 1979 
 
CR retention- YES 
Akase et al. 1989 
Orr & Berger 1985 
Port et al. 1996  
CR retention- NO  
(long ISI) 
Beylin et al. 2001 
 
CR retention- YES 
Akase et al. 1989 
Trace 
paradigm 
CR acquisition- NO 
Anagnostaras et al. 1999 
Berry & Thompson 1979 
Clark & Squire 1998  
Garrud et al. 1984  
Gabrieli et al. 1995  
Ivkovich & Stanton 2001  
James et al. 1987 
Kaneko & Thompson 
1997 
Kim et al. 1995 
Little et al. 1984 
McGlinchey-Berroth et 
al. 1997 
Orr & Berger 1985 
Power & Disterhoft 1999 
Schmajuk et al. 1994 
Schmaltz & Theios 1972 
Solomon & Moore 1975 
Solomon et al. 1990 
Weiss & Thompson 
1991a&b 
CR retention- NO 
Kim et al. 1995 
Moyer et al. 1990 
Takehara et al. 2003 
CR retention- YES  
(short ISI) 
Walker & Steinmetz 2008 
 
CR retention- YES 
Kim et al. 1995 
Takehara et al. 2003 
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Woodruff-Pak  2001 
Lesions of 
Cortex  
 
Before conditioning Early after conditioning Late after conditioning 
Delay 
paradigm 
CR acquisition- YES 
Mauk & Thompson 1987 
McLaughlin et al. 2002 
Oakley & Russell 1972 
Takehara et al. 2003 
Yeo et al. 1984 
 
CR retention- YES 
Oakley & Russell 1972 
Takehara et al. 2003 
Yeo et al. 1984 
 
CR retention- YES 
Oakley & Russell 1972 
Takehara et al. 2003 
Yeo et al. 1984 
 
Trace 
paradigm 
CR acquisition- YES  
Frankland & Bobtempi 
2005 
McLaughlin et al. 2002 
(short ISI) 
Oakley & Steele Russell 
1972 
Simon et al. 2005 
Takehara et al. 2003 
Yeo et al. 1984 
CR acquisition- 
impaired  
Kronforst & Disterhoft 
1998  
McLaughlin et al. 2002 
(long ISI) 
Weible et al. 2000 
CR retention- YES  
Frankland & Bobtempi 2005 
Oakley & Steele Russell 1972 
Simon et al. 2005 
Takehara et al. 2003 
Yeo et al. 1984 
CR retention- NO  
Frankland & Bobtempi 2005 
Oakley & Steele Russell 1972 
Powell et al. 2001 
Simon et al. 2005 
Takehara et al. 2003 
Yeo et al. 1984 
 
 
Lesions of 
Amygdala  
 
Before conditioning Early after conditioning Late after conditioning 
Delay 
paradigm 
CR acquisition- YES 
but decelerated 
Bechara et al. 1995 
Blankenship et al. 2005 
Lee & Kim 2004 
 
CR retention- YES but 
impaired 
Lee & Kim 2004 
McGaugh 2002 
CR retention- YES 
Lee & Kim 2004 
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Trace 
paradigm 
--Data not found 
Predict CR 
acquisition- Yes but 
decelerated 
--Data not found 
Predict CR retention- Yes  
Bϋchel at al. 1999 
Chau & Galvez 2012 
 
--Data not found 
Predict CR retention- Yes  
Bϋchel at al. 1999 
Chau & Galvez 2012 
  
 
 
Lesions of 
Thalamus  
 
Before conditioning Early after conditioning Late after conditioning 
Delay 
paradigm 
CR acquisition- YES 
but decelerated 
Buchanan & Thompson 
1990   
Halverson & Freeman 
2006 
 
--Data not found 
Predict CR retention- Yes 
but impaired 
 
 
--Data not found 
Predict CR retention- Yes 
but impaired 
 
 
Trace 
paradigm 
CR acquisition- YES 
but decelerated 
Powell & Churchland 
2006 
 
--Data not found 
Predict CR retention- Yes 
but impaired 
 
 
--Data not found 
Predict CR retention- Yes 
but impaired 
 
 
Table 1. Experimental data on eyeblink conditioning with lesions. The specific impact to learning and 
memory of the conditioned response by lesions of hippocampus, cortex, amygdala, and thalamus is related 
to the phase of conditioning in which the lesions occur. Representative studies on rats, rabbits, and humans 
used various experimental preparations and performance criteria yet show patterns of effects on the 
acquisition and retention of a CR for delay and trace paradigms based on the age of the memory (degree of 
consolidation).  
 
Additional data support the conclusion that the hippocampus is typically essential during 
acquisition of trace conditioning, while the neocortex is needed for normal retention. In 
particular, research in discriminative avoidance conditioning found that hippocampal 
control of thalamo-cortical excitatory volleys determined timing of CR output during 
acquisition; otherwise, signals from anterior ventral thalamic nuclei and feedback from 
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cingulate cortex area 29 determined timing of CR output during maintenance of learning 
(Gabreil, Sparenborg, & Stolar, 1987). These data support the facts that, while recent 
Nictitating Membrane Response (NMR) learning involving the trace conditioning 
paradigm is severely impaired by hippocampal lesions, its acquisition is resistant to 
cortical lesions. Conversely, NMR trace conditioning retention is not impaired by 
hippocampal lesions, but it is impaired by cortical lesions (Frankland & Bontempi, 2005; 
Oakley & Steele Russell, 1972; Simon, Knuckley, Churchwell, & Powell, 2005; 
Takehara et al., 2003; Yeo, Hardiman, Moore, & Steele Russell, 1984). In cases where 
the ISI is relatively short, the hippocampus is not required to support acquisition of the 
CR (Beylin et al., 2001), corresponding to nSTART short-term memory circuits whose 
persistent activities in both sensory cortical and amygdala representations are capable of 
bridging short temporal gaps.  
The nSTART model proposes how the hippocampus consolidates learning of 
thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical associations by using the same adaptively-timed 
pathways by which the hippocampus learns to adaptively time the appropriate duration of 
motivated attention in a task-selective manner (Grossberg & Merrill, 1992, 1996). By 
means of a consolidation process that is driven by BDNF-mediated endogenous 
hippocampal bursting, which in vivo is also driven by continual periodic septal input 
(Smythe et al., 1992), and BDNF modulation of local, activity-dependent circuits 
(Schuman, 1999; Thoenen, 1995; Tyler et al., 2002), these associations are stored and 
recalled in cortico-hippocampal, hippocampo-cortical and cortico-cortical pathways 
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(Sakurai, 1990), as demonstrated through nSTART computer simulations of the 
corresponding model pathways and mechanisms.  
The fact that amygdala is not required after consolidation of Pavlovian 
conditioning does not contradict the claim of the CogEM model that amygdala is required 
for reinforcement learning for CR acquisition and performance. The polyvalent constraint 
on CogEM during learning is not required for performance in the consolidated case of 
aversive conditioning because the cortico-cortical connection along with extra-amygdala 
circuits, such as those involving volitional signals from the basal ganglia, would be 
sufficient to support performance. Indeed, Chang, Grossberg, and Cao (2014) have 
shown how such a convergence between cortico-cortical and basal ganglia volitional 
signals can initiate a directed search for a desired goal object in a cluttered scene, thereby 
illustrating how the Where’s Waldo problem may be solved. 
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CHAPTER 5. Discussion. 
5.1. Five different types of learning interact during conditioning and memory 
consolidation. 
The nSTART model proposes that at least five different types of learning 
typically occur in parallel to ensure that associations can be formed and consolidated 
across temporal gaps, as occurs during trace conditioning (Figure 2). As defined 
conceptually in Section 2, described mathematically in Section 3, and simulated in 
Section 4, the nSTART model includes: CS category learning of the CS-US association 
via thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical circuits, conditioned reinforcement learning via 
thalamo-amygdala and sensory cortical-amygdala circuits, incentive motivational 
learning via amygdala-orbitofrontal cortical circuits, and adaptively-timed learning of 
motivated attention via sensory cortical-hippocampal-orbitofrontal cortical circuits. There 
is also adaptively-timed learning of motor responses via the cerebellum, but this is not 
simulated in the current study. The key brain structures and processes explicitly 
represented in the nSTART model are summarized in Appendix A.1, Table 2. 
5.2. Multiple hippocampal functions: Space, time, novelty, consolidation, and 
episodic learning. 
The nSTART model does not presume to summarize all the functional roles that 
are played by the hippocampus in vivo. The hippocampus is known to participate in 
multiple functions, including spatial navigation, adaptively-timed conditioning, novelty 
detection, and the consolidation of declarative (notably, episodic) learning and memory. 
The hippocampus hereby raises a general issue that is confronted whenever one tries to 
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understand how a given brain region works: Why does each brain region support a 
particular combination of processes, rather than a different one? How do these processes 
interact in a way that makes functional sense of their anatomical propinquity? Related 
neural models have clarified how some of these other processes work, and why they are 
near one another anatomically. They are briefly reviewed in this section. The articles that 
develop these models include citations of many relevant experimental data.  
In particular, these models indicate that more than one hippocampal process may 
be at work in parallel during memory consolidation. This expanded view of memory 
consolidation is clarified by model explanations of why novelty detection has been linked 
to the process of memory consolidation during the learning of recognition categories, 
whether or not this learning needs to bridge a long temporal gap. Adaptive Resonance 
Theory, or ART, proposes how a memory search can occur during the learning of 
recognition categories, and how a sufficiently big mismatch between learned top-down 
expectations and bottom-up feature patterns can activate the novelty-sensitive orienting 
system (Figure 3), which includes the hippocampus, to drive a memory search for a better 
matching category. The size of such a mismatch registers how novel the current stimulus 
is when calibrated against active top-down expectations. ART explains how such 
memory searches lead to learning of a stable, or consolidated, recognition category that 
requires no further searches, and thus to the cessation of hippocampal novelty potentials 
(Figures 3 and 16). After consolidation of a category is complete, presentation of a 
familiar object exemplar causes direct access to the globally best-matching category via 
thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical pathways.  
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Figure 16. ART circuits for novelty processing. In the START model framework, ART category learning 
circuits and Spectral Timing circuits can both inhibit the orienting system: When a good enough match 
occurs between a feature pattern at level F1 and the top-down expectation from the category level F2, 
inhibition can occur of the orienting system A, thereby preventing a memory search. If inhibition from the 
cognitive-emotional sensory-drive (S−D) resonance that is supported by hippocampal adaptive timing also 
inhibits A, then the orienting system again cannot fire until the adaptively timed signal is removed. The 
former mechanism clarifies how hippocampal novelty potentials fade away as thalamo-cortical and cortico-
cortical category learning consolidates. The latter mechanism clarifies how orienting responses are 
inhibited during expected disconfirmations. 
 
Carpenter & Grossberg (1993) and Grossberg (2013) have noted how these properties can 
qualitatively explain quite a few data about medial temporal amnesia when the model 
hippocampus is ablated, thereby eliminating memory search during the consolidation 
process. These properties include unlimited anterograde amnesia, limited retrograde 
amnesia, perseveration, difficulties in orienting to novel cues, a failure of recombinant 
context-sensitive processing, and differential learning by amnesics and normals on easy 
vs. demanding categorization tasks.  
Thus, in addition to the important role of adaptively-timed hippocampal responses 
in bridging temporal gaps when events to be associated are separated in time, the 
hippocampus is also part of the novelty-sensitive memory search system for consolidating 
thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical category learning. Both of these processes are 
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included in START model circuits (Figure 6), but without the enhancements that have 
enabled nSTART to simulate challenging data about early vs. late lesions of amygdala, 
hippocampus, and orbitofrontal cortex during delay and trace conditioning.  
The adaptively-timed hippocampal circuits are part of a larger theory about why 
both spatial and temporal representations exist within the entorhinal-hippocampal system. 
Neural models have provided a unified explanation of how these spatial representations 
(Mhatre, Gorchetchnikov, and Grossberg, 2012; Grossberg and Pilly, 2012, 2014; Pilly 
and Grossberg, 2012, 2014) and temporal representations (Grossberg and Merrill, 1992, 
1996; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1989) may arise in the entorhinal-hippocampal system 
during development and adult learning, and how they interact with other brain regions to 
control navigational behaviors and episodic learning and memory. This explanation 
emphasizes the fundamental role of brain designs for learning, attention, and prediction, 
and along the way articulates a rigorous mechanistic sense in which the hippocampus is 
indeed a “cognitive map” (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). This learning perspective also 
leads to the prediction that the network laws that give rise to the apparently very different 
behavioral properties of space and time are controlled by mechanistically homologous 
brain mechanisms, thereby clarifying why these spatial and temporal representations both 
occur in the entorhinal-hippocampal system, and how they can thus more easily interact 
to control navigation and episodic memory.  
The timing model in question is the Spectral Timing model that has been used to 
explain and simulate data about normal and abnormal delay and trace conditioning 
(Grossberg & Merrill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1989). Due to the 
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computational homolog between spatial and temporal representations, the spatial model 
is called the Spectral Spacing model (Grossberg & Pilly, 2012, 2014). Both models learn 
to represent spatial and temporal properties of the environments that animals or humans 
experience (Gorchetchnikov & Grossberg, 2007).  
In the case of the Spectral Spacing model, this learning leads to grid cell receptive 
fields of multiple spatial scales along the dorsoventral axis of the medial entorhinal 
cortex that cooperate to form hippocampal place cells that can represent large spaces. In 
the case of the Spectral Timing model, this learning enables “time cells” that response at 
multiple temporal scales to cooperate to represent large time intervals. As noted in 
Section 2.4, the Spectral Timing model predicted in the 1980s the properties of time cells 
that have been reported in the hippocampus during the past few years, notably their 
Weber law properties. In both the Spectral Spacing and Spectral Timing models, a 
spectrum of cell rates generates a spatial gradient of cells with different properties. In the 
case of the Spectral Spacing model, grid cells with increasing spatial scales are learned 
along the dorsoventral axis of the medial entorhinal cortex. In the case of the Spectral 
Timing model, time cells with increasing onset times and variances are generated. It has 
been shown how Spectral Timing can be achieved using properties of the metabotropic 
glutamate receptor (mGluR) system, which proposes a biochemical basis for the ability of 
these cells to span such long time intervals (Fiala, Grossberg, & Bullock, 1996). An open 
question is whether the Spectral Spacing model uses a similar mechanism, suitably 
specialized? 
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These homologous spatial and temporal mechanisms have been used to provide a 
unified theoretical explanation, and quantitative computer simulations, of a body of 
challenging behavioral and neurobiological data about both space and time that have no 
other unified explanation at this time, leading to the name neural relativity for this 
mechanistic homology. In particular, the current study proposes how at least some time 
cells may participate in memory consolidation that requires the ability of the 
hippocampus to bridge across temporal gaps between stimuli that are associated through 
conditioning.  
The coexistence of spatial and temporal learning in the hippocampus may support 
its role in episodic learning and memory, since episodic memories typically combine both 
spatial and temporal information about particular autobiographical events (Eichenbaum 
and Lipton, 2008; Tulving, 1972). The nSTART model does not include spatial 
representations, or the prefrontal working memory and list chunking networks for 
temporary and long-term storage of sequential information, and thus does not attempt to 
explain data about episodic learning and memory. Activation of such spatially-dependent 
episodic memories may always require hippocampal spatial representations, so a 
restricted gradient of retrograde amnesia may not be expected after hippocampal lesions 
that eliminated them. As noted within the "multiple traces" proposal of how memory 
consolidation works (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997, p, 222): "The most parsimonious 
account of the data would be to assume that the hippocampal complex and neocortex 
continue to be involved in both the storage and the retrieval of episodic memory traces 
throughout life".  
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Episodic memories may depend upon knowledge of sequences of correlated 
object and spatial information, not just information about individual ones. This kind of 
sequential information is also important for carrying out context-sensitive searches for 
desired objects in scenes. For example, seeing a refrigerator and a stove at particular 
positions in a familiar kitchen may generate an expectation of seeing a sink at a different 
position. A large psychophysical database about contextual cueing (e.g., Brockmole et 
al., 2010; Chun, 2000; Chun and Jiang, 1998; Jiang and Wagner, 2004; Lleras and von 
Mühlenen, 2004; Olson and Chun, 2002) describes how both object and spatial 
information contribute to such expectations, while they drive efficient searches to 
discover and act upon desired goal objects. The ARTSCENE Search model (Huang & 
Grossberg, 2010) simulates how computation of spatial and object working memories, 
list chunks, and spatial and object priming signals may be accomplished using 
interactions between the perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices (Bar, Aminoff, & 
Schacter, 2008; Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Epstein, Parker, & Feiler, 2007; Murray & 
Richmond, 2001), prefrontal cortex, temporal cortex, and parietal cortex to simulate key 
psychophysical data from contextual cueing experiments. The nSTART, ARTSCENE 
Search, and Spectral Spacing models may in the future be fused to provide a foundation 
on which to build a more complete theory of episodic learning and memory. 
5.3. Alternative models of memory consolidation. 
The popular unitary trace transfer hypothesis assumes that there is a memory 
representation that is first stored in the hippocampus and then transferred to the neocortex 
to be consolidated (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Squire & Alverez, 
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1995). McClelland, et al. (1995) thus propose “a separate learning system in the 
hippocampus and why knowledge originally stored in this system is incorporated in the 
neocortex only gradually” (p. 433). This hypothesis is justified by the assumption that the 
hippocampus can learn quickly, but the neocortex can only learn slowly, so the 
hippocampus is needed to first capture the memory and then that same memory 
representation is transferred to the more slowly learning neocortex. There are, however, 
fundamental conceptual and mechanistic problems with a unitary trace transfer 
hypothesis as presented by McClelland et al. (1995) that persist in more recent 
expositions (Atallah, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2004; O’Reilly & Rudy, 2000): a representation 
problem, a learning rate problem, and a real-time learning problem. These problems are 
illustrated by considering how the unitary trace hypothesis might explain how a normal 
person can see a movie once and remember it well enough to describe it later to a friend 
in considerable detail, even though the scenes flash by quickly.  
 The representation problem concerns the implicit claim that the hippocampus can 
represent and store all the remembered visual and auditory memories in the movie. There 
seems to be no experimental evidence, however, that the hippocampus contains such 
specialized perceptual representations. Moreover, if the hippocampus did contain all the 
perceptual representations that were needed to represent all visual and auditory 
memories, then what does the specialized perceptual circuitry of visual and auditory 
neocortex do? In this regard, the unitary trace modelers never simulate the perceptual 
contents of the memories that are assumed to be stored in hippocampus and transferred to 
neocortex.  
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 The learning rate problem concerns the factual basis for the claim that the 
neocortex must learn slowly. In fact, there are numerous examples that fast perceptual 
and recognition learning can occur in the neocortex (e.g., Fahle, Edelman, & Poggio, 
1995; Kraljic & Samuel, (2006); Sireteanu & Rettenbach, 1995, Stanley & Rubin, 2005; 
Wagman, Shockley, Reley, & Tervey, 2001). In addition, no evidence is presented by 
unitary trace transfer theorists that there are slower learning synapses in neocortex than 
hippocampus. Even one of the proponents of the slow cortical learning hypothesis has 
equivocated on this point: “data that appear to support the limited cortical learning view 
tend to be based on larger lesions of the medial temporal lobe…it is becoming clear that 
the cortex is capable of quite substantial learning on its own…” (O’Reilly & Rudy, 2000, 
p.395).  
The real-time learning problem is admitted by the modelers but not solved. A 
model that has been used in unitary trace model simulations is back propagation. It is 
well-known that this model is not biologically plausible (e.g., Grossberg, 1988, Section 
17). Back propagation must carry out slow learning. Its adaptive weights can change only 
slightly on each learning trial, thus requiring large numbers of acquisition trials to learn 
every item in its memory. If the learning rate is sped up, then the model can experience 
catastrophic forgetting. It is incapable of the kind of fast learning that is experienced 
while watching a movie or other rare but motivationally engaging series of events. It can 
only carry out supervised learning, which means that an explicit teacher provides external 
feedback about the correct response on every learning trial, unlike the unsupervised 
learning that is characteristic of many biological learning experiences, including 
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watching a movie. Its learned weights are computed using an unrealistic non-local weight 
transport mechanism that has no analog in the brain. Finally, because of its slow learning 
requirement, it is important that the data that are being learned have stationary statistical 
properties, so that each weight gets enough exposure to these properties over many 
learning trials to enable enough weight growth to occur. In other words, the probabilities 
of sequential events do not change through time, unlike the world in which we live.  
In order to manage these weaknesses of back propagation, McClelland et al. 
(1995) developed their model based on a process of interleaved learning which is said to 
occur when memories are slowly transferred from the hippocampus to the neocortex via 
incremental adjustments in the neocortical representations, while being supervised by 
hippocampal teaching signals. Various sets of parameter values were used to fit their 
model to each of four data sets with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, the authors 
state that such “…interleaved learning systems... are not at all appropriate for the rapid 
acquisition of arbitrary associations between inputs and responses” (McClelland et al., 
1995, p. 432); in other words, their proposed model cannot do learning in real time. 
Similar explanatory limitations are faced by connectionist models such as the one 
proposed by Moustafa, et al. (2013) that does not simulate biophysical properties of 
neurons, does not use a model that describes the anatomical areas involved in delay and 
trace conditioning, and does not consider the consolidation process. In addition, this 
model assumes a non-existent direct connection from hippocampus to motor output.  
Beyond the self-criticism offered by MeClelland et al. (1995), the unitary trace 
view of memory consolidation has come under criticism from various researchers on both 
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theoretical and experimental grounds. McGaugh (2000) points to protein synthesis and 
various neurotransmitters as providers of endogenous modulation of consolidation. In his 
view, the supposition that the molecular and cellular machinery of consolidation memory 
works slowly is “clearly wrong” (p. 248). Rather, consolidation seems slow because on-
going experience modulates memory strength. In McGaugh's view, the amygdala plays a 
central role in modulating memories and, thus, in memory consolidation. Lesions of the 
amygdala disrupt the influence of epinephrine and glucocorticoids from the adrenal gland 
and, therefore, the consolidation process. In this view, the time-limited role of the 
hippocampus is to serve as a locus in memory processing in a wider consolidation circuit 
that includes bidirectional cortico-hippocampal interactions. Nadel and Bohbot (2001) 
inferred a process of consolidation from retrograde amnesia, but do not see consolidation 
as a transfer of memory from the hippocampus to other areas. Rather, interactions 
between systems preserve their respective specializations. All of these heuristic proposals 
have points of contact within the nSTART model. 
Building on the critique of McClelland et al. (1995) given in Grossberg & Merrill 
(1996), the nSTART model embodies a quite different proposal of hippocampal function 
than that of the MeClelland et al. (1995) model of consolidation. The nSTART model 
avoids the representation problem because neocortex and hippocampus learn different 
things. It avoids the learning rate problem because neocortex can learn as fast as sensory 
inputs and modulatory processes allow. It avoids the real-time learning problem because 
the fast real-time incremental learning that ART, CogEM, and START allow does not 
require unrealistic learning mechanisms such as interleaving, and works well in 
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environments whose statistics can change unpredictably through time (Carpenter & 
Grossberg, 1991, 1993; Grossberg, 2003, 2007, 2013; Grossberg & Levine, 1987; 
Grossberg & Merrill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1987, 1989). 
Additionally, the nSTART model proposes how three basic learning problems are solved 
(Section 1.2): It enables fast motivated attention to be paid to salient objects and events 
using pathways to and from the amygdala that support conditioned reinforcer and 
incentive motivational learning (Figures 2 and 4-6). It maintains motivated attention for 
an appropriate duration on salient objects and events using an adaptively-timed cortical-
hippocampal-cortical circuit that also inhibits unwanted orienting reactions (Figure 6). 
Finally, it prevents premature responses using adaptively-timed cerebellar motor learning 
(Figures 2 and 17). Thus, the hippocampal influence on cortical learning is not just a 
transfer of the same memory trace, but rather the result of interactions between multiple 
types of learning and multiple traces of memory consolidtion.  An enhanced 
understanding in nSTART of the role of neurotrophins in the creation and maintenance of 
memory and the role of attention in the generation of awareness and self-consciousness 
builds upon this analysis.  
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Figure 17. Paths to the cerebellum.  (a) START model adaptively timed cerebellar learning circuit: 
Adaptively timed learning at at cerebellar Purkinje cells causes Long Term Depression, or LTD, of 
transmission from parallel fibers to Purkinje cells. LTD depresses the level of tonic inhibitory firing of 
these cells to cerebellar nuclei, thereby disinhibiting nuclear cells and allowing them to read-out their 
a 
b 
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learned gains in an adaptively timed way to control conditioned motor responses. [Reprinted with 
permission from Grossberg & Merrill (1996).] (b) Pontine nuclei as a key output pathway from the CS to 
the cerebellum. Two circuits are presented: delay condioning only needs the cerebellar circuit; trace 
conditioning also requires forebrain preprocessing to bridge the temporal gap. [Reprinted with permission 
from Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft (2007).]  
 
5.4. Clinical relevance of BDNF. 
In line with recent work on the etiology and treatment of neurological diseases 
such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, epilepsy, Rett’s syndrome, and 
neuropsychiatric disorders such as depression, bipolar, anxiety-related, schitzophrenia, 
and addiction (Autry & Monteggia, 2012; Hu & Russek, 2008), the nSTART model is 
consistent with clinical treatments for impaired cognitive function that implicate an 
important role for BDNF. In clinical applications, the deleterious effects on synaptic and 
behavioral plasticity associated with low-levels of BDNF may be reversed by exercise 
(Molteni et al., 2004), a finding with obvious relevance to educational intervention as 
well. Treatments that include cognitive and physical exercise have been shown to 
increase BDNF levels and to relieve symptoms (Cotman & Berchtold, 2002). In addition, 
BDNF levels, low in proportion to the severity of mania and depression, increase with 
clinical improvement using antidepressants and mood stabilizers (Post, 2007). However, 
too much excitation can cause problems and require therapies to down-regulate BDNF 
and related processes (Birnbaum et al., 2004; Koyama & Ikegaya, 2005). Continued 
research for more effective and applicable BDNF-based therapies is important in light of 
the potential BDNF has for sussessful management of neuropsychiatric disorders (Autry 
& Monteggia, 2012). 
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APPENDIX A. Mathematical Equations and Parameters  
Appendix A.1. nSTART model overview 
nSTART is a real-time neural network with multiple feedforward and feedback 
connections. On-center off-surround membrane, or shunting, equations with terms for 
spontaneous decay, input-driven excitation and inhibition, and recurrent excitation and 
inhibition represent a rate-based approximation to Hodgkin-Huxley dynamics. These 
equations were integrated over time using the Runge-Kutta 4 method for ODE numerical 
integration written in MatLab 12.1 running under the Windows 8 operating system on an 
Intel Quad Core microprocessor. The equations demonstrated the reported qualitative 
properties over a wide range of parameter choices. Final parameter selection was based 
on the goal of running all of the simulations using a single set of parameters. Figure 18 
shows the mechanistic circuit diagram of the interacting nSTART pathways and 
processes that were illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 7 and qualitatively described in 
Section 3.  
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Figure 18. nSTART circuit diagram. Interacting thalamic, prefrontal cortical, amygdala and hippocampal 
processing circuits control adaptively timed responses in conditioning acquisition and maintenance. The 
circuit diagram is a composite of the macrocircuit structure given in Figure 2 and the processing detail 
given in Figure 7. Appendix A contains the mathematical definitions of the circuit variables.  
 
The equations are formally described below. Table 2 presents all system variables 
and their initial values as well as the parameters with their values. 
 
SYSTEM EQUATION VARIABLE VALUE 
(2) Sensory Cortical Dynamics  Si   initial value = 0 
 S  25 
 Conditioned I1 = 1 
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Stimulus 
 Unconditioned 
Stimulus 
I0 = 1, 2 or 4  
 fSSi See Equation (4) 
 Oi See Equation (7) 
 Smi See Equation (6) 
(3) Thalamic Dynamics 
 
Ti   Si; See Equation (2) 
(4) Signal Functions in the Recurrent On-
Center Off-Surround Network 
fSSi initial value = 0 
  max(Si − 0.02, 0) 
(5) Habituative Transmitter Gates Nmi initial value = 1 
  For sensory cortex (Smi), 
see Equation (6). For 
prefrontal cortex (Omi), 
see Equation (13). 
(6) Habituative Transmitter Gates: Sensory 
Cortex 
Smi  initial value = 1 
 
  See Equation (2) 
(7) Corticocortical Category Learning  Oi initial value = 0 
 O  12.5 
 fSSi See Equation (4) 
 wSi, wAi, wHi See Equation (5) 
 A See Equation (14) 
  See Equation (16) 
 BOi See Equation (12) 
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 Omi See Equation (13) 
 (8) Prefrontal Cortical Dynamics: 
    Conditioned Weights at Cortical Synapse   
(M = S (sensory cortex), A (amygdala) and 
H (hippocampus)) 
wMi 
 
 
initial values = 0.01 
No inter-trial reset. 
 fM If M=S, see Equation (9); 
if M=A, see Equation 
(10); 
if M=H, see Equation 
(11). 
 BOi See Equation (12) 
 Oi See Equation (7) 
(9) Prefrontal Cortical Dynamics: 
    Conditioned Weights at Cortical Synapse 
for sensory cortex) 
wSi initial value = 0.01 
 fSSi See Equation (4) 
 BOi See Equation (12) 
 Oi See Equation (7) 
(10) Prefrontal Cortical Dynamics: 
    Conditioned Weights at Cortical Synapse 
for Amygdala 
wAi initial value = 0.01 
 A See Equation (14) 
 BOi See Equation (12) 
 Oi See Equation (7) 
(11) Prefrontal Cortical Dynamics: 
    Conditioned Weights at Cortical Synapse 
wHi initial value = 0.01 
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for Hippocampus 
 H See Equation (16) 
 BOi See Equation (12) 
 Oi See Equation (7) 
(12) Cortical BDNF  BOi initial value = 0 
No inter-trial reset. 
 H See Equation (16) 
 wHi See Equation (11) 
(13) Habituative Transmitter Gates: 
Prefrontal Cortex 
Omi initial value = 1 
 
  See Equation (7) 
(14) Amygdala Drive Representation 
Dynamics 
A initial value = 0 
 A 40 
 fSSi See Equation (4) 
 Fi See Equation (15) 
(15) Conditioned Reinforcer Learning Fi constant US: F0 = 0.50,; 
initial CS: F1 = 0.05. 
No inter-trial reset. 
 fSSi See Equation (4) 
 A See Equation (8) 
(16) Adaptively-Timed Hippocampal 
Activity 
H initial value = 0 
 H 5 
 R See Equation (19) 
 BH See Equation (27) 
  
123 
(17) Adaptively-Timed Population Output 
Signal 
R  
 hij See Equation (18) 
(18) Doubly Gated Signal Spectrum (timed 
responses) 
hij initial value = 0 
 f(xij) See Equation (19) 
 yij See Equation (22) 
 zij See Equation (24) 
(19) Sigmoidal Signal Processing f(xij) initial value = 0 
(20) Activation Spectrum xij initial value = 0 
 rj See Equation (21) 
 fSSi See Equation (19) 
(21) Differential Rates of Spectral Timing  rj Range from 0.016 to 
0.171 
 j Vary from 1 to 20 
(22) Habituative Transmitter Spectrum  yij initial value = 1 
 f(xij) See Equation (19) 
(23) Gated Signal Spectrum   gij initial value = 0 
 f(xij) See Equation (19) 
 yij See Equation (22) 
(24) Spectral Learning Law    zij initial value = 0. 
No inter-trial reset. 
 gij See Equation (23) 
 N See Equation (25) 
(25) Now Print Signal N initial value = 0 
 A See Equation (14) 
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 E See Equation (26) 
(26) Inhibitory Interneuron  E initial value = 0 
 
(27) Hippocampal BDNF 
 
A 
BH 
 
 
R 
See Equation (14) 
initial value = 0. 
No inter-trial reset. 
 
See Equation (17) 
 
(28) Pontine Nuclei P  initial value = 0 
 A See Equation (14) 
 O 1 See Equation (7) 
 
 
Table 2. nSTART System Equations. nSTART: system equations, variables, and parameters. 
 
The model was tested by simulating data from reinforcement learning 
experiments, notably classical conditioning experiments. To simplify the model, we use 
two types of input: iI , i ≥ 1, which turns on when the i
th CS, CSi, occurs, and 
 
I
0
, which 
turns on when a US occurs. 
 
I
i
 activates the ith sensory representation 
iS . Another 
population of cells A represents a drive representation in the amygdala. It receives a 
combination of sensory, reinforcement, and homeostatic (or drive) stimuli. 
Reinforcement learning, emotional reactions, and motivated attention decisions are 
controlled by A. During conditioning, presentation of a CS ( 1I ) before a US ( 0I ) causes 
activation of sensory cortical activity iS  followed by activation of A. Such pairing 
  
125 
strengthens the adaptive weight, or long term memory trace, in the modifiable synapses 
from 
iS  to A, and converts iCS  into a conditioned reinforcer. Conditioned reinforcers 
hereby acquire the power to activate A via the conditioning process. These and other 
learning and performance processes of the nSTART model are defined by the following 
equations and parameters.  
Appendix A.2. Sensory cortex and thalamus. 
Appendix A.2.1. Sensory cortical dynamics. 
Cell activity, or voltage V(t), in vivo can be represented by the membrane, or 
shunting, equation: 
 
C
d
dt
V = (V + -V )g+ + (V - -V )g- + (V p -V )g p,     (1) 
where C is capacitance; the constants V

, V

, and 
pV are excitatory, inhibitory, and 
passive saturation points of V, respectively; and g , g , and pg  are conductances that 
can be changed by inputs (Grossberg, 1968b; Hodgkin, 1964). In the model equations, V 
is replaced with a symbol that represents the activity of a particular cell (population) in 
the network. A basic processing unit in the model is a network of shunting neurons that 
interact within a feedforward and/or feedback on-center off-surround network whose 
shunting dynamics contrast-normalize its cell activities (Grossberg, 1973, 1980). These 
networks also have a total activity with an upper bound that tends to be independent of 
the number of active cells. 
The activity iS  of the i
th sensory cortical cell (population) obeys a competitive 
network:   
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15 (1 )( ( )(1 )) 15 ( )(1 )i i S i i S i i mi i S k k
k i
d
S S S I f S O S S f S O
dt


        .            (2)  
The inputs 
iI  are turned on and off by presentation and termination of a CS input ( 1I ) or 
US input (
0I ) over time. Term 15 iS  describes passive decay of activity iS . Term 
(1 )( ( )(1 ))S i i S i i miS I f S O S     describes excitatory interactions in response to input iI , 
notably the recurrent on-center excitatory feedback signal ( )S if S from population iS  to 
itself (Equation 4), the top-down modulatory attentional input 
iO from orbitofrontal 
cortex, and the habituative transmitter 
miS  that depresses these excitatory interactions in 
an activity-dependent way (Equation 6). Excitation is scaled by parameter
S . Due to the 
shunting term (1 )S iS   in 
b
S
(1- S
i
)(I
i
+ f
S
(S
i
)(1+O
i
))S
mi
, activity 
iS  can continue to 
grow until it reaches the excitatory saturation point, which is set to 1 in Equation 2. Term 
 
-15S
i
k¹i
å fS (Sk )(1+Ok )  describes lateral inhibition of iS  by competitive feedback signals 
( )S kf S  from the off-surround of other sensory cortical activities  
S
k
, k i , modulated by 
the corresponding top-down orbitofrontal signal 
 
O
k
. Due to the excitatory feedback 
signals, a brief CS input (
1I ) gives rise to a sustained STM activity iS  which can remain 
sensitive to the balance of signals across the network due to its shunting off-surround, 
notably by competition from activation in response to the US input (
0I ).  
The dynamics of (sensory cortical)-to-(orbitofrontal cortical) circuits are modeled 
(Figure 2). For simplicity, activity levels of thalamus (T
i
) and sensory cortex ( S
i
) are 
lumped into a single representation: 
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T S
i i
  .          (3) 
With this convention in mind, simulation results may interchangeably mention 
thalamo-cortical or cortico-cortical connectivity, as required by a given context. 
Appendix A.2.2. Signal functions in recurrent on-center off-surround shunting network. 
The signal function ( )S kf S in Equation 2 is a particularly simple faster-than-linear signal 
function, one that is half-wave-rectified, and then linear above an output threshold: 
(Grossberg, 1973):  
( ) [ 0.02] max( 0.02 0)S k i if S S S
     ,      (4) 
where 0.02 is the threshold value that must be exceeded for the signal to become positive. 
Faster-than-linear signal functions tend to suppress noise while contrast-enhancing the 
most active cell activity and making winner-take-all choices in networks such as (2), as 
proved in Grossberg (1973).  
Appendix A.2.3. Habituative transmitter gates. 
Habituative transmitters such as 
 
S
mi
 in (2) tend to obey equations of the following 
general form (Grossberg, 1968, 1972, 1980):  
 
d
dt
N
mi
= 0.5(1- N
mi
)- 2.5 f
N
(N
i
)N
mi
.                 (5) 
The amount of neurotransmitter miN  in (5) accumulates, scaled by a factor of 0.5, up to a 
limit of 1 due to the accumulation term 1 miN , and is inactivated, or habituates, by the 
gated release term 
 
-2.5 f
N
(N
i
)N
mi
, whereby miN  is inactivated by mass action at a rate 
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proportional to the product of an excitatory signal ( )N if N  from either sensory cortex 
(Equation 2) or orbitofrontal cortex (Equation 7), and the amount 
miN  of available 
transmitter. These modulators are similar to those in the habituative transmitter spectrum 
for hippocampal cells (Equation 22). 
In particular, 
 
S
mi
 in (2) obeys:      
0.5(1 ) 2.5( ( )(1 ))mi mi i S i i mi
d
S S I f S O S
dt
     .     (6) 
Smi accumulates up to a limit of 1 due to the accumulation term 
 
0.5(1- S
mi
), and is 
inactivated by mass action at a rate proportional to the product of ( ( )(1 )i S i iI f S O  , the 
excitatory term in Equation 2 that the transmitter gates, and the amount of available 
transmitter Smi. A similar transmitter equation acts within orbitofrontal cortex (Equation 
13). 
 
Appendix A.3. Orbitofrontal cortex, category learning, and incentive motivational 
learning. 
Appendix A.3.1. Orbitofrontal cortical dynamics. 
The activity Oi of the ith orbitofrontal cortical cell (population) obeys a competitive 
network with adaptive learning weights:  
10 (2 )(( ( ) 0.03)0.0625 ( 10 800 ) 0.75 )i i O i S i Si Ai Hi Ci i mi
d
O O O f S w Aw Hw B O O
dt
       
        10 i k
k i
O O

    (7) 
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In (7), a phasic input from sensory cortex ( fS (Si ), Equation 2), plus a tonic 
activity of 0.03 (see fS (Si )+ 0.03), is modulated by inputs from the amygdala ( A , 
Equation 14), hippocampus ( H , Equation 16), and orbitofrontal BDNF ( BOi , Equation 
12). In addition, a recurrent self-excitatory feedback signal (
iO ) supports persistence of 
orbitofrontal activity after the external sensory input is turned off and ( )S if S  decays to 0. 
As in Equation 2, there is a passive decay term 10 iO , an excitatory shunting on-center 
term  
 
b
O
(2-O
i
)(( f
S
(S
i
)+0.03)0.0625w
Si
(Aw
Ai
+10Hw
Hi
+800B
Oi
)+0.75O
i
)O
mi
that can 
increase up to 2, its saturation point, an activity-dependent habituative transmitter gate 
miO  of excitatory cortical interactions (Equation 7), and a shunting off-surround 
inhibitory term 10 i k
k i
O o

   that enables contrast normalization. Adaptive weights, or 
LTM traces, 
Siw , Aiw , and Hiw  (see Equations 8, 9, 10, and 11) gate the inputs ( )S if S , A, 
and  H,  respectively. An excitatory gain of 10 multiplies H and of 800 multiplies 
 
B
Oi
. 
Appendix A.3.2. Cortical category learning and incentive motivational learning. 
The learned adaptive weights to the orbitofrontal cortex all obey an outstar 
learning law (Grossberg, 1980), as described in Section 3. The weights from amygdala 
and hippocampus ( Aiw  and Hiw , respectively) supply incentive motivational support for 
cortico-cortical category learning by Siw . All weights obey the general form: 
 
d
dt
w
Mi
= 4( f
M
(M
i
)+ B
Oi
)(-w
Mi
+ 2O
i
) ,              (8) 
where M = S, A, or H, depending on the context.  
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Learned adaptive weights from sensory cortex to orbitofrontal cortex obey: 
 
d
dt
w
Si
= 4( f
S
(S
i
)+ B
Oi
)(-w
Si
+ 2O
i
) ,                                                                     (9) 
where learning is gated on and off by a sampling signal 
 
f
s
(S
i
)+ B
Oi
 that is the sum of the 
sensory cortical signal ( )S if S , (Equation 4) and the orbitofrontal BDNF 
B
Oi
 (Equation 
12) . The sampling signal’s size determines the rate at which weight 
Siw  approaches 
twice the orbitofrontal activity 
iO  (Equation 7) via term 2Si iw O  .  
Learned adaptive weights from amygdala to orbitofrontal cortex obey: 
 
d
dt
w
Ai
= 4(0.1A+ B
Oi
)(-w
Ai
+ 2O
i
)                                                                 (10) 
and from hippocampus to orbitofrontal cortex obey: 
 
d
dt
w
Hi
= 4(0.5H + B
Oi
)(-w
Hi
+ 2O
i
).                                                               (11) 
Appendix A.3.3. Orbitofrontal BDNF. 
Orbitofrontal BDNF 
 
B
Oi
 is time-averages hippocampal signals H   that are gated by 
learned weights Hiw  with an excitatory gain 3.125: 
 
d
dt
B
Oi
= -B
Oi
+ 3.125Hw
Hi
.                    (12) 
Appendix A.3.4. Habituative transmitter gates in orbitofrontal cortex. 
Activity-dependent habituative neurotransmitters, or postsynaptic sites, Omi  that 
influence orbitofrontal cortical activity obey a specialized version of (5): 
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d
dt
O
mi
= 0.5(1-O
mi
)- 2.5(( f
S
(S
i
)+ 0.03)0.0625w
Si
( Aw
Ai
+10Hw
Hi
+800B
Ci
)+ 0.75O
i
)O
mi
,  
           (13) 
that accumulates to a maximum value of 1 at rate 0.5 via term 
 
0.5(1-O
mi
) , and 
habituates, or is inactivated, at rate 
 
- 2.5(( f
S
(S
i
)+0.03)0.0625w
Si
(Aw
Ai
+10Hw
Hi
+800B
Ci
)+0.75O
i
)  by the on-center input 
term in (7).  
Appendix A.4. Amygdala and conditioned reinforcer learning. 
Appendix A.4.1. Amygdala drive representation dynamics. 
The amygdala activity A of the drive representation obeys: 
 
d
dt
A= -20A+ b
A
(10- A)
i
å fS (Si )Fi.         (14) 
Activity A passively decays via term 20A . Term (10 ) ( )A S i i
i
A f S F    
describes the sum of excitatory signals ( )S if S from the i
th sensory representation to A, 
gated by the conditioned reinforcer adaptive weights 
iF  (Equation 15). This sum can 
increase A  until it reaches the saturation term 10 that is determined by term  (10- A). 
Adaptive weight iF  determines how well iS  can activate A, and thus the extent to which 
the ith CS has become a conditioned reinforcer through learning. Because  iF  multiplies
( )S if S , a large iS  will have a negligible effect on A if iF  is small, and a large effect on 
A if iF  is large. The US LTM trace 0F  is fixed at a relatively large value to enable the 
  
132 
US to activate A  via 
0S and to thereby drive conditioned reinforcer learning when a CS 
is also active. The CS LTM trace 
1F  is initially set to one tenth of the US value to 
prevent the CS from significantly activating A before conditioning takes place. 
Appendix A.4.2. Conditioned reinforcer learning. 
Each adaptive weight 
1F  obeys an outstar learning law:  
1 10.5 ( )( 0.2 )S i
d
F f S F A
dt
                     (15) 
Learning by 
1F  is turned on and off by the sampling signal  
0.5 f
S
(S
i
), whose size 
determines the rate at which
1F  time-averages 0.2A. Activity 1F  can increase or decrease 
during learning, hence both long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression 
(LTD) can occur. To represent the non-learned response to the US, 
0F  is held constant at 
0.5.  
Appendix A.5. Hippocampus and adaptively timed learning. 
Appendix A.5.1. Adaptively-timed hippocampal learning. 
As noted in Section 3.5.1, the hippocampus delivers adaptively timed signals H to 
the orbitofrontal cortex that can maintain its activity for a duration that can span the trace 
interval; see Equation 6. The hippocampus hereby activates an adaptively-timed incentive 
motivational pathway in cases when the amygdala cannot, as described in Section 3.4.1. 
The spectral timing process embodies several processing steps. 
Appendix A.5.2. Adaptively-timed hippocampal activity. 
Activity H in the hippocampus obeys:  
  
133 
 
d
dt
H = -15H + b
H
(2- H )(0.625R+ 0.5B
H
).  (16) 
Term -15H  represents passive decay. The excitatory term is scaled by the excitatory 
gain 
H  and bounded by 2, due to the shunting term (2 ).H H   The two sources of 
excitatory input are the adaptively timed input R (Equation 17) and the total BDNF input 
BH (Equation 27), each with its own gain term.  
Appendix A.5.3. Adaptively-timed population output signal. 
The adaptively timed signal R is a population response:   
 
R =
i, j
å hij            (17) 
that sums over multiple individually timed signals  
 
h
ij
= 8 f (x
ij
)y
ij
z
ij
         (18) 
that are defined below. None of the signals 
 
h
ij
 individually can accurately time the ISI 
between a CS and US. The entire population response in (17) can do so using a 
“spectrum” of differently timed cells, leading to the term “spectral timing” for this kind 
of learning (Grossberg and Merrill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1989).  
Appendix A.5.4. Activation spectrum. 
Model simulations use the simplest embodiment of spectrally-timed learning. A 
more detailed biochemical model is given using Ca++-modulated learning by a spectrum 
of metabotropic glutamate receptor (mGluR) cell sites in Fiala, Grossberg, & Bullock 
(1996), which shows how mGluR dynamics can span such long time intervals.  
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Spectrally timed learning can be initiated when an input signal ( )S if S  (Equation 4) 
from a sensory cortical representation (Equation 2) activates a population of hippocampal 
cell sites with activities 
ijx  that activate the next processing stage via sigmoidal signals: 
8
8 8
( )
0.01
ij
ij
ij
x
f x
x
 

             (19) 
Activities 
ijx  react at a spectrum of rates: 
( (1 ) ( ))ij j ij ij S i
d
x r x x f S
dt
    ,       (20) 
with rates 
jr  ranging from 0.171 (fast) to 0.016 (slow) defined by: 
5.125 / (0.0125 15( 1))jr j   ,       (21) 
for j = 1 to 20. 
Appendix A.5.5. Habituative transmitter spectrum. 
Each spectral activation signal ( )ijf x  is gated by a habituative chemical 
transmitter, or postsynaptic response, 
ijy  that obeys:  
 
d
dt
y
ij
= 0.5(1- y
ij
)-10 f (x
ij
)y
ij
.       (22) 
As in Equation 5, 
ijy  accumulates to 1 via term (1 ijy ) at rate 0.5, and habituates, or 
inactivates, due to a mass action interaction with signal ( )ijf x , via the gated release term
 
-10 f (x
ij
)y
ij
. The different rates 
jr  that activate each ijx  cause the habituative 
transmitters 
ijy  to become habituated at different rates as well. The family of curves ijy ,
 j =1,2,...,20, is called a habituation spectrum.  
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Appendix A.5.6. Gated signal spectrum and time cells. 
Each signal ( )ijf x interacts with ijy  via mass action to generate a net output signal from 
its population of cell sites that obeys: 
 
g
ij
º [ f (x
ij
)y
ij
-0.03]+ º max( f (x
ij
)y
ij
-0.03,0) .     (23) 
Each gated signal 
 
g
ij
 has a different rate of growth and decay, thereby generating 
a unimodal function of time that achieves its maximum value 
ijM  at time ijT , where ijT  is 
an increasing function of j, and 
ijM  is a decreasing function of j . Taken together, all the 
functions 
 
g
ij
 define the gated signal spectrum in Figure 11c. This timed spectrum is the 
basis of adaptively timed learning over an extended time interval that can range from 
hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds, with each 
 
g
ij
 acting as the sampling signal 
for its part of the adaptively timed spectrum. 
Appendix A.5.7. Spectral learning law. 
Each adaptive weight 
 
z
ij
 in the spectrum obeys an outstar learning law: 
 
d
dt
z
ij
= 2g
ij
(-z
ij
+ 2N ).        (24) 
In Equation 24, 
ijg  is a sampling signal that determines the rate with which 
 
z
ij
 samples a 
transient Now Print signal 2N (Equation 25) that is derived from amygdala activity A in 
Equation 14. Each 
ijz  changes by an amount that reflects the degree to which the curves 
ijg  and N  have simultaneously large values through time. If ijg  is large when N is large, 
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then 
ijz  increases in size. If ijg  is large when N is small, then ijz  decreases in size. Since 
the different 
ijg  peak at different times, each 
 
z
ij
 responds to N to different degrees.  
The Now Print signal N obeys:  
 N = [A- E -0.04]
+ º max(A- E -0.04,0),       (25) 
where E is a feedforward inhibitory interneuron that obeys: 
40( ).
d
E E A
dt
            (26) 
The inhibitory interneuronal activity E in (26) time-averages the amygdala activity A at 
rate 40. Its activity hereby lags behind that of A. The difference ( A- E) in (25) may thus 
be activated by any sufficiently rapid increase in A. Either a US, or a CS that has become 
a conditioned reinforcer, can cause such a rapid increase, and thereby activate N, and thus 
learning of any adaptive weight 
 
z
ij
 whose sampling signal 
 
g
ij
 is sufficiently large at 
such a time. 
An important property of N is that it increases in amplitude, but not significantly 
in duration, in response to larger inputs A. Thus learning can be faster in response to 
stronger rewards, but the timing of a conditioned response does not significantly change, 
as in the data and our simulations thereof (Figure 8). 
Appendix A.5.8. Doubly-gated signal spectrum. 
Each long-term memory memory trace 
ijz  learns to a different degree. Each ijz  
also gate the signals 
ijg  in order to generate a twice-gated output signal 
 
h
ij
 (Equation 18) 
from each of the differently timed cell sites. Comparing the signals 
ijh  in Figure 11d with 
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the 
ijg  in Figure 11c shows how adaptively timed learning changes the relative strength 
of each spectral output.  When all the
ijh are added together to generate the population 
output R in (17), accurate adaptively timing is achieved. 
Appendix A.5.9. Hippocampal BDNF. 
Production of hippocampal BDNF
 
B
H
 is a time average of 25 times its adaptively 
timed population signal  R  (Equation 17), scaled by a reaction rate of 2: 
 
d
dt
B
H
= 2(-B
H
+ 25R).  (27) 
Hippocampal BDNF in the model extends hippocampal activation, and thus the incentive 
motivational support that it supplies to cortico-cortical learning during a memory 
consolidation period after the CS and US inputs terminate. 
Appendix A.6. The Pontine Nuclei. 
Appendix A.6.1. Final common path for conditioned output. 
Output signals from the amygdala A (Equation 14) and the CS-activated 
orbitofrontal cortical representation O1 (Equation 7) to the pons combine to form a 
common final path that is used in the model as a signal that generates a behavioral CR 
further downstream (see Section 3.6):  
 
P = A+O
1
.         (28)  
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APPENDIX B. Time Course of nSTART Variables during Trace Conditioning  
Appendix B.1. Trace conditioning during acquisition on 1st training trial 
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Appendix B.2. Trace conditioning during acquisition on 5th training trial 
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Appendix B.3. Trace conditioning during acquisition on 20th training trial 
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Appendix B.4. Trace conditioning during retention test after 20 training trials 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
142 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Akase, E., Alkon, D.L., & Disterhoft, J.F. (1989). Hippocampal lesions impair memory 
of short-delay conditioned eyeblink in rabbits. Behavioral Neuroscience, 103, 935-943.  
Aggleton, J.P. (1993). The contribution of the amygdala to normal and abnormal 
emotional states. Trends in Neurosciences, 16, 328-333. 
Aggleton, J.P., & Saunders, R.C. (2000). The amygdala— what’s happened in the last 
decade? In J.P. Aggleton (Ed.), The Amygdala, 2nd Ed., New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp 1-30.  
Albouy, G., King, B.R., Maquet, P. & Doyon, J. (2013). Hippocampus and striatum: 
dynamics and interaction during acquisition and sleep-related motor sequence memory 
consolidation. Hippocampus, 23, 985-1004. 
Anagnostaras, S.G., Maren, S., & Fanselow, M.S. (1999). Temporally graded retrograde 
amnesia of contextual fear after hippocampal damage in rats: Within-subjects 
examination.  Journal of Neuroscience, 19, 1106-1114. 
Atallah, H.E., Frank, M.J., & O’Reilly, R.C. (2004). Hippocampus, cortex, and basal 
ganglia: Insights from computational models of complementary learning systems. 
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 82, 253-267.  
Autry, A.E., & Monteggia, L.M. (2012). Brain-Derived Neurotrophic Factor and 
Neuropsychiatric Disorders. Pharmacological Reviews, 64, 238-258. 
Baloch, A., & Waxman, A. (1991). Visual learning, adaptive expectations, and 
behavioral conditioning of the mobile robot MAVIN. Neural Networks, 4, 271-302. 
Bar, M., Aminoff, E., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Scenes unseen: The parahippocampal 
cortex intrinsically subserves contextual associations, not scenes or places per se. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 28, 8539-8544.  
Barbas, H. (1995). Anatomic basis of cognitive-emotional interactions in the primate 
prefrontal cortex. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 19, 499-510.  
Barbas, H. (2007). Flow of information for emotions through temporal and orbitofrontal 
pathways. Journal of Anatomy, 211, 237-249. 
Baxter, M.G., Parker, A., Lindner, C.C.C., Izquierdo, A.D., & Murray, E.A. (2000). 
Control of response selection by reinforcer value requires interaction of amygdala and 
orbital prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 20, 4311-4319.  
  
143 
Bayley, P.J., Frascino, J.C., & Squire, L.R. (2005). Robust habit learning in the absence 
of awareness and independent of the medial temporal lobe. Nature Letters, 436, 550-553. 
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Adolphs, R., Rockland, C., & Damasio, A.R. 
(1995). Double dissociation of conditioning and declarative knowledge relative to the 
amygdala and hippocampus in humans. Science, 269, 1115-1118.  
Berger, T.W. (1984). Long-term potentiation of hippocampal synaptic transmission 
affects rates of behavioral learning. Science, 224, 627-630.  
Berger, T.W., Clark, G.A., & Thompson, R.F. (1980). Learning-dependent neuronal 
responses recorded from limbic system brain structures during classical conditionings. 
Physiological Psychology, 8, 155-167. 
Berger, T.W., Laham, R.I., & Thompson, R.F. (1980). Hippocampal unit-behavior 
correlations during classical conditioning. Brain Research, 193, 229-248. 
Berger, T.W., & Thompson, R.F. 1978. Neuronal plasticity in the limbic system during 
classical conditioning of the rabbit nictitating membrane response. I. The hippocampus. 
Brain Research, 145, 323-346. 
Berger, T.W., Weikart, C.L., Basset, J.L., & Orr,W.B. (1986). Lesions of the retrosplenial 
cortex produce deficits in reversal learning of the rabbit nictitating membrane response: 
implications for potential interactions between hippocampal and cerebellar brain systems. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 100, 802-809. 
Berry, S. D., & Thompson, R.F. (1979).  Medial septal lesions retard classical 
conditioning of the nictitating membrane response of rabbits. Science, 205, 2009-2010. 
Beylin, A.V., Gandhi, C.C., Wood, G.E., Talk, A.C., Matzel, L.D., & Shors T.J. (2001). 
The Role of the Hippocampus in Trace Conditioning: Temporal Discontinuity or Task 
Difficulty? Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 76, 447–461. 
Birnbaum, S.G., Yuan, P.X., Wang, M., Vijayraghavan, S., Bloom, A.K., Davis, D.J., 
Gobeske, K.T., Sweatt, J.D., Manji, H.K., & Arnsten, A.F. (2004). Protein kinase C 
overactivity impairs prefrontal cortical regulation of working memory. Science, 306, 882-
884. 
Blair, H.T., Sotres-Bayon, F., Moiya, M.A.P., & LeDoux, J.E. (2005). The lateral 
amygdala processes the value of conditioned and unconditioned aversive stimuli. 
Neuroscience, 133, 561-569. 
Blumer, D., & Benson, D.F. (1975). Personality changes with frontal lobe lesions. In D.F. 
Benson & D. Blumer (Eds.), Psychiatric Aspects of Neurological Disease. New York: 
Grune & Stratton, pp 151-170. 
  
144 
Bonhoffer, T. (1996). Neurotrophins and activity-dependent development of the 
neocortex. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 6, 119-126.  
Bower, G.H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148. 
Brockmole, J. R., Castelhano, M. S., & Henderson, J. M. (2006). Contextual cueing in 
naturalistic scenes: Global and local contexts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 699-706. 
Brown, J., Bullock, D., & Grossberg, S. (1999). How the basal ganglia use parallel 
excitatory and inhibitory learning pathways to selectively respond to unexpected 
rewarding cues. Journal of Neuroscience, 19, 10502-10511.  
Brown, J., Bullock, D., & Grossberg, S. (2004). How laminar frontal cortex and basal 
ganglia circuits interact to control planned and reactive saccades. Neural Networks, 17, 
471-510.  
Brown, M. W., & Aggleton, J. P. Recognition memory: What are the roles of the 
perirhinal cortex and hippocampus? (2001). Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 51-61. 
Buchanan, S.L., & Thompson, R.H. (1990).  Mediodorsal thalamic lesions and Pavlovian 
conditioning of heart rate and eyeblink responses in the rabbit. Behavioral 
Neuroscicience, 104, 912-918. 
Bϋchel, C., Dolan, R.J., Armony, J.L., & Friston, K.J. (1999). Amygdala-hippocampal 
involvement in human aversive trace conditioning revealed through event-related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of Neuroscience, 19, 10869-10876.  
Bullock, D., Cisek, P., & Grossberg, S. (1998). Cortical networks for control of voluntary 
arm movements under variable force conditions. Cerebral Cortex, 8, 48-62. 
Buzsáki, G., & Chrobak, J.J. (2005). Synaptic plasticity and self-organization in the 
hippocampus. Nature Neuroscience, 8, 1418-1420. 
Buzsáki, G., Llinás, R., Singer, W., Berthoz, A. & Christen, Y. (Eds.) (1994). Temporal 
Coding in the Brain, Springer-Verlag: Berlin.  
Cabelli, R.J., Hohn, A., & Shatz, C.J. (1995). Inhibition of ocular dominance column 
formation by infusion of NT-4/5 or BDNF. Science, 267, 1662-1666. 
Cahill, L., & McGaugh, J.L. (1990). Amygdaloid complex lesions differentially affect 
retention of tasks using appetitive and aversive reinforcement. Behavioral Neuroscience, 
104, 532-543. 
Carpenter, G.A. (1994). A Distributed Outstar Network for Spatial Pattern Learning. 
Neural Networks, 7, 159-168. 
  
145 
Carpenter, G.A. (1997) Distributed learning, recognition, and prediction by ART and 
ARTMAP neural networks. Neural Networks, 10, 1473–1494. 
Carpenter, G.A., & Grossberg, S. (1987). A massively parallel architecture for a self-
organizing neural pattern recognition machine. Computer Vision, Graphics, and Image 
Processing, 37, 54-115.  
Carpenter, G.A., & Grossberg, S. (1990). ART 3: Hierarchical search using chemical 
transmitters in self- organizing pattern recognition architectures. Neural Networks, 3, 
129-152.  
Carpenter, G.A., & Grossberg, S. (1991). Pattern Recognition by Self-Organizing Neural 
Networks. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Carpenter, G.A., & Grossberg, S. (1993). Normal and amnesic learning, recognition and 
memory by a neural model of cortico-hippocampal interactions. Trends in Neurosciences, 
16, 131-137.  
Chang, C., & Gaudiano, P. (1998). Application of biological learning theories to mobile 
robot avoidance and approach behaviors. Journal of Complex Systems, 1, 79-114. 
Chau, L. S., & Galvez, R. (2012). Amygdala’s involvement in facilitating associative 
learning-induced plasticity: a promiscuous role for the amygdala in memory acquisition. 
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 6, 1-9. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnint.2012.00092 
Chen, C., Kano, M., Abeliovich, A., Chen, L., Bao, S., Kim, J. J., Hashimoto, K., 
Thompson, R. F., & Tonegawa, S. (1995). Impaired motor coordination correlates with 
persistent multiple climbing fiber innervation in PKC-gama mutant mice. Cell, 83, 1233-
1242. 
Chen, G., Kolbeck, R., Barde, Y.-A., Bonhoeffer, T., & Kossel, A. (1999). Relative 
contribution of endogenous neurotrophins in hippocampal long-term potentiation. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 19, 7983-7990. 
Christian. K.M., & Thompson, R.F (2003). Neural substrates of eyeblink conditioning: 
Acquisition and retention. Learning & Memory, 11, 427-455. 
Choi, J.-S., & Brown, T.H. (2003). Central amygdala lesions block ultrasonic 
vocalization and freezing as conditional but not unconditional responses. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 23, 8713- 8721.  
Chun, M. M. (2000). Contextual cueing of visual attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
4, 170- 178.  
  
146 
Chun, M. M., & Jiang, Y. (1998). Contextual cueing: implicit learning and memory of 
visual context guides spatial attention. Cognitive Psychology, 36, 28-71. 
Clark, R.E., Broadbent, N.J., Zola, S.M., & Squire, L.R. (2002). Anterograde amnesia 
and temporally graded amnesia for a nonspatial memory task after lesions of 
hippocampus and subiculum. Journal of Neuroscience, 22, 4663-4669. 
Clark, R.E., Manns, J.R., & Squire, L.R. (2001). Trace and delay eyeblink conditioning: 
contrasting phenomena of declarative and nondeclarative memory. Psychological 
Science, 12, 304-308. 
Clark, R.E., & Squire, L.R. (1998). Classical conditioning and brain systems: The role of 
awareness. Science, 280, 77- 81.  
Clark, R.E., & Squire, L.R. (2004). The importance of awareness for eyeblink 
conditioning is conditional: Theoretical comment on Bellebaum and Daum (2004). 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 118, 1466-1468. 
Clark, R.E., & Squire, L.R. (2010). An animal model of recognition memory and medial 
temporal lobe amnesia: History and current issues Neuropsychologia, 48, 2234-2244.  
Clark, R.E., & Zola, S. (1998). Trace eyeblink classical conditioning in the monkey: a 
nonsurgical method and behavioral analysis.  Behavioral Neuroscience, 5, 1062-1068. 
Contreras-Vidal, J.L., Grossberg, S., & Bullock, D. (1997). A neural model of cerebellar 
learning for arm movement control: Cortico-spinal-cerebellar dynamics. Learning and 
Memory, 3, 475-502. 
Cotman, C.W., & Berchtold, N.C. (2002) Exercise: a behavioral intervention to enhance 
brain health and plasticity. Trends in Neurosciences, 25, 295-301. 
Cousens, G., & Otto, T. (1998). Long-term potentiation and its transient suppression in 
the rhinal cortices induced by theta-related stimulation of hippocampal field CA1. Brain 
Research. 780, 95-101. 
Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.  
Damasio, A.R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1991). Somatic markers and the guidance of 
behavior: theory and preliminary testing. In H.S. Levin, H.M. Eisenberg, & A.L. Benton, 
(Eds.), Frontal Lobe Function and Dysfunction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 
217-229. 
Daum, I., Schugens, M.M., Breitenstein, C., Topka, H., & Spieker, S. (1996). Classical 
eyeblink conditioning in Parkinson’s Disease. Movement Disorders, 11, 639-646. 
  
147 
Davis, G.W., & Murphy, R.K. (1994). Long-term regulation of short-term transmitter 
release properties: retrograde signaling and synaptic development. Trends in 
Neurosciences, 17, 9-13. 
Davis, M. (1994). The role of the amygdala in emotional learning. International Review 
of Neurobiology, 36, 225-265. 
Deadwyler, S. A., West, M. O., & Lynch, G. (1979). Activity of dentate granule cells 
during learning: Differentiation of perforant path inputs. Brain Research, 169, 29-43. 
Deadwyler, S.A., West, M.O., & Robinson, J.H. (1981). Entorhinal and septal inputs 
differentially control sensory-evoked responses in the rat dentate gyrus. Science, 211, 
1181-1183. 
Desimone, R. (1998). Visual attention mediated by biased competition in extrastriate 
visual cortex. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 353, 1245-
1255. 
Destexhe, A., Contreras, D., & Steriade, M. (1998). Mechanisms underlying the 
synchronizing action of corticothalamic feedback through inhibition of thalamic relay 
cells. Journal of Neurophysiology, 79, 999-1016. 
Dranias, M. R., Grossberg, S., & Bullock, D. (2008). Dopaminergic and non-
dopaminergic value systems in conditioning and outcome-specific revaluation. Brain 
Research, 1238, 239-287. 
Eichenbaum, H., & Lipton, P. A. (2008). Towards a functional organization of themedial 
temporal lobe memory system: role of the parahippocampal and medial entorhinal 
cortical areas. Hippocampus, 18, 1314–1324. 
Engel, A. K., Fries, P., & Singer, W. (2001). Dynamic predictions: Oscillations and 
synchrony in top-down processing. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 704-716. 
Epstein, R. A., Parker, W. E., & Feiler, A. M. (2007). Where am I now? Distinct roles for 
parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices in place recognition. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 27, 6141-6149.  
Evarts, E.V. (1973). Motor cortex reflexes associated with learned movement. Science, 
179, 501-503.  
Everitt, B.J., Cardinal, R.N., Hall, J., Parkinson, J.A., & Robbins, T.W (2000). 
Differential involvement of amygdala subsystems in appetitive conditioning and drug 
addiction. In J.P. Aggleton (Ed.), The Amygdala, 2nd Ed., New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp 335-390. 
  
148 
Fahle, M., Edelman, S., & Poggio, T. (1995). Fast perceptual learning in hyperacuity. 
Vision Research, 35, 3003-3013. 
Felleman, D.J., & van Essen, C.D. (1991). Distributed hierarchical processing in the 
primate cerebral cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 1, 1-47. 
Fiala, J., Grossberg, S., & Bullock, D. (1996). Metabotropic glutamate receptor activation 
in cerebellar Purkinje cells as substrate for adaptive timing of the classically conditioned 
eye-blink response. Journal of Neuroscience, 16, 3760-3774. 
Flores, L.C., & Disterhoft, J.F. (2009). Caudate nucleus is critically involved in trace 
eyeblink conditioning. Journal of Neuroscience, 29, 14511–14520.  
Frankland, P.W., & Bontempi, B. (2005). The organization of recent and remote 
memories. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 119-130. 
Franklin, D.J., & Grossberg, S. (2005). A neural model of normal and amnesic learning 
and memory: Conditioning, adaptive timing, neurotrophins, and hippocampus. First 
Annual Conference on Computational Cognitive Neuroscience (CCN), Washington DC. 
November. 
Franklin, D.J., & Grossberg, S. (2008). Cognitive-emotional learning by neocortex, 
amygdala, and hippocampus: Timing, neurotrophins, amnesia, and consciousness. 
Proceedings of the twelfth international conference on cognitive and neural systems 
(ICCNS), Boston University, May.  
Freedman, D.J., Riesenhuber, M., Poggio, T., and Miller, E. K. (2002). Visual 
categorization and the primate prefrontal cortex: neurophysiology and behavior. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 88, 929-941. 
 
Freeman Jr., J.H., & Muckler, A.S. 2003. Developmental changes in eyeblink 
conditioning and neuronal activity in the pontine nuclei. Learning & Memoyr, 10, 
337–345. 
 
Friedman, H.V., Bressler, T., Garner, C.C., & Ziv, N.E. (2000). Assembly of new 
individual excitatory synapses: Time course and temporal order of synaptic molecule 
recruitment. Neuron, 27, 57-69.  
Fulton, J.F. (1950). Frontal Lobotomy and Affective Behavior. New York: Norton.  
Fuster, J.M. (1989). The Prefrontal Cortex (second edition). New York: Raven Press. 
Gabreil, M., Sparenborg, S.P., & Stolar, N. (1987). Hippocampal control of cingulate 
cortical and anterior thalamic information processing during learning in rabbits. 
Experimental Brain Research, 67, 131-52.  
  
149 
Gabrieli, J.D., McGlinchey-Berroth, R., Carrillo, M.C., Gluck M.A., Cermak, L.S., & 
Disterhoft, J.F. (1995). Intact delay-eyeblink classical conditioning in amnesia. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 109, 819-827. 
Ganguly, K., Kiss, L., & Poo, M-m. (2000). Enhancement of presynaptic neural 
excitability by correlated presynaptic and postsynaptic spiking. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 
1018-1026.  
Garrud, P., Rawlins, J.N.P., Mackintosh, N.J., Godall, G., Cotton, M.M., & Feldon, J. 
(1984). Successful overshadowing and blocking in hippocampectomized rats. 
Behavioural Brain Reserch, 12, 39-53.  
Gaudiano, P., & Chang, C. (1997). Adaptive obstacle avoidance with a neural network 
for operant conditioning: Experiments with real robots. Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE 
International Symposium on Computational Intelligence in Robotics and Automation, 13-
18.  
Gaudiano, P., Zalama, E., Chang, C., & Lopez-Coronado, J. (1996). A model of operant 
conditioning for adaptive obstacle avoidance. In P. Maes, et al. (Eds.), From Animals to 
Animats 4. Proceedings of the fourth International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive 
Behavior, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp 373-381.  
Gibbon, J. (1977). Scalar expectancy and Weber's law in animal timing, Psychological 
Review, 84, 279-325. 
Gilbert, P.F.C., & Thach, W.T. (1977). Purkinje cell activity during motor learning. Brain 
Research, 128, 309-328. 
Gloor, P., Olivier, A., Quesney, L.F., Andermann, F., & Horowitz, S. (1982). The role of 
the limbic system in experiential phenomena of temporal lobe epilepsy. Annals of 
Neurology, 12, 129-144. 
Gnadt, W., & Grossberg, S. (2008). SOVEREIGN: An autonomous neural system for 
incrementally learning planned action sequences to navigate towards a rewarded goals. 
Technical Report CAS/CNS-TR-2007-015. Neural Networks, 21, 699-758.  
Gochin, P.M., Miller, E.K., Gross, C.G., & Gerstein, G.L. (1991). Functional interactions 
among neurons in inferior temporal cortex of the awake macaque. Experimental Brain 
Research, 84, 505-516. 
Gorchetchnikov, A., & Grossberg, S. (2007). Space, time, and learning in the 
hippocampus: How fine spatial and temporal scales are expanded into population codes 
for behavioral control. Neural Networks, 20, 182-193.  
  
150 
Gorski, J.A., Zeiler, S.R., Tamowski, S, & Jones, K.R. (2003). Brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor is required for the maintenance of cortical dendrites. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 23, 6856-6865.  
Grant, D.A. (1973).  Cognitive factors in eyelid conditioning.  Psychophysiology, 10, 75-
81. 
Green, J. T., & Woodruff-Pak, D. S. (2000). Eyeblink classical conditioning: 
Hippocampus is for multiple associations as cerebellum is for association-response. 
Psychological Bulletin, 126, 138-158. 
Grossberg, S. (1968a). Some nonlinear networks capable of learning a spatial pattern of 
arbitrary complexity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 59, 368-372.  
Grossberg, S. (1968b). Some physiological and biochemical consequences of 
psychological postulates. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 60, 758-765. 
Grossberg, S. (1969). On learning and energy-entropy dependence in recurrent and 
nonrecurrent signed networks. Journal of Statistical Physics, 1, 319-350. 
Grossberg, S. (1971). On the dynamics of operant conditioning. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 33, 225-255. 
Grossberg, S. (1972). A neural theory of punishment and avoidance, II: Quantitative 
theory. Mathematical Biosciences, 15, 253-285. 
Grossberg, S. (1976a). Adaptive pattern classification and universal recoding, I: Parallel 
development and coding of neural feature detectors. Biological Cybernetics, 23, 121-134. 
Grossberg, S. (1976b). Adaptive pattern classification and universal recoding, II: 
Feedback, expectation, olfaction, and illusions. Biological Cybernetics, 23, 187-202. 
Grossberg, S. (1980). How does a brain build a cognitive code? Psychological Review, 
87, 1-51. 
Grossberg, S. (1982). Processing of expected and unexpected events during conditioning 
and attention: A psychophysiological theory. Psychological Review, 89, 529-572. 
Grossberg, S. (1987). The Adaptive Brain, Volume I. New York: Elsevier. 
Grossberg, S. (1999). The link between brain learning, attention and consciousness. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 1-44.  
Grossberg, S. (2000a). The complementary brain: unifying brain dynamics and 
modularity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 233-245. 
  
151 
Grossberg, S. (2000b). The imbalanced brain: From normal behavior to schizophrenia. 
Biological Psychiatry, 48, 81-98.  
Grossberg, S. (2003). How does the cerebral cortex work? Development, learning, 
attention, and 3D vision by laminar circuits of visual cortex. Behavioral & Cognitive 
Neuroscience Reviews, 2, 47-76. 
Grossberg, S. (2007). Consciousness CLEARS the mind. Neural Networks, 20, 1040-
1053. 
Grossberg, S. (2013). Adaptive Resonance Theory: How a brain learns to consciously 
attend, recognize, and predict a changing world. Neural Networks, 37, 1-47.  
Grossberg, S. (2016). Towards solving the hard problem of consciousness: The varieties 
of brain resonances and the conscious experiences that they support. Submitted for 
publication. 
Grossberg, S., Bullock, D., & Dranias, M. (2008). Neural dynamics underlying impaired 
autonomic and conditioned responses following amygdala and orbitofrontal lesions. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 122, 1100-1125. 
Grossberg, S., & Kazerounian, S. (2016). Phoneme restoration and empirical coverage of 
Interactive Activation and Adaptive Resonance models of human speech processing. 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, in press. 
Grossberg, S., & Levine, D.S. (1987). Neural dynamics of attentionally modulated 
Pavlovian conditioning: Blocking, inter-stimulus interval, and secondary 
reinforcement. Applied Optics, 26, 5015-5030.  
Grossberg, S., & Merrill, J.W.L. (1992). A neural networks model of adaptively timed 
reinforcement learning and hippocampal dynamics. Cognitive Brain Research, 1, 3-38. 
Grossberg, S., & Merrill, J.W.L. (1996). The hippocampus and cerebellum in adaptively 
timed learning, recognition, and movement. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 257-
277.  
Grossberg, S., & Paine, R.W. (2000). A neural model of corticocerebellar interactions 
during attentive imitation and predictive learning of sequential handwriting movements. 
Neural Networks, 13, 999-1046. 
Grossberg, S., & Pearson, L. (2008). Laminar cortical dynamics of cognitive and motor 
working memory, sequence learning and performance: Toward a unified theory of how 
the cerebral cortex works. Psychological Review, 115, 677-732.  
  
152 
Grossberg, S., & Pilly, P.K. (2012). How Entorhinal Grid Cells May Learn Multiple 
Spatial Scales from a Dorsoventral Gradient of Cell Response Rates in a Self-organizing 
Map. PLoS Comput Biol 8(10): e1002648. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002648. 
Grossberg, S., & Pilly, P. K. (2014). Coordinated learning of grid cell and place cell 
spatial and temporal properties: multiple scales, attention, and oscillations. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B., 369, 20120524. 
Grossberg, S., & Schmajuk, N.A. (1987). Neural dynamics of attentionally-modulated 
Pavlovian conditioning: Conditioned reinforcement, inhibition, and opponent processing. 
Psychobiology, 15, 195-240.  
Grossberg, S., & Schmajuk, N.A. (1989). Neural dynamics of adaptive timing and 
temporal discrimination during associative learning. Neural Networks, 2, 79-102. 
Grossberg, S., & Seidman, D. (2006). Neural dynamics of autistic behaviors: Cognitive, 
emotional, and timing substrates. Psychological Review, 113, 483-525.  
Grossberg, S., & Seitz, A. (2003). Laminar development of receptive fields, maps, and 
columns in visual cortex: The coordinating role of the subplate. Cerebral Cortex, 13, 
852-863.  
Grossberg, S., & Versace, M. (2008). Spikes, synchrony, and attentive learning by 
laminar thalamocortical circuits. Brain Research, 1218, 278-312. 
Halgren. E., Walter, R.D., Cherlow, D.G., & Crandall, P.H. (1978). Mental phenomena 
evoked by electrical stimulations of the human hippocampal formation and amygdala. 
Brain, 101, 83-117. 
Halverson, H.E., & Freeman, J.H. (2006). Medial auditory thalamic nuclei are necessary 
for eyeblink conditioning. Behavioral Neuroscience, 120, 880-887. 
Halverson, H.E., Poremba, A. & Freeman, J.H. (2008). Medial auditory thalamus 
inactivation prevents acquisition and retention of eyeblink conditioning. Learning & 
Memory, 15, 532-538. 
Harries, M.H., & Perrett, D.I. (1991). Visual processing of faces in temporal cortex: 
Physiological evidence for a modular organization and possible anatomical correlates. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 3, 9-24. 
Heldt, S.A., Stanek, L., Chhatwal, J.P., & Ressler, K.J. (2007). Hippocampus-specific 
deletion of BDNF in adult mice impairs spatial memory and extinction of aversive 
memories. Molecular Psychiatry, 12, 655-670. 
  
153 
Hilgard, E.R., Campbell, A.A., & Sears, W.N. (1937). Conditioned discrimination: 
Development with and without verbal report.  American Journal of Psychology, 49, 564-
580. 
Hobson, J.A., & Pace-Schott, E.F. (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: neuronal 
systems, consciousness and learning. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3, 679–693. 
Holland, P.C., & Gallagher, M. (1999). Amygdala circuitry in attentional and 
representational processes. Trends in Cognitive Science, 3, 65-73.  
Hodgkin, A.L. (1964). The Conduction of the Nervous Impulse. Springfield, IL: Charles. 
C. Thomas. 
Höistad, M., & Barbas, H. (2008). Sequence of information processing for emotions 
through pathways linking temporal and insular cortices with the amygdala. Neuroimage, 
40, 1016-1033. 
Hu Y., & Russek S.J. (2008). BDNF and the diseased nervous system: a delicate balance 
between adaptive and pathological processes of gene regulation. Journal of 
Neurochemistry, 105, 1-17.  
Huang, T.-R., & Grossberg, S. (2010). Cortical dynamics of contextually cued attentive 
visual learning and search: Spatial and object evidence accumulation. Psychological 
Review, 117, 1080-1112. 
Ito, M. (1984). The Cerebellum and Neural Control. New York: Raven Press. 
Ivkovich, D., & Thompson, R.H. (1997). Motor cortex lesions do not affect learning or 
performance of the eyeblink response in rabbits. Behavioral Neuroscience, 111, 727-738. 
James, G.O., Hardiman, M.J., & Yeo, C.H. (1987). Hippocampal lesions and trace 
conditioning in the rabbit. Behavioural Brain Research, 23, 109-116.  
Ji, D., & Wilson, M.A. (2007). Coordinated memory replay in the visual cortex and 
hippocampus during sleep. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 100-107.  
Jiang, Y., & Wagner, L. C. (2004). What is learned in spatial contextual cueing: 
Configuration or individual locations? Perception and Psychophysics, 66, 454-463. 
Kalaska, J.F., Cohen, D.A.D., Hyde, M.L., & Prud’homme, M.J. (1989). A comparison 
of movement direction-related versus load direction-related activity in primate motor 
cortex using a two-dimensional reaching task. Journal of Neuroscience, 9, 2080-2102. 
Kali, S., & Dayan, P. (2004). Off-line replay maintains declarative memories in a model 
of hippocampal-neocortical interactions. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 286-294.  
  
154 
Kalmbach, B.E., Ohyama, T., Kreider, J.C., Riusech, F., & Mauk, M.D. (2009). 
Interactions between prefrontal cortex and cerebellum revealed by trace eyelid 
conditioning. Learning & Memory, 16, 86-95. 
Kaneko, T., & Thompson, R.F. (1997). Disruption of trace conditioning of the nictitating 
membrane response in rabbits by central cholinergic blockade. Psychopharmacology, 
131, 161-166. 
Kang, H., & Schuman, E.M. (1995). Long-lasting neurotrophin-induced enhancement of 
synaptic transmission in the adult hippocampus, Science, 267, 1658-1662. 
Kang, H, Welcher, A.A., Shelton, D., & Schuman, E.M. (1997). Neurotrophins and time: 
different roles for TrkB signaling in hippocampal long-term potentiation. Neuron, 19, 
653-664. 
Kapp, B.S., Wilson, A., Pascoe, J.P., Supple, W, & Whalen, P.J. (1990). A 
neuroanatomical systems analysis of conditioned bradycardia in the rabbit. In M. Gabriel 
& J. Moore (Eds.), Learning and Computational Neuroscience: Foundations of Adaptive 
Networks, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp 53-90. 
Killcross, A.S., Everitt, B.J., & Robbins, T.W. (1997). Different types of fear-conditioned 
behaviour mediated by separate nuclei within amygdala. Nature, 388, 377-380.  
Kim, J.J., Clark, R.E., & Thompson, R.F. (1995). Hippocampectomy impairs the memory 
of recently, but not remotely, acquired trace eyeblink conditioned responses. Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 109, 195-203.  
Kimble, G.A, (1962).  Classical conditioning and the problem of awareness.  Journal of 
Personality, 30, 27-45. 
Kalmbach, B.E., Ohyama, T., Kreider, J.C., Riusech, F., & Mauk, M.D. (2009). 
Interactions between prefrontal cortex and cerebellum revealed by trace eyelid 
conditioning. Learning & Memory, 16, 86-95.  
Knipper, M., de Pehna Berzaghi, M., Blochl, A., Breer, H., Thoenen, H., & Lindholm, D. 
(1993). Positive feedback between acetylcholine and the neurotrophins nerve growth 
factor and brain-derived neurotrophic factor in rat hippocampus. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 6, 668-671.  
Kohara, K., Kitamura, A., Morishima, M., & Tsumoto, T. (2001). Activity-dependent 
transfer of brain-derived neurotrophins to postsynaptic neurons. Science, 291, 2419-2423. 
Kohonen, T. (1984). Self-organization and associative memory. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
  
155 
Kokaia, Z., Bengzon, J., Metsis, M., Kokaia, M., Persson, H., & Lindvall, O. (1993). 
Coexpression of neurotrophins and their receptors in neurons of the central nervous 
system. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 90, 6711-6715. 
Korte, M., Carroll, P., Wolf, E., Brem, G., Thoenen, H., & Bonhoffer, T. (1995). 
Hippocampal long-term potentiation is impaired in mice lacking brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 92, 8856-
8860.  
Koyama, R., & Ikegaya, Y. (2005). To BDNF or nor to BDNF: That is the epipelptic 
hippocampus. The Neuroscientist, 11, 282-287. 
Kraljic, T., & Samuel, A.G. (2006). Generalization in perceptual learning for speech. 
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 13, 262-268.  
Kraus, B. J., Robinson, R. J. II., White, J. A., Eichenbaum, H., & Hasselmo, M. E. 
(2013). Hippocampal “time cells”: Time vs. path integration. Neuron, 78, 1090-1101. 
Kronforst-Collins, M.A., & Disterhoft, J.F.  (1998). Lesions of the caudal area of rabbit 
medial prefrontal cortex impair trace eyeblink conditioning. Neurobiology of Learning 
and Memory, 69, 147-162.  
LeDoux, J.E. (1993). Emotional memory systems in the brain. Behavioural Brain 
Research, 58, 69-79. 
Lee, T., & Kim, J.J. (2004). Differential effects of cerebellar, amygdalar, and 
hippocampal lesions on classical eyeblink conditioning in rats. Journal of Neuroscience, 
24, 3242-3250. 
Lehmann, H., Treit, D., & Parent, M. (2000). Amygdala lesions do not impair shock-
probe avoidance retention performance. Behavioral Neuroscience, 114, 107-116. 
Lessmann, V. (1998). Neurotrophin-dependent modulation of glutamatergic synaptic 
transmission in the mammalian CNS. General Pharmacology, 31, 667-674.  
Li, H., Bandrowski, A.E., & Prince, D.A. (2005). Cortical injury affects short-term 
plasticity of evoked excitatory synaptic currents. Journal of Neurophysiology, 93, 146-
156. 
Liddle, P.F, (1994). Volition and schizophrenia. In A.S. David & J.C Cutting (Eds.), The 
Neuropsychology of Scizophrenia. Hillsdale: Erlbaum Press, pp 39-49. 
Little, A.H., Lipsitt, L.P., & Rovee-Collier, C. (1984). Classical conditioning and 
retention of the infant's eyelid response: Effects of age and interstimulus interval. Journal 
of Experimental Child Psychology, 37, 512-5 24. 
  
156 
Lleras, A., & von Mühlenen, A. (2004). Spatial context and top-down strategies in visual 
search. Spatial Vision, 17, 465-482. 
Llinas, R., Ribary, U., Joliot, M., & Wang, X.T. (1994). Content and context in temporal 
thalamocortical binding. In G. Buzsáki, R. Llinas, W. Singer, A. Berthoz, & Y. Christen 
(Eds.), Temporal Coding in the Brain (pp. 251-272). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Louie, K., & Wilson, M.A. (2001). Temporally structured replay of awake hippocampal 
ensemble activity during rapid eye movement sleep. Neuron, 29, 145-156.  
Macchi, G., & Rinvik, E. (1976). Thalmo-telencephalic circuits: A neuroanatomical 
survey. In A. Rémond (Ed.). Handbook of Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology (Vol. 2, Pt. A). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
MacDonald, C. J., Lepage, K. Q., Eden, U. T., & Eichenbaum, H. (2011).  Hippocampal 
“time cells” bridge the gap in memory for discontiguous events. Neuron, 71, 737-749. 
Manns, J.R., Clark, R.E., & Squire, L.R. (2000). Parallel acquisition of awareness and 
trace eyeblink classical conditioning. Learning & Memory, 7, 267-272.  
Manns, J.R., Clark, R.E., & Squire, L.R. (2001). Single-cue delay eyeblink conditioning 
is unrelated to awareness. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 1, 192-198. 
Maquet, P., Laureys, S., Peigneux, P., Fuchs, S., Petiau, C., Phillips, C., Aerts, J., Del 
Fiore, G., Degueldre, C., Meulemans, T., Luxen, A., Franck, G., Van Der Linden, M., 
Smith, C., & Cleeremans, A. (2000). Experience dependent changes in cerebral activation 
during human REM sleep. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 831-836. 
Mauk, M.D., & Ruiz, B.P. (1992). Learning-dependent timing of Pavolian eyelid 
responses: Differential conditioning using multiple interstimulus intervals. Behavioral 
Neuorscience, 106, 666-681.  
Mauk, M.D., & Thompson, R.F. 1987. Retention of classically conditioned eyelid 
responses following acute decerebration. Brain Research, 403, 89–95. 
McAllister, W.R., & McAllister, D.E. (1958). Effect of knowledge of conditioning upon 
eyelid conditioning.  Journal of Experimental Psychology, 25, 579-583.  
McClelland, J.L., McNaughton, B.L., & O’Reilly, R.C. (1995). Why there are 
complementary learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex: Insights from the 
successes and failures of connectionist models of learning and memory. Psychological 
Review, 102, 419-457. 
  
157 
McEchron, M.D., & Disterhoft, J.F. (1997). Sequence of single neuron changes in CA1 
hippocampus of rabbits during acquisition of trace eyeblink conditioned responses. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 78, 1030-1044. 
McGaugh, J.L. (2000). Memory- a century of consolidation. Science, 287, 248-251. 
McGaugh, J.L. (2002). Memory consolidation and the amygdala: A systems perspective. 
Trends in Neurosciences, 25, 456-461. 
McGlinchey-Berroth, R., Brawn, C., & Disterhoft J.F. (1999). Temporal discrimination 
learning in severe amnesic patients reveals an alteration in the timing of eyeblink 
conditioned responses. Behavioral Neuroscience, 113, 10-18. 
McGlinchey-Berroth, R., Carrillo, M.C., Gabrieli, J.D., Brawn, C.M. & Disterhoft, J.F. 
(1997). Impaired trace eyeblink conditioning in bilateral, medial-temporal lobe amnesia. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 111, 873-882.  
McLaughlin J., Skaggs H., Churchwell, J., & Powell, D.A. (2002). Medial prefrontal 
cortex and Pavlovian conditioning: Trace versus delay conditioning. Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 116, 37-47. 
Medina, J.F., Repa, J.C, Mauk, M.D. & LeDoux, J.E. (2002). Parallels between 
cerebellum-and amygdala-dependent conditioning. Neuroscience, 3, 122-313.  
Mehta, M.R. (2007). Cortico-hippocampal interaction during up-down states and 
memory consolidation. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 13-15.  
 
Meyers, E. M., Freedman, D. J., Kreiman, G., Miller, E. K., & Poggio, T. (2008). Dynamic 
population coding of category information in inferior temporal and prefrontal 
cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 100, 1407-1419.  
 
Mhatre, H., Gorchetchnikov, A., and Grossberg, S. (2012). Grid cell hexagonal patterns 
formed by fast self-organized learning within entorhinal cortex. Hippocampus, 22, 320-
334. 
 
Mishkin, M. (1982). A memory system in the monkey. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London. B: Biological Sciences, 298, 85-95. 
Mishkin, M. (1993). Cerebral memory circuits. In T.A. Poggio & D.A. Glaser DA (Eds.), 
Exploring Brain Functions: Models in Neuroscience. New York:Wiley & Sons, pp. 113-
125.  
Mishkin, M., & Aggleton, J. (1981). Multiple functional contributions of the amygdala in 
the monkey. In Y. Ben-Ari (Ed.), The Amygdaloid Complex, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp 
409- 420. 
  
158 
Mishkin, M., Ungerleider, L.G., & Macko, K.A. (1983). Object vision and spatial vision: 
Two cortical pathways. Trends in Neurosciences, 6, 414-417. 
Molteni, R., Wu, A., Vaynman, S., Ying, Z., Barnard, R.J., & Gomez-Pinilla, F. (2004). 
Exercise reverses the harmful effects of consumption of a high-fat diet on synaptic and 
behavioral plasticity associated to the action of brain-derived neurotrophic factor. 
Neuroscience, 123, 429-440. 
Monteggia, L.M., Barrett, M., Powell, C.M., Berton, O., Galanis, V., Gemelli, T., Meuth, 
S., Nagy, A., Greene, R.W., & Nestler, E.J. (2004). Essential role of brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor in adult hippocampal function. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences USA, 101, 10827–10832. 
Moustafa, A.A., Wufong, E., Servatius, R.J., Pang, K.C., Gluck, M.A., & Myers, C.E. 
(2013). Why trace and delay conditioning are sometimes (but not always) hippocampal 
dependent: a computational model. Brain Research, 1493, 48-67. 
Moyer, J.R., Jr., R.A. Deyo, R.A., & Disterhoft, J.F. (1990). Hippocampectomy disrupts 
trace eye-blink conditioning in rabbits. Behavioral Neuroscience, 104, 243-252. 
Murray, E. A., & Richmond, E. J. (2001). Role of perirhinal cortex in object perception, 
memory, and associations. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 2, 188-193. 
Nádasdy, Z., Hirase, H., Czurkó, A., Csicsvari, J., & Buzsáki, G. (1999). Replay and time 
compression of recurring spike sequences in the hippocampus. Journal of Neuroscience, 
19, 9497-9507. 
Nadel, L., & Bohbot, V. (2001). Consolidation of memory. Hippocampus, 11, 56-60. 
Nadel, L., & Moscovitch, M. (1997). Memory consolidation, retrograde amnesia and the 
hippocampal complex. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 7, 217-227. 
Neufeld, M., & Mintz, M. (2001). Involvement of the amygdala in classical conditioning 
of eyeblink in response in rat. Brain Research, 889, 112-117.  
Norman, R.J., Villablanca, J.R., Brown, K.A., Schwafel, J.A., & Buchwald, J.S. (1974).  
Classical eyeblink conditioning in the bilaterally hemispherectomized cat. Experimental 
Neurology, 44, 363-380. 
Nowak, A.J., & Berger, T.W. (1992). Functional three-dimensional distribution of 
entorhinal projections to dentate granule cells of the in vivo rabbit hippocampus. Society 
for Neuroscience Abstracts, 18, 321. 
Oakley, D.A., & Steele Russell, I. (1972). Neocortical lesions and Pavlovian 
conditioning. Physiology & Behavior, 8, 915-926. 
  
159 
Olson, I. R., & Chun, M. M. (2002). Perceptual constraints on implicit learning of spatial 
context. Visual Cognition, 9, 273-302. 
Olson, S., & Grossberg, S. (1998). A neural network model for the development of 
simple and complex cell receptive fields within cortical maps of orientation and ocular 
dominance. Neural Networks, 11, 189-208.  
O'Reilly, J.X., Beckmann, C.F., Tomassini, V., Ramnani, N., Johansen-Berg, H. (2010). 
Distinct and Overlapping Functional Zones in the Cerebellum Defined by Resting State 
Functional Connectivity. Cerebral Cortex, 20, 953-965. 
O'Reilly, R.C., & Rudy, J.W. (2000). Computational principles of learning in the 
neocortex and hippocampus. Hippocampus, 10, 389-397. 
Orr, W.B., & Berger, T.W. (1985). Hippocampectomy disrupts the topography of 
conditioned nictitating membrane responses during reversal learning. Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 99, 35-45. 
Oswald. B.B., Maddox, S.A., Tisdale, N. & Powell, D.A. (2010). Encoding and retrieval 
are differentially processed by the anterior cingulate and prelimbic cortices: A study 
based on trace eyeblink conditioning in the rabbit. Neurobiology of Learning and 
Memory, 93, 37-45.  
Otto, T., & Eichenbaum, H. (1992). Neuronal activity in the hippocampus during delayed 
non-match to sample performance in rats: Evidence for hippocampal processing in 
recognition memory. Hippocampus, 2, 323-334. 
Page, M.P.A. (2000) Connectionist modelling in psychology: a localist manifesto.  
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 443-467. 
Palma, J., Versace, M., & Grossberg, S. (2012a). After-hyperpolarization currents and 
acetylcholine control sigmoid transfer functions in a spiking cortical model. Journal of 
Computational Neuroscience, 32, 253-280.  
Palma, J., Grossberg, S., & Versace, M. (2012b). Persistence and storage of activity 
patterns in spiking recurrent cortical networks: Modulation of sigmoid signals by after-
hyperpolarization currents and acetylcholine. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience, 
6:42. Doi: 10.3389.fncom.2012.00042.  
Papka, M., Ivry, R., & Woodruff-Pak, D.S. (1997). Eyeblink classical conditioning and 
awareness revisited. American Psychological Society, 8, 404-408. 
Passingham, R.E. (1997). The Frontal Lobes and Voluntary Action. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
  
160 
Pavlov, I.P. (1927). Conditioned reflexes. London: Constable and Company. (Reprinted 
by Dover Publications, 1960.) 
Pessoa, L., Japee, S., & Ungerleider, L.G. (2000). Visual awareness and the detection of 
fearful faces. Emotion, 5, 243-247.  
Pessoa, L., Padmala, S., & Morland, T. (2005). Fate of unattended fearful faces in the 
amygdala is determined by both attentional resources and cognitive modulation. 
NeuroImage, 28, 249-255. 
Phillips, H.S., Hains, J.M., Laramee, G.R., Rosenthal, A., & Winslow, J.W.  (1990). 
Widespread expression of BDNF but not NT3 by target areas of basal forebrain 
cholinergic neurons. Science, 250, 290-294.  
Pilly, P.K., & Grossberg, S. (2012). How do spatial learning and memory occur in the 
brain? Coordinated learning of entorhinal grid cells and hippocampal place cells. Journal 
of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24, 1031-1054. 
Pollen, D. A. (1999). On the neural correlates of visual perception. Cerebral Cortex, 9, 4-
19.  
Port, R.L., Mikhail, A.A., Patterson, M.M. (1985). Differential effects of 
hippocampectomy on classically conditioned rabbit nictitating membrane response 
related to interstimulus interval. Behavioral Neuroscicience, 99, 200-208. 
Port, R.L., Romano, A.G., Steinmetz, J.E., Mikhail, A.A., & Patterson, M.M. (1986). 
Retention and acquisition of classical trace conditioned responses by rabbits with 
hippocampal lesions. Behavioral Neuroscience, 100, 745-752. 
Post, R.M. (2007). Role of BDNF in bipolar and unipolar disorder: Clinical and 
theoretical implications. Journal of Psychiatry Research, 41, 979-990. 
Powell, D.A., & Churchwell, J. (2002). Mediodorsal thalamic lesions impair trace 
eyeblink conditioning in the rabbit. Learning & Memory, 9, 10-17.  
Powell, D.A., Skaggs, H., Churchwell, J., & McLauglin, J. (2001). Posttraining lesions of 
the medial prefrontal cortex impair performance of Pavlovian eyeblink conditioning but 
have no effect on concomitant heart rate changes in rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus). 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 115, 1029-1038. 
Purves, D. (1988). Body and brain: A trophic theory of neural connections. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Qin, Y.L., McNaughton, B.L., Skaggs, W.E., & Barnes, C.A. (1997). Memory 
reprocessing in corticocortical and hippocampalcortical neuronal ensembles. 
  
161 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B: Biological Sciences, 352, 
1525-1533.  
Raizada, R.D.S., & Grossberg, S. (2003). Towards a theory of the laminar architecture of 
cerebral cortex: Computational clues from the visual system. Cerebral Cortex, 13, 100-
113.  
Rattiner, L.M., Davis, M., & Ressler, K.J. (2005), Brain-derived neurotrophic factor in 
amygdala-dependent learning. The Neuroscientist, 11, 323-333.  
 
Rolls, E.T. (1998). The orbitofrontal cortex. In A.C. Roberts, T.W. Robbins, & L. 
Weiskrantz, (Eds.), The Prefrontal Cortex: Executive and Cognitive Functions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp 67-86.  
Rolls, E.T. (2000). The orbitofrontal cortex and reward. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 284-294. 
Rossato, J.I, Bevilaqua, L.R.M., Izquierdo, I, Medina, J.H. & Cammarota, M. (2009). 
Dopamine controls persistence of long-term memory storage. Science, 325, 1017-1020. 
Sakurai, Y. (1990). Hippocampal cells have behavioral correlates during the performance 
of an auditory working memory task in the rat. Behavioral Neuroscience, 104, 253-263.  
Schinder, A.F., Berninger, B., & Poo, M-m. (2000). Postsynaptic specificity of 
neurotrophin-induced presynaptic potentiation. Neuron, 25, 151-163. 
Schmajuk, N.A., Lam, P., & Christiansen, B.A. (1994).  Hippocamectomy disrupts latent 
inhibition of the rat eyeblink conditioning. Physiology and Behavior, 55, 597-601. 
Schmaltz, L.W., & Theios, J. (1972). Acquisition and extinction of a classically 
conditioned response in hippocampectomized rabbits. Journal of Comparative 
Physiological Psychology, 79, 328-333. 
Schoenbaum, G., & Eichenbaum, H. (1995). Information coding in the rodent prefrontal 
cortex: II. Ensemble activity in orbitofrontal cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 74, 
751-762.  
Schoenbaum, G., Setlow, B., Saddoris, M.P., & Gallagher, M. (2003). Encoding 
predicted outcome and acquired value in orbitofrontal cortex during cue sampling 
depends upon input from basolateral amygdala. Neuron, 39, 855-867. 
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 80, 1-27. 
  
162 
Schultz, W., Apicelli, P., Scarnati, E., & Ljungberg, T. (1992). Neuronal activity in 
monkey ventral striatum related to the expectation of reward. Journal of Neuroscience, 
12, 4595-4610. 
Schuman, E.M. (1999). Neurotrophin regulation of synaptic transmission. Current 
Opinion in Neurobiology, 9, 105-109.  
Sears, L.L., & Steinmetz, J.E. (1990). Acquisition of classically conditioned-related 
activity in the hippocampus is affected by lesions of the cerebellar interpositus nucleus. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 104, 681-92. 
Sherman, S.M., & Guillery, R.W. (2003). The role of thalamus in the flow of information 
to cortex. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B: Biological 
Sciences, 357, 1695-1708. 
Shors, T.J, Weiss, C., & Thompson, R.F. (1992). Stress-induced facilitation of classical 
conditioning. Science, 257, 537-539. 
Siapas, A.G., Lubenov E.V., & Wilson M.A. (2005). Prefrontal phase locking to 
hippocampal theta oscillations. Neuron, 46, 141-151.  
Siegel, J.J., Kalmback, B., Chitwood, R.A., & Mauk, M.D. (2012). Persistent activity in a 
cortical-to-subcortical circuit: bridging the temporal gap in trace eyelid conditioning.  
Journal of Neurophysiology, 107, 50-64.  
Siegel J.J., Taylor W., Gray R., Kalmbach B., Zemelman B.V., Desai N.S., Johnston D., 
& Chitwood, R.A. (2015). Trace Eyeblink Conditioning in Mice Is Dependent upon the 
Dorsal Medial Prefrontal Cortex, Cerebellum, and Amygdala: Behavioral 
Characterization and Functional Circuitry (1,2,3). Eneuro. 2. PMID 26464998 DOI: 
10.1523/ENEURO.0051-14.2015.  
Sillito, A.M., Jones, H.E., Gerstein, G.L., & West, D.C. (1994). Feature-linked 
synchronization of thalamic relay cell firing induced by feedback from the visual cortex. 
Nature, 369, 479-482.  
Silver, M.R., Grossberg, S., Bullock, D., Histed, M.H., & Miller, E.K. (2011). A neural 
model of sequential movement planning and control of eye movements: Item-order-rank 
working memory and saccade selection by the supplementary eye fields. Neural 
Networks, 26, 29-58.  
Simon, B., Knuckley, B., Churchwell, J., & Powell, D.A. (2005). Post-training lesions of 
the medial prefrontal cortex interfere with subsequent performance of trace eyeblink 
conditioning. Journal of Neuroscience, 25, 10740-10746. 
Singer, W. (1999). Time as coding space. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 9,189-194. 
  
163 
Sireteanu, R., & Rettenbach, R. (1995). Perceptual learning in visual search: Fast, 
enduring, but non-specific. Vision Research, 35, 2037-2043. 
Skaggs, W.E., & McNaughton, B.L. (1996). Replay of neuronal firing sequences in rat 
hippocampus during sleep following spatial experience. Science, 271, 1870-1873. 
Smith, M.C. (1968). CS-US interval and US intensity in classical conditioning of the 
rabbit’s nictitating membrane response. Journal of Comparative and Physiological 
Psychology, 66, 679-687. 
Smythe, J.W., Colom, L.V., & Bland, B.H. (1992). The extrinsic modulation of 
hippocampal theta depends on the coactivation of cholinergic and GABA-ergic medial 
septal inputs. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 16, 289-308. 
Solomon, P.R., & Moore, J.W. (1975). Latent inhibition and stimulus generalization of 
the classically conditioned membrane response in rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus) 
following dorsal hippocampal ablation.  Journal of Comparative Physiological 
Psychology, 89, 1192-1203. 
Solomon, P.R., Groccia-Ellison, M., Levine, E., Blanchard, S., & Pendlebury, W.W. 
(1990).  Do temporal relationships in conditioning change across the life span? 
Perspectives from eyeblink conditioning in humans and rabbits.  Annals of the New York 
Academy of Science, 608, 212-238.  
Sosina, V.D. (1992). The EEG analysis of the interrelationships of structures of the 
thalamofrontal system during the recovery of conditioned reflex behavior of 
amygdalectomized rats. Institute of Higher Nervous Activity and Neurophysiology, 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Translated by I.P. Pavlova from Zhurnal 
Vysshei Nervnoi Deyatel’nosti imeni, 42, 672-678. Plenum Publishing Corporation, 0097-
0549/93/2305-0398, pp. 398-403. 
Squire, L.R., & Alverez P. (1995). Retrograde amnesia and memory consolidation: a 
neurobiological perspective. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 5, 178-183.  
Squire, L.R., & Cohen, N.J. (1984). Human memory and amnesia. In G. Lynch, J. 
McGaugh, & N.M. Weinberger (Eds.), Neurobiology of Learning and Memory. New 
York: Guilford Press, pp. 3-64.  
Stanley, D.A., & Rubin, N. (2005). Rapid detection of salient regions: Evidence from 
apparent motion. Journal of Vision, 5, 690-701. 
Staubli, U., & Lynch, G. (1987). Stable hippocampal long-term potentiation elicited by 
theta pattern stimulation. Brain Research, 435, 227-234. 
  
164 
Steriade, M. (1999). Coherent oscillations and short-term plasticity in corticothalamic 
networks. Trends in Neuroscience, 22, 337-345.  
Takashima, A., Nieuwenhuis, I.L.C., Jensen, O., Talamini, L.M., Rijpkema, M., and 
Guillén Fernández, G. (2009). Shift from Hippocampal to Neocortical Centered Retrieval 
Network with Consolidation. Journal of Neuroscience, 29, 10087-10093.  
Takehara, K., Kawahara, S., & Krino, Y. (2003). Time-dependent reorganization of the 
brain components underlying memory retention in trace eyeblink conditioning. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 23, 9897-9905. 
Thoenen, H. (1995). Neurotrophins and neural plasticity. Science, 270, 593-598.  
Thompson, R.F. (1988). The neural basis of basic associative learning of discrete 
behavioral responses. Trends in Neurosciences, 11, 152-155. 
Thompson, R.F., Clark, G.A., Donegan, N.H., Lavond, G.A., Lincoln, D.G., Maddon, J., 
Mamounas, L.A., Mauk, M.D., & McCormick, D.A. (1987). Neuronal substrates of 
discrete, defensive conditioned reflexes, conditioned fear states, and their interactions in 
the rabbit. In I. Gormenzano, W.F. Prokasy & R.F. Thompson (Eds.), Classical 
Conditioning, Third Edition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, pp 371-399. 
Thompson, L.T., Moyer Jr., J.R., & Disterhoft, J.F. (1996). Transient changes in 
excitability of rabbit CA3 neurons with a time course appropriate to support memory 
consolidation. Journal of Neurophysiology, 76, 1836-1849. 
Tieu, K.H., Keidel, A.L., McGann, J.P., Faulkner, B., & Brown, T.H. (1999). Perirhinal-
amygdala circuit-level computational model of temporal encoding in fear conditioning. 
Psychobiology, 27, 1-25.  
Tokuoka, H., Saito, T., Yorifugi, H., Kishimoto, T., & Hisanaga, S. (2000). Brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor-induced phosphorylation of neurofilament-H subunit in primary 
cultures of embryo rat cortical neurons. Journal of Cell Science, 113, 1059-1068. 
Tse, D., Langston, R.F., Kakeyama, M., Bethus, I., Spooner, P.A., Wood, E.R., Witter, 
M.P., & Morris, R.G. (2007). Schemas and memory consolidation. Science, 6, 76-82. 
Tsumoto, T., Creutzfeldt, O.D., & Legéndy, C.F. (1978). Functional organization of the 
corticofugal system from visual cortex to lateral geniculate nucleus in the cat. 
Experimental Brain Research, 32, 345-364. 
Tucker, K.L., Meyer. M., & Barde, Y.A. (2001). Neurotrophins are required for nerve 
growth during development. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 29-37. 
  
165 
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In Organization of Memory. E. 
Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.). New York, NY: Academic press. 
Tyler, W.J., Alonso, M., Bramham, C.R., & Pozzo-Miller, L.D. (2002). From acquisition 
to consolidation: On the role of brain-derived neurotrophic factor signaling in 
hippocampal-dependent learning. Learning & Memory, 9, 224-237.  
Ungerleider, L.G., & Mishkin, M. (1982). Two cortical visual systems: Separation of 
appearance and location of objects. In D.L. Ingle, M.A. Goodale and R.J.W. Mansfield 
(Eds.) Analysis of Visual Behavior, Cambridge: MIT Press, 549-586. 
Van Essen, D.C., & Maunsell, J.H.R. (1983). Hierarchical organization and functional 
streams in the visual cortex. Trends in Neurosciences, 6, 370-375.  
van Ooyen, A., & Willshaw, D.J. (1999). Competition for neurotrophic factor in the 
development of nerve connections. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. B: 
Biological Sciences, 266, 883-892. 
Vazdarjanova, A., & McGaugh, J.L. (1998). Basolateral amygdala is not a critical locus 
for memory of contextual fear conditioning. Proceeding of the National Academy of 
Science. U.S.A., 95, 15003-15007. 
Vertes, R.P, Hoover, W.B., & Di Prisco, G.V. (2004). Theta rhythm of the hippocampus: 
Subcortical control and functional significance. Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience 
Reviews, 3, 173-200. 
Vinogradova, O.S. (1975). Functional organization of the limbic system in the process of 
registration of information: facts and hypotheses. In R.C. Isaacson and K.H. Pribram 
(Eds.), The Hippocampus: Volume 2: Neurophysiology and behavior. New York: Plenum 
Press, pp 3-70. 
Wagman, J.B., Shockley, K., Reley, M.A., & Tervey, M.T. (2001). Attunement, 
calibration and exploration in fast haptic perceptual learning. Journal of Motor Behavior, 
33, 323-327. 
Walker, A.G., & Steinmetz, J.E (2008). Hippocampal lesions in rats differentially affect 
long- and short-trace eyeblink conditioning. Physiology & Behavior, 93, 570-578. 
Weible, A.P., McEchron, M.D., & Disterhoft, J.F.  (2000). Cortical involvement in 
acquisition and extinction of trace eyeblink conditioning.  Behavioral Neuroscience, 114, 
1058-1067. 
Weiskrantz, L., & Warrington, E. K. (1979). Conditioning in amnesic patients. 
Neuropsychologia, 17, 187-194. 
  
166 
Weiss, C., & Disterhoft, J. F. (2011). Exploring Prefrontal Cortical Memory Mechanisms 
with Eyeblink Conditioning.  Behavioral Neuroscience, 114, 318-326. 
Weiss, C., & Thompson, R. F. (1991a). The effects of age on eyeblink conditioning in the 
freely moving rat: Optimizing the conditioning parameters. Behavioral Neuroscience, 
113, 1100-1105. 
Weiss, C., & Thompson, R.F. (1991b).  Trace eyeblink conditioning in the freely moving 
Fischer-344 rat.  Neurobiology of Aging, 12, 249-254. 
Wilson, F.A.W., Scalaidhem, O., & Goldman-Rakic, P.S. (1993). Dissociation of object 
and spatial processing domains in primate prefrontal cortex. Science, 260, 1955-1958.  
Wilson, M. A. (2002). Hippocampal memory formation, plasticity, and the role of sleep. 
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 78, 565-569. 
Wilson, M.A., & McNaughton, B.L. (1994). Reactivation of hippocampal ensemble 
memories during sleep. Science, 265, 676-679. 
Winocur, G., Moscovitch, M., & Bontempi, B. (2010). Memory formation and long-term 
retention in humans and animals: Convergence towards a transformation account of 
hippocampal–neocortical interactions. Neuropsycologia, 48, 2339-2356. 
Woodruff-Pak, D.S. (1993). Classical eye-blink conditioning in H.M.: Delay and trace 
paradigms. Behavioral Neuroscience, 107, 911-925. 
Woodruff-Pak, D.S. (2001). Eyeblink classical conditioning differentiates normal aging 
from Alzheimer's disease. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science, 36, 87-108. 
Woodruff-Pak, D. S., & Disterhoft, J. F.  (2007). Where is the trace in trace conditioning? 
Trends in Neurosciences, 31, 105-112. 
Woodruff-Pak, D. S., & Steinmetz, J. E. (Eds.) (2000a). Eyeblink classical conditioning: 
Volume I: Applications in humans. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Woodruff-Pak, D. S., & Steinmetz, J. E. (Eds.) (2000b). Eyeblink classical conditioning: 
Volume II: Animal models. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Yazdanbakhsh, A., & Grossberg, S. (2004). Fast synchronization of perceptual grouping 
in laminar visual cortical circuits. Neural Networks, 17, 707-718. 
Yeo, C.H., Hardiman, M.J., Moore, J.W., & Steele Russell,. I. (1984). Trace conditioning 
of the nictitating membrane response in decorticate rabbits. Behavioural Brain Research, 
11, 85-88. 
  
167 
Zang, H.T., Li, L.Y, Zou, X.L., Song, X.B., Hu, Y.L., Feng, Z.T., & Wang, T.T.H., 
(2007). Immunohistological distribution of NGF, BDNF, NT-3, and NT-4 in adult rhesus 
monkey brains. Journal of Histochemistry and Cytochemistry, 55, 1-19. 
  
168 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Daniel J. Franklin  
20 Puritan Park Swampscott, MA 01907 
Home: 781-598-4487 Mobile: 617-388-5989 E-mail: d.j.franklin@live.com 
linkedin.com/pub/dan-franklin/13/a87/b9 
 
INTERESTS: Neural network models of perception, cognition, emotion and action.  
Data mining with neural networks.  Application of neuroscience to education and 
business.  
 
EDUCATION 
Boston University, Boston, MA: PhD (Cognitive & Neural Systems).  
Boston University, Boston, MA: MBA (Statistics and Organizational Design).  
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: MTS (History of Religion and Public Education).   
Member: Committee on Academic Policy; Admissions Committee. 
Williams College, Williamstown, MA: BA (Comparative Religion).  
 
PROFESSIONAL 
SOCIETIES 
American Statistical Association 
American Educational Research Association 
Learning & Brain Society 
International Mind, Brain & Education Society 
International Neural Network Society  
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics 
Project Management Institute  
Society for Neuroscience 
 
TEACHING  
EXPERIENCE 
 
Aug 2016 – present  Director of Mathematics, Everett Public Schools. Everett, MA. 
Direct, supervise, and coordinate the math curriculum, instruction 
and assessment for 7,000+ urban students by data-driven teacher 
support and evaluation, research-based professional development, 
and program assessment and improvement. 
 
Jan 2004 – present  Adjunct Faculty North Shore Community College, Danvers, MA 
Courses: Introduction to Statistics; Mathematics for Elementary 
School Teachers. 
  
Jun 2006 – Jul 2009 Director, Boston University Boston, MA. NSF Summer 
Workshops for Teacher Professional Development 
  
169 
 
Sep 2002 – May 2005 Teacher, Massachusetts Public Schools: Marblehead (2004-2005) 
High School Mathematics. Advisor, Science Team. Revere (2002-
2004) Middle School and High School Math. 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS  
Valedictorian, Revere High School, 1970 
Phi Beta Kappa, Williams College, 1973 
Boston University Deans Award, 2008, 2009 
Research supported in part by CELEST, an NSF Science of Learning Center 
(NSF SBE-0354378). 
 
SKILLS 
Management by Continuous Process Improvement 
Leadership through positive employee and organizational development; 
Collaborative innovation using data with Scrum/Agile management; Strategic 
planning, application portfolio management, and program oversight; Tactical 
project management, problem resolution, and risk management; Financial control 
and cost/benefit analysis; operations and development trade-offs; Design and 
implement metrics for delivery and performance of products/services; 
Benchmark, gap-analysis, and recommended action plans across diverse groups; 
Rollout new processes, technologies and business applications at multiple sites; 
Design and delivery of reusable software components; Design/deliver corporate 
training for programmers, and business management; Contract negotiation, 
vendor management, grant management 
 
Technical 
 Mainframe and client server application development and testing software 
 SAS, MatLab, Predict (Neural Networks), Tableau 
 ExamView, Angel, Blackboard, SCORM, Tin Can 
 FileMaker Pro, Turning Technologies Audience Response Systems 
 MS Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Access, Project), Adobe CS4, SharePoint, 
Google tools, WebEx, Skype 
 
PRESENTATIONS 
 
Franklin, D.J. (2012). Games and activities based on whole-brain learning. National 
Council of Teachers of Matheamtics (NCTM) Regional Meetings: Dallas, Hartford, and 
Chicago. October and November. 
 
Franklin, D.J. (2011). The whole-Brain approach to mathematics learning for children. 
National Council of Teachers of Matheamtics (NCTM) Regional Meetings: Albaquerque, 
Atlantic City, and St. Louis. October and November. 
  
170 
 
Franklin, D.J. (2011). The whole-brain approach to curriculum and pedagogy. Workshop. 
Annual Title I Conference. Marlborough, MA. March.  
 
Franklin, D.J. (2009). Learning statistics through models of mind and brain. Workshop. 
35th Annual Meeting of the New England Mathematical Association of Two Year 
Colleges. Southern New Hampshire University, Manchester, NH. April.  
 
Franklin, D.J. (2009). Learning mathematics and science using models of mind and brain. 
Poster. Intensive Immersion Institute Conference in Mathematics and Science. Lowell, 
MA. March. 
 
Franklin, D.J. (2009). Neural network modeling: Seeing principles and methods through 
models of vision. Second Annual iSLC Student/Postdoctoral Fellow Conference. 
Workshop. Seattle, Washington. February. 
 
Franklin, D.J. (2007). Curriculum content and pedagogy based on models of mind and 
brain. International Mind, Brain, and Education Society (IMBES). Fort Worth, Texas, 
November.  
 
Franklin, D.J., & Grossberg, S. (2005). A neural model of normal and amnesic learning 
and memory: Conditioning, adaptive timing, neurotrophins, and hippocampus. First 
Annual Conference on Computational Cognitive Neuroscience (CCN), Washington DC. 
November. 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Franklin, D.J. (2012). The Way of the Game: A Case Study in the Use of Adaptive 
Interaction Design for Early Mathematics Online Curriculum. Proceedings of the London 
International Conference on Education (LICE-2012), Curriculum, Research and 
Development, 209-212.  London, UK. 
 
Franklin, D.J. (2008). Interactive Curriculum Based on Models of Mind & Brain. Brains, 
Minds, and Media, Vol.3, bmm1418, in: Lorenz S, and Egelhaaf M (Eds.): Interactive 
Educational Media for the Neural and Cognitive Sciences. Brains, Minds & Media. 
 
Franklin, D.J. (2007). NSF Task Force on Educational Neuroscience. Invited participant. 
Arlington, Virginia. December.  Results published in published in K. W. Fischer, U. 
Goswami and J. Geake (2010) The Future of Educational Neuroscience, Mind, Brain and 
Education, 4, 68-80. 
 
Franklin, D.J. and Grossberg, S. (2008). Cognitive-emotional learning by neocortex, 
amygdala, and hippocampus: Timing, neurotrophins, amnesia, and consciousness. In 
  
171 
Proceedings of the twelfth international conference on cognitive and neural systems 
(ICCNS), Boston University, May. 
 
 
OTHER ACTIVITIES 
 
Educational Publishing & Technology  2005-present 
 
Team Franklin Consulting, LLC, Swampscott, MA (2015-present). Consultant. 
Provide design, editorial, technology, and management support to various projects.  Team 
Franklin is dedicated to developing high quality business and educational materials for 
students and professionals. We provide services for print and digital curricula including 
innovative games that support learning. Clients: Learning One to One Foundation; 
LearningMate Solutions. 
 
Pearson Education, Boston, MA. (2013-2015) Editorial Director of Secondary 
Mathematics Product Development. Design, develop, and deliver multi-media 
secondary mathematics learning solutions to satisfied customers for deployment in print 
and on multiple digital devices via cloud. Coordinate plans with internal and external 
groups for visual and learning design, technology, production, materials management, 
data analytics, and research. Support Agile development based on data from formal 
prototype testing, mock classroom, field-test, and efficacy research. Structure interactive 
learning tasks based on research in neuroscience, computer science, mathematics 
education, and gaming. Design implementation and field-test of next generation 
assessment and adaptive learning support modules; support data analytics and algorithm 
testing. Worked with Global Curricula Standards and Scales Project team on international 
standards alignments and development asset reuse. 
 
Six Red Marbles, Charlestown, MA. (2009-2013) Executive Director of Curriculum 
and Learning. Design, develop, and deliver scalable, award-winning, digital curriculum 
to meet state and national standards for K-12 mathematics. Interactive games included 
those for learning early mathematics, statistics and probability, and STEM (computer 
science). Design user interfaces and structure learning tasks based on research in 
neuroscience, computer science, mathematics education, and gaming. Develop authoring 
tool with automatic alerts to develop and test 200 competency-based, on-line courses for 
higher education and professional development in various disciplines on LMS. Manage 
local/remote internal/freelance staff. Provide leadership and hands-on support for 
instructional design, writing, editorial, development, and management on multiple digital 
and print projects on behalf of various clients. Prepare bids, grants, and patents. 
 
Boston University, Boston MA. (2005-2009) Director of Curriculum Development, 
Center for Excellence in Education, Science and Technology, a National Science 
Foundation Science of Learning Center.  Lead teams of graduate students and faculty 
to develop K-16 inquiry-based print and software materials to study models of mind, 
  
172 
brain and behavior within mainstream science and mathematics curricula. Incorporate 
research findings in mathematics education and gaming. Ensure compliance with content 
and process standards set by various professional and government agencies.  Design and 
deliver curriculum development workshops to teachers at all levels; conduct content and 
program research to improve product. Grant preparation and project reporting.  
 
Business     
 
Fidelity Investments, Boston, MA                 1984-2001   
  
 Vice President, Workflow Systems, Fidelity Investments Systems Company 
 Vice President of Development, Fidelity Investments & Brokerage Group 
 Vice President, Software Engineering Technology, Fidelity Systems Company 
 Manager & Director, Development Center, Fidelity Systems Company                    
 Sr. Programmer/Analyst, Software Development Company             
 Programmer/Analyst, Fidelity Retail Systems 
 
Professional Development 
 
Mathematics Education, Teaching, Research 
 Web Intelligence and Big Data (Gautam Sroff, TCS Innovation Labs, Dehli).  
 Mathematical Thinking (Keith Devlin, Stanford University). 
 Innovation By Design, Workshop, Cambridge. 
 Responsible Conduct of Research Program/Boston University 
 Leadership Program in Discrete Mathematics, Tufts/Rutgers 
 Improving Mathematics Instruction (Institute of Teaching/Learning Mathematics)  
 Linear Equations and Their Foundations, EduTron 
 Research for Better Teaching 
 Several courses at various area schools in mathematics and computer science. 
 
Certifications 
 Massachusetts Educator Licensure #228127: Primary Field: Secondary Mathematics; 
Supervisor/Director, Secondary Mathematics 
 Project Management Professional 
 
 
